THE MEMBERSHIP AND SIZE of the House of Representatives was assailed by critics.
The weight of character and the apparent force of their arguments renders this aspect of the Constitution worthy of attention.
The Constitution requires a census within three years of the first meeting of Congress and every decade thereafter.
It then provides for no more than one representative for every 30,000 counted: “The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.” Art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
Summary of Objections to Number of Representatives
There are four charges against this aspect of Article 1, section 2:
(1) the small number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests;
(2) those representatives will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents;
(3) representatives will be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the People, and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the depression of the many; and
(4) as defective as the number will be in the first instance, it will grow more disproportionate through increases in population and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent increase of the representatives.
In this paper I answer the first objection, and in Federalist 56 through Federalist 58 I answer the other three.
Using State Ratios of Representatives to Inhabitants in order to Determine the Number of House Members Would Result in the Confusion of a Multitude
No political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative legislature.
There is no point on which the policy of the several States is more at variance, whether I compare their legislative assemblies directly with each other, or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their constituents.
The most numerous branch in Delaware consists of 21 representatives, while in Massachusetts it amounts to between 300 and 400.
A very considerable difference also is observable among States nearly equal in population.
The Convention determined Pennsylvania and Massachusetts initially would be granted 8 representatives, yet the number of members in Pennsylvania’s largest popular chamber is not more than one fifth of that in Massachusetts. New York, whose population is to that of South Carolina as six to five, has little more than one third of the number of representatives. As great a disparity prevails between Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island.
In Pennsylvania, the representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents than of 1 for every 4,000 or 5,000.
In Rhode Island, they bear a proportion of at least 1 for every 1,000.
And according to the constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to 1 to every 10 electors, thereby far exceeding the proportion in any of the other States.
Another general remark worth making is that the ratio between representatives and constituents ought not be the same where the constituents are very numerous as where they are very few.
Were the ratio of representatives to constituents in Virginia regulated by the standard in Rhode Island, Virginia’s representatives would amount to between 400 and 500 – and twenty or thirty years hence – to 1,000.
On the other hand, applying the ratio Pennsylvania to Delaware would reduce Delaware’s representative assembly to seven or eight members.
Nothing is more fallacious than founding our political calculations on arithmetical principles.
Sixty or seventy individuals may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven.
But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would proportionably be a better depositary.
And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand representatives, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed.
Avoiding the Confusion of the Multitude, Where Passion Reigns
The truth revealed by experience demands – in all cases – that a certain number is necessary at least to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes.
On the other hand, the number must be kept within a certain limit to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude.
In all very numerous assemblies – of whatever character composed – passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason.
Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.
The truth revealed by experience demands – in all cases – that a certain number is necessary at least to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes. On the other hand, the number must be kept within a certain limit to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude.
The More Restricted Scope of Federal Legislation Justifies Fewer Representatives
The observations I made in Federalist 53 and Federalist 54 concerning the benefits of biennial elections extend to the number of representatives needed in the House.
For the same reason that less frequent elections than the public might otherwise require are justified by the limited powers of the Congress – as well as by the control of State legislatures – the members of the Congress need be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation, and were under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies.
With these general ideas in mind, I here respond to the objections stated against the number of members proposed for the House of Representatives.
Anticipated Increases in Population Will Increase the Number of House Members to 400, which Ought Eliminate Fears of Too Few Representatives
At the outset of the Federal government, the number of representatives will be 65. It is said 65 are too few individuals to safely entrust with so much power.
However, a census will be taken within three years, after which the number may be augmented to 1 for every 30,000 inhabitants. With every successive 10-year renewal of the census, augmentations may continue under the above limitation.
It is not extravagant or conjectural to estimate the first census will – at the rate of 1 for every 30,000 – raise the number of representatives to at least 100. Estimating the Negroes in the proportion of three fifths, the population of the United States will by that time amount to three million.
At the expiration of 25 years, the number of representatives may amount to 200, and by 50 years increased to 400. Four hundred is a number which ought put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the House of Representatives.
I take for granted here that the number of representatives will be augmented from time to time in the manner provided by the Constitution.
If I were to assume the contrary, I should admit the objection would have very great weight indeed.
The true question to be decided then, is whether the smallness of the number – as a temporary regulation – is dangerous to the public liberty.
Will 65 members for a few years – and 100 or 200 for a few more – be a safe depositary for a limited and well-guarded power of legislating for the United States?
In order to say these numbers would be insufficient, I would first have to obliterate every impression I have received with regard to the present genius of the People of America, the spirit actuating State legislatures, and the principles which are incorporated with the political character of every class of citizens.
I am unable to conceive that the People of America – in their present temper or under any circumstances which can speedily happen – will choose and every second year reelect 65 or 100 individuals who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery.
I am unable to conceive that the State legislatures – which must feel so many motives to watch, and which possess so many means of counteracting, the Federal legislature – would fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the Federal government against the liberties of their common constituents.
I am equally unable to conceive there are in the United States – at this time or any short time – any 65 or 100 individuals capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the People at large, who would either desire or dare – within the short space of two years – to betray the solemn trust committed to them.
What may be produced by changed circumstances, time, and an increase in population requires a prophetic spirit to declare, and makes no part of my pretensions.
But judging from the circumstances now before us – and from the probable state of them within a moderate period of time – I must pronounce the liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of hands proposed by the Constitution.
Sixty or seventy individuals may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would proportionably be a better depositary. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand representatives, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed.
Our Recent History Provides Evidence that Bribery and Treachery Are Scant Risks
From what quarter can a danger to our liberties proceed?
Are we afraid of foreign gold?
If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our Federal leaders and enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how are we at this time a free and independent nation?
The Congress which conducted us through the Revolution had less members than any Congress will have under the Constitution.
Further, the members were not chosen by – nor responsible to – their fellow citizens at large.
Although they were appointed from year to year (and recallable at the pleasure of their States), they were generally continued for three years, and for still longer terms prior to ratification of the Articles of Confederation.
The Congress always held its consultations under the veil of secrecy.
It had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign nations; through the whole course of the war they had the fate of their country more in their hands than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with our future representatives.
From the greatness of the prize at stake – future control of the United States – and the eagerness of Great Britain to reclaim it – one may well suppose that the use of means other than force would not have been scrupled.
Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not betrayed; nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers of calumny.
The Prospect of a Appointment to a Preexisting Civil Office Holds Little Allurement to Corruption
Is danger to the House of Representatives to be apprehended from other branches of the Federal government?
Where are the means to be found by the President, or the Senate, or both?
Their emoluments of office will not suffice without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives.
Their private fortunes – as is the case for all American citizens – cannot possibly be sources of danger.
The only means the President and Senate and President may possess will be in the dispensation of appointments.
Is it here that suspicion rests her charge?
Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate.
Now we are told the fidelity of the other chamber is to be the victim.
The improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of government – standing on as different foundations of republican principles and at the same time accountable to the society over which they are placed – ought alone to quiet this apprehension.
The Constitution fortunately provides a still further safeguard.
The members of the Congress are ineligible for any civil office that may be created (or of which the emoluments may be increased) during the term of their election.
Therefore no offices can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties.
To suppose such preexisting offices would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the People – who are selected by the People themselves – is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all reasoning must be vain.
Republican Government Assumes There Is More Virtue than Depravity in Humanity
The sincere friends of liberty who give themselves up to the extravagancies of jealousy are not aware of the injury they do their own cause.
There is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, but other qualities in human nature justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.
Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.
Were the pictures inspired by the political jealousy of some faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be there is insufficient virtue among men for self-government, and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain humans from destroying and devouring one another.
Madison or Hamilton