THE REMAINING CHARGE against the House of Representatives is grounded on the erroneous supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population will demand.
This objection would have had great weight if it were supported, but like most of the other objections against the Constitution, proceeds from a partial view of the subject, or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures every object which it beholds.
The Federal Constitution Compares Favorably to State Constitutions
Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the Federal Constitution provides the security of a gradual augmentation of the number of representatives, and therefore does suffer by a comparison with the provisions of State constitutions.
The number of representatives in the first instance – 65 – is declared to be temporary, with its duration limited to the short term of three years, when an initial census is to be completed. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
Within every successive term of ten years a census of inhabitants is to be repeated.
One unequivocal object of these regulations is to readjust, from time to time, the apportionment of representatives to the number of inhabitants, with the single exception that each State shall have at least one representative.
A second object to augment the number of representatives at the same periods, under the sole limitation that the whole number shall not exceed one for every 30,000 inhabitants.
In reviewing the constitutions of the several States, we find that some of them contain no determinate regulations on this subject, others correspond pretty much on this point with the Federal Constitution, and the most effectual security in any of them is resolvable into a mere directory provision.
As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual increase of representatives under the State constitutions has at least kept pace with the increase of the constituents.
It appears State representatives have been as ready to concur in augmentations as constituents have called for them.
The House – Representing the People – and the Senate – Representing States – Will Concur in Necessary Augmentations to House Membership
There is a peculiarity in the Constitution which ensures a majority of the People and their representatives will ensure a constitutional augmentation of those representatives.
The peculiarity is that one branch of the legislature (the House) is a representation of citizens, while the other branch (the Senate) represents the States.
In the House, the larger States will have most weight.
The advantage in the Senate will be in favor of the smaller States.
Larger States Will Advocate for More Representatives
From this circumstance, the larger States will be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of that part of the legislature in which their influence predominates.
As it happens only four of the largest States will have a majority of the all the votes in the House of Representatives.
Should the representatives or the People of the smaller States at any time oppose a reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few States will be sufficient to overrule the opposition.
A coalition would not fail to take place – notwithstanding rivalries and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary occasions – prompted by a common interest and justified by equity and the principles of the Constitution.
Those favoring a steady augmentation of representatives apprehend that smaller States in the Senate may coalesce to oppose augmentation, in order to preserve the power of their current representation.
Since Senate concurrence would be indispensable to augmentation, their argument proceeds, the just and constitutional views of the House might be defeated.
Fortunately these fears are among the difficulties which – existing only in appearance – vanish on a close and accurate inspection. The following reflections will be admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory on this point.
The House Will Have the Advantage on Speaking for the People
Notwithstanding the equal authority which subsists between the two chambers of Congress on all legislative subjects (excepting only that the House of Representatives must originate bills requiring appropriation of money), the House of Representatives will have the advantage in a question depending on the comparative firmness of the two houses.
The House of Representatives has the greater number of members, and will speak with the known and determined sense of a majority of the People, especially when supported by the more powerful States.
This advantage will be increased by the consciousness felt by the one side of being supported in its demands by right, reason, and the Constitution.
The consciousness on the opposite side must contend against the force of all these solemn considerations.
The People can never err more than in supposing that – by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit – they will strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. On the contrary, experience will forever admonish that – after securing a sufficient number of representatives for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society – additional representatives will counteract those views.
Augmentation Will Lead to Reapportionment
It is by no means certain that a majority of votes – even in the Senate – would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of representatives.
In the gradation between the smallest and largest States, there are several which – although generally likely to arrange themselves among the smaller States – are too little removed in extent and population from the larger States to support an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions.
It will not be looking too far to add that an expedient too obvious to be overlooked will persuade senators from new States to favor augmentation of House membership.
As these new States will advance in population with peculiar rapidity for a great length of time, they will be interested in frequent reapportionments of the representatives to the number of inhabitants.
The Power over the Purse Will Secure the Necessary Reapportionment
The large States prevailing in the House of Representatives will have nothing to do but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of each other.
The senators from the growing States will be bound to contend for augmentations by the interest their States will have in reapportionment.
These considerations will afford ample security on augmentations and reapportionments, and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been voiced.
However, should the smaller States pursue an unjust policy against augmentation due to their predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, the larger States will have a constitutional and infallible resource to accomplish their just purposes, for only the House of Representatives can propose the supplies requisite for the support of government.
The Power over the Purse Led to the Ascendancy of the House of Commons
The House holds the power over the purse.
In the history of the British Constitution, the power over the purse aided an infant and humble representation of the People in the House of Commons to enlarge the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally to reduce – as far as it seems to have wished – all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of that government.
The power over the purse may be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the People, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
It was argued that the House of Representatives would be as much interested as the Senate in maintaining the Federal government in its proper functions, and thus be unwilling to stake its existence or reputation on the pliancy of that chamber.
In a trial of firmness between the two chambers, it was asked, would not the House be as likely as the Senate to yield first?
These concerns created no difficulty with those who reflected that the Senate – with its smaller membership and the more permanent and conspicuous the station – would have a stronger interest in the concerns of the Federal government, since those who represent the dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations will be particularly sensible to every prospect of public danger or of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs.
To these causes we may ascribe the continual triumph of the British House of Commons over the other branches of the government, whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed.
An absolute inflexibility in the other branches – although it would have involved every department of the state in general confusion – has neither been apprehended nor experienced.
In the United States, the utmost degree of firmness the Senate or President can display will not be more than equal to a resistance in which they will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles.
In this review of the constitution of the House of Representatives, I have passed over the circumstances of the present condition of economy, which had some effect in lessening the temporary number of representatives.
A disregard of economic conditions would probably have been as rich a theme of declamation against the Constitution as has been shown by the smallness of the number proposed.
I also omit any remarks on the difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in engaging in the Federal service a large number of such characters as the People will probably elect.
In the history of the British Constitution, the power over the purse aided an infant and humble representation of the People in the House of Commons to enlarge the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally to reduce – as far as it seems to have wished – all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of that government. The power over the purse may be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the People, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
The Larger the Popular Assembly, the Fewer the Individuals Controlling It
I must be permitted to add one observation on this subject claiming a very serious attention, in my judgment.
This observation is that in all legislative assemblies, the greater the number of members, the fewer will be the individuals who will in fact direct their proceedings.
Passion, Not Reason, Rules Large Assemblies
In the first place, the more numerous an assembly may be – and of whatever characters composed – the greater is known to be the ascendency of passion over reason.
In the next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities. It is precisely on characters of this description that the eloquence and address of the few are now known to act with all their force.
In the ancient republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a scepter had been placed in a single hand.
On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative assembly becomes, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the People.
Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation.
The People can never err more than in supposing that – by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit – they will strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. On the contrary, experience will forever admonish that – after securing a sufficient number of representatives for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society – additional representatives will counteract those views.
The People can never err more than in supposing that – by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit – they will strengthen the barrier against the government of a few.
On the contrary, experience will forever admonish that – after securing a sufficient number of representatives for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society – additional representatives will counteract those views.
When a deliberative assembly increases in size, the countenance of the government may appear to become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic.
The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.
When a deliberative assembly increases in size, the countenance of the government may appear to become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.
A Quorum Requiring More than a Majority Is Inconvenient
A quorum is the number of representatives made competent for legislative business.
The Constitution sets the quorum for conducting business as a majority of each chamber: “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.” Art. I, § 5, cl 1.
It was said that more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision.
It cannot be denied that some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution.
It might have been an additional shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures.
But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale.
In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed.
It would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority.
If more than a majority were required in particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal.
In some emergencies, a minority might attempt to extort unreasonable indulgences.
In the ancient republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a scepter had been placed in a single hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative assembly becomes, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the People. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation.
Secessions
Lastly, requiring more members for a quorum or particular votes would foster and facilitate the baneful practice of secessions.
This practice has shown itself even in States where only a majority is required.
The practice is subversive of all the principles of order and regular government, and has led more directly to public convulsions and the ruin of popular governments than any other which has yet been displayed among us.
Madison or Hamilton