WE CONTINUE TO EXAMINE THE OBJECTIONS to the provision regarding Federal elections: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
It Was Unnecessary to Declare Elections Should Be Held in the Counties Where the Electors Reside
The more candid individuals opposed to this provision – when pressed in argument – will sometimes concede its propriety, but add the qualification that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided.
This, say they, is a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power.
A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless.
So far as it would have had the effect of quieting apprehensions, it might not have been undesirable.
But in fact it would have afforded little or no additional security against the danger apprehended.
An impartial and judicious examiner would never consider the absence of a provision directing elections be held in the county where the elector resided as a serious – still less as an insuperable – objection to the plan.
The different views taken of the subject in Federalist 59 and Federalist 60 satisfy all dispassionate and discerning individuals that if the public liberty should ever be the victim of the ambition of the national rulers, the power to set election locations will be guiltless of the sacrifice.
Those inclined to consult only their jealousy would find greater disquietude and alarm from the latitude which most of their own States allow in respect to elections, than from the latitude which is granted to the Federal government in the same respect.
New York’s Constitution Offers No Greater Protection than the Federal Constitution
A review of State constitutions removes any ill impressions which may remain in regard to this matter, but as that review would lead into long and tedious details, I shall content myself with the single example of the State of New York.
The constitution of New York makes no provision for locality of elections other than (1) the members of the Assembly shall be elected in the counties, and (2) the members of the Senate shall be elected in the great districts into which the State is or may be divided.
At present these are four in number, and each includes from two to six counties.
It is readily perceived that it would be no more difficult for the legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New York by confining elections to particular places, than for the Congress to defeat by like expedient the suffrages of the citizens of the United States.
The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws furnishes a ready answer to this question: when the place of election is at an inconvenient distance from the elector, the effect will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty thousand miles.
Suppose, for instance, the city of Albany was appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is a part.
Would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors of the members both of the senate and assembly for that county and district?
Can we imagine that the electors who reside in the remote subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge – or any part of the county of Montgomery – would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany vote for members of the State assembly or senate, sooner than they would repair to the city of New York, to participate in the choice of the members of the House of Representatives?
The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws furnishes a ready answer to this question: when the place of election is at an inconvenient distance from the elector, the effect will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty thousand miles.
It is apparent that the objections to the Federal power of regulating elections apply with equal force to the like power in the Constitution of New York, and for this reason it is impossible to acquit one and condemn the other.
A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion in respect to the constitutions of most of the other States.
If it should be said that these defects in State constitutions furnish no apology for the comparable Federal provisions, I answer that the State constitutions have never been thought chargeable with inattention to the security of liberty.
It is apparent the objections to the Federal power to regulate election locations are the caviling refinements of a predetermined opposition than the well-founded inferences of a candid research after truth.
To those who are inclined to excuse as innocent omissions in the State constitutions what they view as an unpardonable blemish in the Federal Constitution, it is fair to ask them for a substantial reason why the representatives in a single State should be more impregnable to the lust of power (or other sinister motives) than the representatives of all of the United States?
If they cannot do this, they ought at least prove to us it is easier to subvert the liberties of over three million people in the United States – who have the advantage of local governments to head their opposition – than the liberties of two hundred thousand in the State of New York.
Finally, they ought to convince us that is less probable for a predominant faction in a single State – in order to maintain its superiority – to prefer a particular class of electors, than for a similar spirit to take possession of the representatives of all the States, which are spread over a vast region and in several respects distinguishable from each other by a diversity of local circumstances, prejudices, and interests.
The Advantage of Uniformity in the Time of Federal Elections
Hitherto my observations have aimed at a vindication of the provision in question only on theoretical grounds, the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and the safety of placing it in the manner proposed.
But there is also a positive advantage which will result from this provision, and which could not have been obtained as well from any other: I allude to the circumstance of uniformity in the time of elections for the Federal House of Representatives.
This uniformity may prove to be of great importance to the public welfare, both as a security against the perpetuation of an improper spirit in the House of Representatives, and as a cure for the diseases of faction.
If each State were permitted to choose its own time for holding a Federal election, there could be at many different periods as months in the year.
The times of election in the several States – as they are now established for local purposes – vary between extremes as wide as March and November.
The consequence of these different election times – if applied to the House of Representatives – would mean there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time.
If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they come forward in succession.
As there is a contagion in example – which few individuals have sufficient force of mind to resist – the mass of members would likely remain nearly the same, assimilating constantly to itself its gradual accretions.
I am inclined to think that a six-year term for representatives – with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time – might be less formidable to liberty than a two-year term subject to gradual and successive alterations.
Nonetheless, since the dangers inherent in a gradual change in membership are merely speculative, it was hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish – as a fundamental point – what would deprive several States of the convenience of having the elections for their own governments and the Federal government at the same epochs.
In respect to the Senate, uniformity in the time of elections is no less requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation of senators, and for conveniently assembling the Congress at a stated period each year.
The consequence of these different election times – if applied to the House of Representatives – would mean there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they come forward in succession.
The Omission of a Precise Time for Federal Elections Leaves It to the Discretion to Congress
If the need for a uniform time is so important, it may be asked: Why was no time fixed in the Constitution?
The question may be answered in part with the observation New York’s own constitution – so admired by the most zealous adversaries of the Federal Constitution – also omits a fixed time for the like purpose.
The best answer for the omission is that the power to fix the time for election is a matter which might safely be entrusted to legislative discretion. If a time had been appointed, upon experiment, it might have been found less convenient than some other time.
Hamilton