“Where annual elections end, tyranny begins,” is a maxim currently popular.
If it be true that proverbial sayings are generally founded in reason, it is not less true they are often applied to cases to which the reason does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us.
On what reason is this proverbial observation founded?
No one will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between the sun or seasons and the period within which human virtue can resist the temptations of power.
Happily for mankind, liberty is not confined to any single point of time, but lies between extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations required by the situations and circumstances of civil society.
If it were found expedient, the election of magistrates of a government might be annual, monthly, weekly or even daily – and all have been tried. Among the periods established among ourselves for the election of the most numerous branches of the State legislatures, they no more coincide than in the elections of other civil magistrates.
Length of Terms in the Most Numerous Legislative Bodies in the Several States
In Connecticut and Rhode Island, elections are half-yearly.
In the other States they are annual, with the exception of South Carolina, which has biennial elections, as the Constitution declares for the House of Representatives.
The difference between the longest period (two years) and shortest period (six months) is four to one, yet it is not easy to show Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty than South Carolina, or that any one of these three States is distinguished for its liberty in comparison to States whose elections are annual.
“Where annual elections end, tyranny begins,” is a maxim currently popular. If it be true that proverbial sayings are generally founded in reason, it is not less true they are often applied to cases to which the reason does not extend.
Annual Elections Arose from the Desire for Stability of Government
In searching for the reasons for the maxim that tyranny begins when annual elections end, I can discover only one, yet it is wholly inapplicable to our case.
An important distinction exists between a law established by a government – and therefore alterable by that or a later government – and a Constitution established by the People, which is unalterable by the government.
This distinction – so well understood in America – seems little understood and less observed in any other country.
In other countries, the full power to change the form of the government resides with the person or body possessing the supreme power of legislation.
Even in Great Britain – where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear the most about the rights of the Constitution – it is maintained that the authority of parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, both with regard to its constitution and the ordinary objects of legislative provision.
Accordingly, parliament has in several instances actually changed some of the most fundamental articles of the government by mere legislative acts. Parliament has on several occasions changed the period of election. Most recently, parliament substituted septennial elections in place of triennial elections, and by the same act continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the British people!
An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of free government, and led them to seek some security to liberty against the danger to which exposes the People.
In the absence of a constitution paramount to the government, some other security was needed.
Since elections are the cornerstone of liberty, what better security would the case admit than appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time to measure the danger of innovations, fixing the national sentiment, and uniting patriotic exertions?
The most simple and familiar portion of time applicable to the subject was one year.
From this the maxim of annual elections has been inculcated by a laudable zeal, in order to erect a barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited government, and to hinder the advance towards tyranny that longer election periods may allow.
But what necessity is there of applying the expedient of a one-year election limit to a Federal government already limited by the authority of a paramount Constitution?
Who will pretend the liberties of the People of America will be less secure under biennial elections unalterably fixed the Constitution, than those of any other nation would be under annual or even more frequent elections, subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the government?
Biennial Elections Favor Increased Knowledge of Important Issues
Another important question is whether biennial elections are necessary or useful.
The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative appears from several very obvious considerations.
No person can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which legislation is to be enacted.
A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of individuals in private as well as public stations.
Another part can only be attained – or at least thoroughly attained – by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it.
In all cases, therefore, the period of service ought to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of the service.
As we have seen, the period of legislative service established in most of the States for the more numerous legislative branch is one year.
The question then may be put into this simple form: does a period of two years result in a greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for legislation than a period of one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation?
The very statement of the question suggests the answer is yes.
No person can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which legislation is to be enacted. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of individuals in private as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained – or at least thoroughly attained – by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it.
In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to existing (and largely uniform) laws – with which all the citizens are more or less conversant – and to the general affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conversation of every class of citizen.
The great theater of the United States presents a very different scene.
The laws are far from uniform, as they may vary in every State. The public affairs of the union are extremely diversified and spread throughout a very extensive region.
The local affairs connected with them can only with difficulty be correctly learned in any place other than in the central councils to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every part of the empire.
Some knowledge of the affairs of all of the States – and even of their laws – ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States.
Foreign trade cannot properly be regulated by uniform laws without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, usages, and regulations of the different States. Trade between the different States cannot be duly regulated without some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other respects.
How can taxes be judiciously imposed and effectually collected if they be not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in the different States?
Can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided without a similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each other?
These are the principal objects of legislation, and suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the representatives ought to acquire.
Other objects will require a proportional degree of information with regard to them. By degrees, all these difficulties will be very much diminished.
The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of a code. Improvements on first drafts will every year become easier and fewer.
Past transactions of the government will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members.
The affairs of the United States more and more will become objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large.
And the increased intercourse among the different States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws.
But even with all these abatements, the business of legislation must continue to exceed – both in novelty and difficulty – the legislative business of a single State, which justifies the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it.
Knowledge of Foreign Affairs Also Is Essential
A branch of knowledge which must belong to the acquirements of a representative is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce, a representative must be acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, and also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations.
A representative ought not be altogether ignorant of the laws of other nations, as far as it is a proper object legislation submitted to the government.
Although the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements, the connection between the several branches of government will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation, and sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and cooperation.
Some portion of this knowledge may be acquired from personal advisors, but some of it can be derived only from the public sources of information. Both sources will be required to effect a practical attention to the subject during the period of actual service in the House of Representatives.
Travel Distance for Representatives Favors Biennial Elections
There are other considerations not unworthy of notice, although perhaps of less importance, such as the distance which many representatives will be obliged to travel – and the arrangements rendered necessary by that circumstance – which might raise a serious objection from some fit candidates for service, if limited to a one-year term, than one extended to a two-year term.
An inconvenience mingled with the advantages of annual elections is that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. Whatever the unlawful means actually used, an irregular member who is seated is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. A very pernicious encouragement is thus given to the use of unlawful means to obtain an irregular return.
No argument can be drawn on this subject from the case of representatives selected prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
These delegates were elected annually by their State legislatures, but reelection was considered by the legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course, subject to a limit of three terms in a six-year period.
The election of the representatives by the People will not be governed by the same principle.
As happens in all such assemblies, a few of the members will possess superior talents.
By frequent reelections, they will become members of long standing, thoroughly mastering the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages, such as ensnaring newer members who possess less information. This last remark also applies to the relation which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Limiting Terms to a Single Year Will Encourage Fraud
An inconvenience mingled with the advantages of annual elections is that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect.
Whatever the unlawful means actually used, an irregular member who is seated is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. A very pernicious encouragement is thus given to the use of unlawful means to obtain an irregular return.
Were elections for the House of Representatives held annually, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States.
Each chamber is the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members, as it necessarily must be.
Whatever improvements may be suggested by experience for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, a great portion of a single year would unavoidably elapse before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of a seat.
The prospect of such an event would be little check to an unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat.
All these considerations warrant us affirming that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as they will be safe to the liberty of the People.
Hamilton or Madison