Concurrence Fosters Stability of Administration
ONE OF THE ADVANTAGES from the cooperation of the Senate in the business of appointments will be its contribution to the stability of the administration, since the consent of the Senate would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.
Therefore, a change of the chief magistrate (the President) would not occasion so violent or general a revolution in the officers of the Federal government as might be expected the President were the sole disposer of offices.
Where an individual in any station of government has given satisfactory evidence of his or her fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a more agreeable person by the apprehension that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon the Presidency.
Those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration will most prize a provision which connects the individual appointed with the approval or disapproval of the Senate, which – from the greater permanency of its own composition – will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy than any other part of the Federal government.
It Is Unlikely the President or Senate Will Wield Undue Influence Over One Another
The union of the Senate with the President in the article of appointments led some to say it would give the President an undue influence over the Senate, while others proposed it would have an opposite tendency, a strong proof that neither suggestion is true.
To restate the first contention in its proper form is to refute it.
It amounts to this: the President would have an improper influence over the Senate, because the Senate would have the power of restraining the President.
This is absurd, for a President could much more effectually to establish a dangerous empire over the Senate if granted the entire power of appointment, rather than a mere power of nomination subject to Senate control.
Consider the converse suggestion: the Senate would influence the President.
The objection is so indistinct it forbids a precise answer.
In what manner is this influence to be exerted?
In relation to what objects?
The power of influencing a person – in the sense here used – implies a power of conferring a benefit.
How could the Senate confer a benefit upon the President by employing its right to approve or reject nominations?
Some pointed to the possibility the Senate might gratify the President by acquiescence in a favorite choice even though public motives might dictate different conduct.
My answer is the instances in which the President could be personally interested in the result would be too few to effect a material advantage to the Senate.
The power which originates the disposition of honors and emoluments is more likely to attract than to be attracted by the power which can merely obstruct their course.
So if by “influencing the President” is meant the power of restraint, this is precisely what must have been intended.
It has been shown the restraint would be salutary, while not destroying a single advantage that might be gained if the President had the sole power of appointment.
The right of nomination would produce all the good of that of appointment, and would in a great measure avoid its evils.
Those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration will most prize a provision which connects the individual appointed with the approval or disapproval of the Senate, which – from the greater permanency of its own composition – will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy than any other part of the Federal government.
The Constitution’s System of Appointments Far Surpasses that of New York
If one compares the mode of appointment of officers of the United States with that of New York, a decided advantage appears in the Federal government.
First, the power of nomination is unequivocally vested in the executive. And since it is necessary to submit each nomination to the judgment of the Senate (an entire branch of the legislature), the circumstances attending an appointment would naturally become well known, and the public would be at no loss to determine what part had been performed by the different actors.
The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President singly and absolutely.
The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate, particularly if the rejection counteracted the good intentions of the executive.
If an ill appointment should be made – the executive for nominating – and the Senate for approving – would participate in the opprobrium and disgrace, though in different degrees.
The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of appointment in New York.
Its council of appointment consists of from three to five persons, of whom the governor is always one.
This small body – shut up in a private apartment impenetrable to the public eye – proceed to the execution of the trust committed to them.
The governor claims the right of nomination – upon the strength of some ambiguous expressions in the constitution – but it is not known to what extent or in what manner the governor exercises it, nor upon what occasions the governor may be contradicted or opposed.
The censure of a bad appointment – due to uncertainty of its author and want of a determinate object – has neither poignancy nor duration.
An unbounded field for cabal and intrigue lies open, while all idea of responsibility is lost.
The most the public can know is (1) the governor claims the right of nomination; (2) at least two of the three four others can often be managed with little difficulty; (3) if some of the members should be of an uncomplying character, their opposition can be overcome by regulating the times of meetings to render their attendance inconvenient; and (4) from whatever cause it may proceed, a great number of very improper appointments are from time to time made.
Whether a governor of New York prefers individuals who are best qualified for their offices – or prostitutes power to the advancement of persons whose chief merit is their implicit devotion to the governor’s will – and to the support of a despicable and dangerous system of personal influence – can only be the subjects of speculation and conjecture for the public.
The Convention Rejected the Alternative of Forming a Separate Council of Appointment
However constituted, every council of appointment will be a conclave in which cabal and intrigue will have their full scope.
The number of council members cannot be made large enough to preclude a facility of combination without a corresponding unwarrantable increase of expense.
Each member will likely have friends and connections to provide for, so the desire of mutual gratification will beget a scandalous bartering of votes and bargaining for places.
The private attachments of one individual might easily be satisfied; but to satisfy the private attachments of a dozen or twenty individuals would occasion a monopoly of all the principal employments of the government in a few families, leading more directly to an aristocracy or an oligarchy than any measure a cabal could contrive.
While it might be possible to avoid such an accumulation of offices by frequently changing the persons who were to compose the council, the mischiefs of a mutable administration would fully appear.
A council smaller in size than the Senate would also be more liable to executive influence due to their fewer number, and also would act less immediately under public inspection.
To substitute such a council for the Senate would produce an increase of expense, a multiplication of the evils which spring from favoritism and intrigue in the distribution of public honors, a decrease of stability in the administration of the government, and a diminution of the security against an undue influence of the President.
The House of Representatives Is Too Mutable and Numerous to Serve Any Role in Appointments
Some argued in favor of uniting the House of Representatives in the power of making appointments, but that body so fluctuating – and at the same time so numerous – it can never be deemed proper for the exercise of the power of appointment or ratification.
In half a century it may consist of three or four hundred persons.
All the advantages of the stability – of both the President and Senate – would be defeated by this union.
Infinite delays and embarrassments would be occasioned.
The examples of most of the States in their local constitutions confirm this.
A council smaller in size than the Senate would also be more liable to executive influence due to their fewer number, and also would act less immediately under public inspection.
The Remaining Executive Powers Are Unexceptionable
The only remaining powers of the executive are comprehended:
(1) in giving information to Congress of the state of the Union;
(2) in recommending to their consideration such measures as the President shall judge expedient;
(3) in convening them, or either branch, upon extraordinary occasions;
(4) in adjourning them when they cannot themselves agree upon the time of adjournment;
(5) in receiving ambassadors and other public ministers;
(6) in faithfully executing the laws; and
(7) in commissioning all the officers of the United States.
The only objections were invented by an insatiable avidity for censure.
Some questioned the power of convening either the House or the Senate.
With respect to the Senate, a good reason is readily apparent: since this body has a concurrent power with the executive in the article of treaties, it might often be necessary to call it together with a view to this object, when it would be unnecessary and improper to convene the House of Representatives.
A few cavils were raised as to the reception of ambassadors, but these were answered in Federalist 69.
The Executive Department Balances the Republican Requisites of Energy, Safety, Responsibility, and Due Dependence on the People
My survey of the structure and powers of the executive department is now complete. I have shown how it combines – as far as republican principles will admit – all the requisites to energy.
The remaining inquiry is: does it also combine – in the republican sense – the requisites to safety, a due dependence on the People, and a due responsibility?
The answers to these questions must be in the affirmative.
The President will be elected or re-elected once every four years by persons immediately chosen by the People for that purpose.
The President will at all times liable to impeachment, trial, dismissal from office, incapacity to serve in any other, and to forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in the common course of law.
Finally, in those instances in which the abuse of the executive authority was materially to be feared – treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors – the President would be subject to the control of the Senate.
What more could an enlightened and reasonable People desire?
Hamilton