THE DEFINITION OF THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE – the right of an individual (elector) to vote – is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government.
It was therefore incumbent on the Convention to define and establish this right in the Constitution.
The Qualification of Voters Is Determined by Existing State Rules
The Convention decided the qualifications of electors are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” Art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
To have left the qualification of electors open for the occasional regulation of Congress or the legislative discretion of the States would have been improper due to the importance of the right.
Delegating qualifications to State legislatures also would have rendered the House of Representatives too dependent on state officials. The composition of the House of Representatives ought to be dependent on the People alone.
Any attempt to reduce to one uniform rule the different qualifications to vote in the different States would have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the Convention. The provision the Convention chose was the best option.
The rule the Convention established must be satisfactory to every State because it conforms to the standard already enacted (or may be enacted) by the State itself.
It will be safe to the United States because – being fixed by the State constitutions – it is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the People of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution.
Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the Federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.
The Qualification of Representatives Was Set by the Convention
The qualifications of the elected – being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity – were very properly considered and regulated by the Convention. A representative of the United States must meet four standards: (1) at least twenty five years old, (2) seven years a citizen of the United States, (3) on the date of election an inhabitant of the State represented, and (4) during the time of service, must be in no office under the United States. Art. I, §2, cl. 2.
Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the Federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.
The Convention Selected a Two-Year Term as Optimum
In order to decide on the length of a representative’s term, two questions were considered: first, whether biennial elections will be safe, and second, whether they be necessary or useful.
As it is essential to liberty that a government should have a common interest with the People, it is particularly essential that the House of Representatives should have an immediate dependence on the People, and an intimate sympathy with them. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectively secured.
However, the particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances. Experience is the guide that ought always be followed whenever it can be found.
As it is essential to liberty that a government should have a common interest with the People, it is particularly essential that the House of Representatives should have an immediate dependence on the People, and an intimate sympathy with them. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectively secured.
The scheme of representation – as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person – was at most very imperfectly known to ancient polity. Instructive examples are thus found only in more modern times. And even here, in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it is proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case.
Length of Terms in the House of Commons
The first example is the House of Commons in Great Britain. Prior to adoption of the Magna Carta in 1215, the history of this branch of the English Constitution is too obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of a representative branch is still questioned among political antiquaries. The earliest records of subsequent date prove that parliaments were to sit only every year, not that they were to be elected every year. And even these annual sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch that very long and dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition.
To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of Charles II (1660-1685) that the intermissions should not be protracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of William III in 1689 – following a revolution in the government – the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the fundamental rights of the People that parliaments ought to be held frequently. By another statute passed a few years later in the same reign, the term “frequently” was reduced to a precise meaning: parliament shall be called within three years after the termination of the preceding parliament. This three-year period was lengthened to seven years earlier this century under alarm for the Hanoverian succession.
From these facts, it appears the greatest frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom for binding the representatives to their constituents, does not exceed three years. And if we argue from the degree of liberty retained even under elections held every seven years, a reduction of the period from seven to three years – with the other necessary reforms – would so far extend the influence of the People over their representatives as to satisfy us that federal elections held every two years cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their constituents.
Elections in Ireland
Until recently, elections in Ireland were regulated entirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the accession of a new prince or some other contingent event. The parliament which commenced with George II (1727-1760) continued throughout his whole reign of more than 30 years. The only influence the People had on representatives consisted in the People’s right to supply occasional vacancies by the election of new members, and in the chance of some event which might produce a general new election.
The Irish parliament’s ability to maintain the rights of their constituents was extremely shackled by the crown’s control over the subjects of their deliberation. Recently these shackles were broken, and octennial parliaments established. What effect to be produced by this partial reform must be left to further experience.
The example of Ireland can throw but little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be that even though the People of that country have been under disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty which depends on a due connection between their representatives and themselves.
The definition of the right of suffrage – the right of an individual (elector) to vote – is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was therefore incumbent on the Convention to define and establish this right in the Constitution.
Examples from the States when They Were British Colonies
I bring my inquiry nearer home. The example of the States while British colonies claims particular attention. In all of them, the principle of representation was established in at least one branch of the legislature. But the periods of election were different.
They varied from one to seven years. There is no reason to infer – from the spirit and conduct of the representatives of the People prior to the Revolution – that biennial elections would have been dangerous to the public liberties. The spirit which everywhere displayed itself at the commencement of the struggle – and which vanquished the obstacles to independence – is the best of proofs that a sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement. This remark also holds good with regard to the former colonies whose elections were least frequent, as well as to those whose elections were most frequent.
Elections in Virginia
Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain. It was the first also in espousing the resolution of independence by public act.
In Virginia, nevertheless, elections under the former government were septennial. This particular example is not brought into view as a proof of any advantage in septennial elections, but merely as a very substantial proof that the liberties of the People can be in no danger from biennial elections.
Three Additional Circumstances Confirm Biennial Elections Are Best
These examples are strengthened by three important circumstances. The first is the House of Representatives will possess only a part of that supreme legislative authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament, and which (with a few exceptions) was exercised by the colonial assemblies and the Irish legislature. It is a well-founded maxim that – where no other circumstances affect the case – the greater the power is, the shorter its duration ought to be. Conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted.
In the second place, the House of Representatives will not only be restrained by its dependence on the People, it will be watched and controlled by collateral legislatures, which other legislative bodies are not.
And in the third place, no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the Federal government for seducing – if they should be disposed to seduce – the House of Representatives from their duty to the People, and the means of influence over this popular branch possessed by these more permanent branches of the government. With less power to abuse, the House of Representatives will be less tempted on one side, and doubly watched on the other.
Hamilton or Madison