ACCORDING TO THE FORMAL DIVISION OF SUBJECTS announced in Federalist 1, two points appear to remain for discussion: (1) the analogy of the proposed government to your own State constitution, and (2) “the additional security which its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property.”
A review the of these papers shows I have fully anticipated and exhausted my points on these heads in the progress of the work, so at this advanced stage of the question, it would scarcely be possible to do anything more than repeat in a more dilated form what has been heretofore said.
The Alleged Defects of the U.S. Constitution Are Also Present in New York’s Constitution
The proposed Constitution remarkably resembles the act organizing the government of New York, both with respect to their excellences and their supposed defects.
Among the pretended defects of the Federal Constitution are the re-eligibility of the executive, the want of an executive council, the omission of a formal bill of rights, and the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of the press.
These and other defects noted in the course of our inquiries (see primarily Federalist 72 and Federalist 84) are as much chargeable to the existing Constitution of New York as to the Constitution for the United States.
An individual who can rail at the Federal constitution for imperfections but easily excuse the same in his own constitution has slender pretensions to consistency.
Is there a better proof to establish the insincerity and affectation of those zealous adversaries of the Federal constitution?
They profess devotion to their State constitution, yet with fury attack the Federal constitution for defects of which their own is more vulnerable.
Additional Securities to Republican Government, Liberty, and Property
The Constitution and preservation of the Union will provide additional securities to republican government, to liberty and to property. It will:
1. Restrain local factions and insurrections, and impose on the ambition of powerful individuals in single states, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the People;
2. Diminish the opportunities for foreign intrigue, which the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate;
3. Prevent extensive military establishments, which would grow out of wars between disunited States;
4. Guarantee expressly to each a republican form of government;
5. Exclude absolutely and universally titles of nobility; and
6. Take precautions against the repetition of those practices by State governments which have undermined the foundations of property and credit, planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.
I have, my fellow citizens, executed the task I assigned to myself.
With what success, your conduct must determine.
I trust at least I have not failed in the assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted, addressing myself purely to your judgments, and studiously attempting to avoid those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties.
I must confess, I have been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution.
The charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the People has been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan.
The charge has something in it too wanton and too malignant not to excite the indignation of everyone who desires a refutation of the calumny.
The perpetual charges rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great inspire the disgust of all sensible individuals.
All those of honesty reprove the unwarranted misrepresentations practiced to keep the truth from the public eye.
These circumstances may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression.
It is certain I have frequently felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation over the course of these papers.
Let us pause now and ask ourselves whether the proposed Constitution is vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it, is worthy of public approbation, and necessary to the public safety and prosperity?
Everyone is bound to answer these questions according to the best of their conscience and understanding, and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of that judgment.
This is a solemn duty – constrained by all the obligations forming the bands of society – to be discharged sincerely and honestly, without dispensation from any source.
There is no justification for an improper selection.
No pride of opinion, no temporary passion or prejudice, no partial motive, no particular interest, no obstinate adherence to party; no particular interest of the community, instead: the very existence of the nation.
And let the citizens of New York remember a majority of America has already given its sanction to the plan which is to be approved or rejected.
The Pursuit of a “Perfect Plan” Ultimately Proves Fruitless
I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which it has been opposed.
I am persuaded that it is the best which our political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to any the Revolution has produced.
Some enemies have felt triumph over the seeming concession that the proposed Constitution does not claim absolute perfection.
“Why,” say they, “should we adopt an imperfect thing?
Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is irrevocably established?”
While these seem like plausible questions, they assume and greatly exaggerate concessions not made, to argue the plan is radically defective and needs material alterations or the rights and the interests of the community cannot safely be confided to it.
But every advocate declares the system is a good one that promises every species of security a reasonable People can desire, and that while it may not be perfect in every part, on the whole it is the best the present views and circumstances of the country permit.
In the next place, the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan would prolong the precarious state of our national affairs and expose the existing Union to the jeopardy of successive experiments.
To begin with, I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. Further, the result of the deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily be a compound – and include the errors and prejudices as well as the good sense and wisdom of the individuals composing it.
A compact which embraces many distinct States in a common bond of amity and union must necessarily be a compromise of many dissimilar interests and inclinations.
How can perfection spring from such materials?
Amending the Constitution Prior to Ratification Is more Difficult than Amending It Afterwards
That it will be far easier to amend the Constitution after ratification rather than before is absolutely demonstrable.
The moment an alteration is made in proposed Constitution, it becomes a new one for purpose of adoption, and must undergo a new decision of each State.
It will therefore require the concurrence of all thirteen States to complete its establishment throughout the union.
But if the proposed Constitution is ratified by all thirteen States, only two thirds of the States are needed to propose an alteration, and three fourths to effect it.
The chances of successful amendment are thus higher after ratification than before.
Attempting to Amend the Constitution before Ratification Will Upset the Balance Among Competing Interests
This is not all.
Every proposed Federal constitution will inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which States are to be accommodated in their interests – or in their opinion of their interests.
In any body of individuals charged with formation of an original constitution, we see very different combinations of the parts upon different points.
Many of those who form a majority on one question may become part of the minority on a second, and form a dissimilar majority on a third.
Hence the necessity of molding and arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole. All the parties to the compact must be satisfied.
The number of particulars and the number of parties must be multiplied to grasp the difficulties and casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act.
But once the Constitution is established, every amendment would be a single proposition brought forward singly.
Management and compromise – the giving or taking of points – would be unnecessary.
The will of the requisite number of States would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue.
When the requisite number of States are united in the desire for a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place.
The facility of affecting an amendment is infinitely easier than establishing a complete constitution in the first instance.
I see no weight in the assertion that the persons delegated to the administration of the Federal government – upon ratification of an amendment – always will be disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which they were once possessed.
Upon mature consideration, any amendments thought useful will be applicable to the organization of the government, and not to the mass of its powers.
I also think there is little weight is due to the intrinsic difficulty of governing numerous states – independently of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity – which necessarily will impose on the national rulers a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their constituents.
A Duly Ratified Amendment Will Overcome Federal Resistance
But yet a further consideration proves beyond the possibility of a doubt that persons delegated to the administration of the national government will not yield authority: whenever two thirds of the states concur, the national rulers will have no option upon the subject.
Article Five of the Constitution requires Congress – on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the States – to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures or conventions of three fourths of the states.
The words of this article are peremptory.
The Congress “shall call a convention.”
Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body.
With that, all declamations about the disinclination to change vanish into air.
However difficult it may be to unite two thirds or three fourths of the state legislatures on amendments affecting local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty on amendments for the general liberty or security of the People?
We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.
If this is untrue, I am myself deceived by it, for it is one of those rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical demonstration.
To those who see the matter in the same light with me – however zealously they desire amendments – the most direct road to their own object is through amendment after the Constitution is ratified.
The zeal to amend prior to ratification must abate in every individual who is ready to accede to the truth of the solid and ingenious observations of Hume:
“To balance a large state or society – whether it be monarchical or republican – on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty that no human genius, however comprehensive, can effect it by the mere dint of reason and reflection. The judgments of many must unite in the work, experience must guide their labor, and time must bring it to perfection. The first trials and experiments will inevitably result in mistakes and difficulties, which must be corrected and overcome.”
These judicious reflections are a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers of the union, and ought to put them on guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the states from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious demagoguery, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain but from time and experience.
I cannot entertain an equal tranquility with those who treat the dangers of continuing in our present situation as imaginary.
A nation without a national government is an awful spectacle.
To have composed a Constitution in a time of profound peace by the voluntary consent of a whole people is a prodigy.
I look forward to its ratification with trembling anxiety.
No rule of prudence permits us to let go of the hold we now have and to recommence the course in so arduous an enterprise.
I dread the consequences of new attempts, because I know that powerful individuals in New York and in other States are enemies to a general national government in every possible shape.
Hamilton