These seven essays form the third major division of The Federalist Papers.
Having demonstrated both the indispensable advantages of Union and the fatal defects of the Articles of Confederation, Hamilton now turns to the practical question of power: what kind of government is actually capable of preserving the Union?
The answer is unambiguous. The new government must possess energetic authority over the common defense.
Federalist 23 opens the section by stating the core principle: the means ought to be proportioned to the end. Because the objects of national government — external security, internal peace, and the regulation of commerce — are unlimited in their demands, the powers necessary to achieve them must also be unlimited in extent (though carefully limited in their objects).
Hamilton then systematically dismantles the popular objections to a federal military establishment:
- Nos. 24 and 25 refute the claim that standing armies in peacetime are inherently dangerous or unnecessary.
- No. 26 shows that the Constitution’s two-year appropriation limit is a far more effective safeguard than any absolute prohibition.
- Nos. 27 and 28 explain why a well-administered federal government will rarely need force to execute its laws, yet must retain the ability to quell insurrections when they arise.
- No. 29 completes the argument by defending federal authority over the militia while preserving the States’ role in appointing officers and training the citizen-soldiers.
Taken together, Federalist 23–29 make the case that an energetic federal power over military forces is not a threat to liberty — it is the only reliable means of securing it.
Without such power the Union itself cannot survive.
[Ed. note: On this site the full modern-English text of each paper appears below. The language has been carefully updated for clarity while remaining completely faithful to every original argument. Most paragraphs have been broken into shorter sentences for easier reading and study.]
Federalist 23: The Necessity of an Energetic Federal Government to Preserve the United States
WE ARE NOW ARRIVED at the point of examining the necessity of a Constitution energetic enough to preserve the United States.
This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches: (1) the principal objects of the Federal government, (2) the quantity of power necessary to accomplish those objects, and (3) the persons upon whom that power ought to operate.
The principal objects of the Federal government are these: (1) the common defense of the States; (2) the preservation of the public peace against internal convulsions as well as external attacks; (3) the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; and (4) the superintendence of our political and commercial intercourse with foreign countries.
The Common Defense of the States
The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct their operations; and to provide for their support.
These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.
The circumstances which can endanger the safety of nations are infinite.
For this reason, it is unwise to impose constitutional shackles on the power to respond to these circumstances.
The power must be coextensive with all of the possible combinations of circumstances, and ought to be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defense.
To an unprejudiced mind, this truth carries its own evidence along with it.
The truth may be obscured, but neither argument nor reasoning can make it plainer, for it rests on axioms as simple as they are universal: the means ought to be proportioned to the end, and the persons from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained.
The principal objects of the Federal government are these:
(1) the common defense of the States;
(2) the preservation of the public peace against internal convulsions as well as external attacks;
(3) the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; and
(4) the superintendence of our political and commercial intercourse with foreign countries.
Whether there ought to be a Federal government entrusted with the care of the common defense was a question that was open for discussion in the first instance.
But once decided in the affirmative, it necessarily follows that the Federal government ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution of its trust.
And in the absence of proof that the power to protect public safety can be reduced to certain determinate limits, it must be admitted that no limit can exist on the authority to provide for the defense and protection of the community – in any matter essential to its efficacy, that is, in any matter essential to the formation, direction, or support of the national forces.
The Articles of Confederation Recognized Broad Federal Powers Were Needed
The care of the common defense was fully recognized by the framers of the Articles of Confederation, although they did not make a proper or adequate provision for its exercise.
The powers granted to the Congress included an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and money, to govern the army and navy, and to direct their operations.
Congressional requisitions were constitutionally binding upon the States, which were under the most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies required of them.
The evident intention of the Congress was that the Congress could command whatever resources it judged requisite to the “common defense and general welfare.”
The framers of the Articles of Confederation presumed that the sense of a State as to true interests – and a regard to the dictates of good faith – would be sufficient pledges for the punctual performance of the duties of the States to the national government.
The experiment proved this expectation was ill-founded and illusory, as quotas failed. Impartial and discerning readers of Federalist 21 and Federalist 22 were shown the absolute necessity for an entire change in the first principles of our former system.
In order to give the Federal government energy and duration, we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the States in their collective capacities, and instead extend the laws of the Federal government to the individual citizens of America.
We must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions, as equally impracticable and unjust.
The United States must be invested with full power to levy troops, build and equip fleets, and raise the revenues required for the formation and support of an army and navy in the customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments.
Once the members of the Constitutional Convention decided the circumstances of our country demand a compound government, not a simple one, it became essential to discriminate the objects which shall appertain to the different departments (or provinces) of power, and granting to each the most ample authority for fulfilling those objects.
A few issues will illustrate the manner of analysis used at the Convention.
For instance, shall the Federal government be constituted the guardian of the common safety? Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary to this purpose?
Should the Federal government be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them?
If so, the same must be the case in respect to commerce and every other matter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. Is the administration of justice between the citizens of the same State more properly the department of the local governments?
If so, the States must possess all the authorities connected with this object, along with every other that may be allotted to their cognizance and direction.
A policy that fails to confer in each case a degree of power commensurate to the end would violate the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and entrust the great interests of the nation to hands which are disabled from managing them with vigor and success.
A government whose constitution renders it unfit to be entrusted with all the powers a free people ought to delegate to it would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the national interests. However, once these powers are properly delegated, coincident powers may safely accompany them.
The Federal Government Must Have the Power and the Means to Provide for a Common Defense
There is a manifest inconsistency in devolving upon the Federal government the care of the general defense, but leaving in State governments the powers to provide for it.
The Federal government will make the most suitable provisions for the public defense, since it will be the body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided. It will be the center of information, and will best understand the extent and urgency of the dangers that threaten.
As it will be the representative of the whole, it will feel itself most deeply interested in the preservation of every part.
The responsibility implied from the duty assigned to it will most sensibly demand the necessity of proper exertions.
By the extension of its authority throughout the States, it alone can establish uniformity and concert in the plans and measures to secure the common safety.
To leave the State governments in control of the powers of providing for a defense will infallibly lead to a want of cooperation between the Federal and State governments, and among the separate State governments.
Its natural and inevitable concomitants will be weakness, disorder, undue distribution of the burdens and calamities of war, and an unnecessary and intolerable increase of expense.
We had unequivocal experience of these detrimental effects in the course of the Revolutionary War.
Every view we take of the subject convinces us it is both unwise and dangerous to deny to the Federal government an unconfined authority over those objects entrusted to its management. (Of course, a most vigilant and careful attention of the structure of the Federal government is deserved to see it be modeled in such a manner as to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite powers.)
A government whose constitution renders it unfit to be entrusted with all of the powers a free people ought to delegate to any government, would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the national interests. However, once these powers are properly delegated, coincident powers may safely accompany them.
The adversaries of the Constitution failed to confine themselves to showing the internal structure of the Federal government rendered it unworthy of the confidence of the People.
Instead they wandered into inflammatory declamations and senseless objections to the powers conferred.
The powers granted are not too extensive for the objects of Federal administration, namely, the management of our national interests.
Hamilton
Federalist 24: The Objections to a Standing Army Are Illusory
THE ONLY SPECIFIC OBJECTION raised with respect to the powers to be conferred upon the Federal government concerning the creation and direction of the national forces is that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace.
The Objections to Standing Armies Are So Weak as to Betray Duplicity
The objection is brought forward in the most vague and general form, supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument, and without even the sanction of theoretical opinion.
It contradicts the practice of other free nations as well as the general sense of the American People, as they expressed in most State constitutions.
The objection is premised upon a supposed necessity of restraining the legislative authority (Congress) in the article of military establishments.
But the objection is rejected in all State constitutions except two, which do not even prohibit them.
A stranger to our politics might reasonably assume the argument against standing armies must have a foundation based on a positive constitutional injunction against maintaining standing armies in times of peace, or that the whole power of levying troops is vested in the executive without any legislative control.
Yet the Constitution contains neither.
First, it contains no provision in favor of standing armies.
Second, the whole power of raising armies is not lodged in the executive, but instead in the Congress, a popular legislative body consisting of the representatives of the People who are elected every two years.
Further, the proposed Constitution includes an important qualification on the legislative discretion.
Section 8 of Article I provides: “The Congress shall have Power . . . [¶] To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years . . . .”
By forbidding the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any period longer than two years, the drafters have included a precaution that will be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without evident necessity.
The vehement objections and pathetic declamation concerning standing armies are unsupported by a colorable pretext.
The American People – so jealous of their liberties – have declined to insert into their State constitutions the most precise and rigid precautions against standing armies.
Nonetheless, the same omission in the Federal Constitution gave birth to a torrent of apprehension and clamor.
Only two of the several State constitutions contain an interdiction of standing armies in time of peace.
The other eleven State constitutions are silent on the subject, or have express terms admitting the right of the State legislature to authorize their existence.
The two States purporting to interdict standing armies are Pennsylvania and North Carolina, whose constitutions provide: “As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up.”
Upon inspection, the italicized words are more a caution than a prohibition.
The constitutions of four other States – New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland – formally admit the authority of their legislatures to maintain standing armies, using this language: “Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up without the consent of the legislature.”
The italicized language is a formal admission of the authority of the legislature. New York has no bill of rights, and her constitution says not a word about the matter.
No bill of rights appear annexed to the constitutions of any other State, and their constitutions are equally silent.
Further, the Articles of Confederation imposed not a single restraint on a standing army in the United States.
In the absence of a plausible foundation for the cry raised against standing armies, the objection is simply a dubious experiment on the public credulity, dictated by a deliberate deception or an excessive zeal too intemperate to be deceptive, effected by the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to the Constitution.
The allowance of standing armies conforms to the general sense of Americans as declared in their various constitutions, and adds a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them, namely, the requirement of review every two years.
A calm and dispassionate observer might indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and lament that a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions – the adoption of the Constitution – should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination.
The conduct of its opponents has too much appears intended to mislead the People by alarming their passions, and to avoid convincing them with arguments addressed to their intellect.
The American People – so jealous of their liberties – have declined to insert into their State constitutions the most precise and rigid precautions against standing armies. Nonetheless, the same omission in the Federal Constitution gave birth to a torrent of apprehension and clamor.
It is Foreseeable that a Military Force May Soon Be Required
Having set forth the artifice of the objections, I now review the facts concerning standing armies.
Restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in time of peace are improper.
Even if restraints were imposed, they would not be observed due to the necessities of society.
Although a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, various considerations warn us against an excess of confidence or security.
The improvements in the art of navigation have rendered distant nations neighbors, at least as to facility of communication.
Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A future concert of views between these nations is not improbable.
In France and Spain, the increasing remoteness of consanguinity of their monarchs is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between these two kingdoms.
Further, politicians have with great reason always considered ties of blood as precarious links of political connection. These combined circumstances admonish us not to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger.
Regular Federal Troops on the Western Frontier Are Preferable to State Militias
To our north – and stretching far into our interior – are growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain.
To our south – and extending to meet the British settlements – are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain.
For now, it is wise to regard the native tribes on our western frontier as natural enemies – for they have the most to fear from us – and the most to hope from our enemies.
Prior to the Revolution – and ever since the peace – there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our western frontier.
These will remain indispensable, if only to guard against the ravages and depredations of the native tribes.
Our garrisons must be furnished by occasional detachments from the militia or by permanent corps in the pay of the government.
If the garrisons are furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, it would prove impracticable.
Even if it were practicable, it would prove pernicious.
Members of a militia would not long submit – if at all – to being dragged from their occupations and families to perform the disagreeable duty of attending forts, especially in times of profound peace.
And even if they could be prevailed upon (or compelled) to do it, would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private citizens.
The increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, the loss of labor, and the disruption of the industrious pursuits of individuals would conclusively doom the scheme.
The better resource is a permanent corps in the pay of the Federal government.
It will be a standing army in time of peace: a small one, indeed, but real nonetheless.
This view of the subject shows at once the impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and prudence of the Congress.
As the United States increases in strength, it is certain Britain and Spain would augment their military establishments in our neighborhood.
Unless we are willing to be exposed – in a naked and defenseless condition – to their insults and encroachments, it will be expedient to increase our frontier garrisons in a ratio to the force by which our western settlements might be annoyed.
Some of the particular posts will include the command of large districts of territory, and facilitate future expansion into the remainder.
These posts also will be keys to trade with the native American nations.
No one can think it wise to leave such posts in a situation at any instant to be seized by one or two formidable neighboring powers.
The usual maxims of prudence and policy dictate otherwise.
A Federal Navy Also is Required
If we are to be a commercial people – or only to secure our Atlantic side – we must have a navy as soon as possible.
There must be dockyards and arsenals, with fortifications and garrisons to protect them.
When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its dockyards by its fleets, the necessity of protective garrisons will be superseded.
But where naval establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons will be an indispensable security against naval attacks on our arsenals and dockyards, and sometimes on the fleet itself.
Hamilton
Federalist 25: The Utility of a Federal Standing Army
A Federal Standing Army Must Be Controlled by the Federal Government, not State Governments
THE ARGUMENT THAT STANDING ARMIES ought to be provided for by State governments under Federal direction is an inversion of the primary principle of our political association.
The project would be oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful to the United States.
Although the territories of Britain, Spain, and the native tribes do not border on particular States, they encircle the United States from Maine to Georgia.
The danger is a common one, although in different degrees.
The means of guarding against it ought to be the objects of common councils and a common treasury.
Due to local situation, some States are more directly exposed, such as New York.
But if New York had to provide for its own defense, it would have to sustain not only the whole weight of establishments requisite to her own immediate safety, but also the protection of her neighbors.
This would be both inequitable as to New York and unsafe as to her neighbors.
Various inconveniences would attend such a system. To those States required to support the necessary establishments, they would be unwilling and unable to bear the burden for a considerable in the future.
Further, the security of all would be subject to the parsimony, improvidence or inability of a part.
Should the resources of one State become more abundant and extensive – and its provisions proportionally enlarged – the other States quickly would take alarm at seeing the whole military force of the United States in the hands of two or three States, which likely would be among the most powerful in the country.
Every lesser State would choose some counterpoise.
Pretenses easily could be contrived.
The growth of competing military establishments – nourished by mutual jealousy – would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper size.
Being at the separate disposal of the State, they would be engines for the abridgment or demolition of the national authority.
The People Will Keep a Warier Eye on the Representatives of the Federal Government
I have already given reasons why State governments will be naturally prone to a rivalry with the United States.
The foundation of the rivalry is the love of power. In any contest between the Federal government and one of the States, the citizens of that State would be most apt to unite with their local government.
The ambition of a State – stimulated by its separate and independent possession of military forces – would afford too strong a temptation (and too great a facility) to make enterprises upon and ultimately subvert the constitutional authority of the United States.
In those circumstances, the liberty of the People would be less safe than if the national forces were left in the hands of the Federal government.
Because an army may be considered a dangerous weapon of power, it ought to be in the hands of individuals of whom the People are most jealous (distant Federal representatives), rather than in the hands of those of whom the People are least jealous (State representatives).
The People are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.
The framers of our former Confederation were fully aware of the danger to the United States from the separate possession of military forces by the States.
They expressly prohibited the States from having either ships or troops without the consent of Congress.
A Federal government supported only by State military establishments will result in conflict between the States and the United States.
Other reasons demonstrate the impropriety of restraining the discretion of Congress with respect to standing armies, as revealed by a cross-examination of potential objections.
Those opposed to standing army in times of peace never inform us how far the prohibition should extend.
Does the prohibition extend to raising armies as well as keeping them up, whether the season be tranquil or not?
If it be confined to keeping them up, it will be imprecise, and thus ineffectual. What shall be denominated “keeping them up,” once armies are raised?
What date shall be designated to ascertain a violation?
Shall it be a week, a month, a year?
The People are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.
Or shall we say they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned their raising continues?
To admit this is to admit they might be kept up in time of peace, against threatening or impending danger.
This would at once deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and introduce an extensive latitude of construction.
Who shall be the judge of the continuance of the danger?
That question undoubtedly must be submitted to the Federal government, where the matter would eventually be brought to the issue whether the Federal government, in order to provide against an apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise troops, and afterwards keep them on foot as long as the peace or safety of the community was in any degree of jeopardy.
A discretion of such wide latitude would afford ample room for eluding the force of any paper prohibition of a standing army.
The Only Reason to Limit a Standing Army Is the Possibility Congress and President Might Combine to Usurp Power
The utility of a provision against standing armies in times of peace can be founded only on the possibility of a combination between the executive and the legislative in some scheme of usurpation.
If this should happen, they easily could fabricate pretenses of approaching danger. Indian hostilities – instigated by Spain or Britain – would always be at hand.
Foreign powers could themselves stage provocations to produce the desired appearances, in exchange for Federal concessions.
If an army were raised in response, it easily could be applied to execute the project of usurpation.
Some might respond the militia of the country is a natural bulwark against a standing army, and would be at all times equal to the national defense. This belief would have lost the Revolution.
Even in Circumstances of Attempted Usurpation, a Standing Army Will Still Prove Essential
To obviate this possibility, one might argue the prohibition against a standing army ought be limited to the raising of armies in time of peace.
But if this prohibition were added, the Constitution would incapacitate the nation from preparing a defense before it was actually invaded.
This would be an extraordinary spectacle for the world to see. The Federal government would have to await the presence of an enemy within our territory to warrant the commencement of levies of men for the protection of the country.
We would have to await receipt of an actual blow before even preparing to return it, contrary to the policies by which nations anticipate distant danger to meet gathering storm.
We would thereby expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness to seize us as naked and defenseless prey, based on the fear that our leaders – created by our choice and dependent on our will – might endanger our liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation.
State Militias Are an Inadequate Substitute for a Standing Army
Some might respond the militia of the country is a natural bulwark against a standing army, and would be at all times equal to the national defense.
This belief would have lost the Revolution.
The facts from our own experience are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion.
The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind.
Considerations of economy confirm this position.
During the Revolution, the valor of the American militia erected eternal monuments to their fame, but the bravest of them know the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were.
Like most other things, war is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, perseverance, time, and practice.
The Recent Rebellions in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts Prove the Utility of a Standing Army
All policies based on violence defeat themselves, as they are contrary to the natural course of human affairs and experience. Recent events in Pennsylvania affords an example of the truth of this remark.
The bill of rights of that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace.
Nevertheless, in a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of her counties, Pennsylvania resolved to raise a body of troops; and in all probability will keep them up as long as there is any appearance of danger to the public peace.
The conduct of Massachusetts also affords a lesson on the same subject, although on different ground.
That State (without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the Articles of the Confederation required) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the spirit of revolt.
The constitution of Massachusetts contained no obstacle to the measure; but the instance of its still instructs us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as well as under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in time of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is therefore improper in this respect to control the legislative discretion.
It also teaches us – in its application to the United States – how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be respected, even by its own constituents.
And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public necessity.
The Example of Lysander
In the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, tradition held the post of admiral could not be conferred twice on the same person.
But when their Peloponnesian confederates suffered a severe defeat at sea from the Athenians, the confederates demanded that Lysander (who had before served with success in the post of admiral) command the combined fleets.
The Lacedaemonians agreed (not only to gratify their allies – but also to preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient institutions), yet they resorted to the flimsy subterfuge of naming Lysander vice-admiral, although he was actually vested with the real power of an admiral.
This example is selected from among a multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced and illustrated by domestic examples, which is: nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated to run counter to the necessities of society.
Wise politicians are cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know that every breach of fundamental law – though dictated by necessity – impairs that sacred reverence rulers ought to maintain towards the constitution of their country, and sets a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
Hamilton
Federalist 26: The Constitution’s Biennial Review of Standing Armies Is Salutary
The Balance of Power and Privilege
IT WAS HARDLY TO BE EXPECTED that the minds of individuals inspired by our popular revolution would stop at that happy median that combines the energy of government with the security of private rights.
There is a salutary yet delicate boundary between power and privilege that can give rise to difficulties.
Unless resolved as to standing armies, we will travel from one chimerical project to another, marking change upon change, but without any material change for the better.
Those who would restrict the Congress will combat the general consensus of America. Instead of learning from experience – which counsels avoidance of extremes – the opponents of congressional authority would conduct us into more dangerous and extravagant extremities.
The idea of restraining the authority of Congress to provide for the national defense originates in a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. It found support only in Pennsylvania and North Carolina.
Every other State refused to give it the least countenance – wisely judging that the very act of delegating power requires we place confidence somewhere – and it is better to hazard an abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic restrictions on the legislative authority.
Those who would restrict the Congress will combat the general consensus of America. Instead of learning from experience – which counsels avoidance of extremes – the opponents of congressional authority would conduct us into more dangerous and extravagant extremities.
The doctrines they propound are calculated to induce us to depress or relax the tone of government by expedients that were condemned or forborne on other occasions.
But the citizens of America have too much discernment to be argued into anarchy.
Experience has wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind that greater energy of government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the community.
Historical Restrictions on Funding Standing Armies Were Directed Principally at Hereditary Monarchs
The idea that aims to exclude military establishments in times of peace has its origins in the history of England, a land from which many of the inhabitants of our country have sprung.
For a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of the monarch was almost unlimited Inroads were gradually made upon the prerogative in favor of liberty – first by the barons and afterwards by the People – until the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became extinct.
English liberty was made complete with the glorious (or bloodless) revolution which elevated the Prince of Orange to the throne in 1688.
Prior to that event, Charles II had kept on foot (in time of peace) a body of 5,000 regular troops, based on his own authority and incident to the undefined power of making war, which was an acknowledged prerogative of the British crown.
James II increased this number to 30,000, who were paid out of his civil list.
In order to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an authority, the Bill of Rights was amended after the revolution to declare “the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless with the consent of parliament, was against law.”
Thus when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch in that kingdom, no security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up based solely on the monarch’s authority alone.
The British patriots who effected the memorable revolution were too temperate and well-informed to impose any restraint on legislative discretion.
They were aware a certain number of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable, that no precise bounds could be set to national exigencies, and that a power equal to every possible contingency must exist somewhere in the government.
By referring the exercise of that power to the judgment of their legislature (the Parliament), they had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution that could be reconciled with the safety of the community.
The Fear of a Standing Army Should Not Exist when Authorized by Congress, which Represents the People
From this history, the People of America have developed a natural disposition to view standing armies in times of peace as a danger to liberty.
The circumstances of our revolution have further quickened the public sensibility on every point connected with the security of popular rights. But the warmth of this zeal was raised beyond the degree consistent with the due temperature of the body politic with the attempts of Pennsylvania and North Carolina to restrict the authority of the legislature in the article on military establishments.
These States erroneously assumed that the reasons for being vigilant against misuse of this power by monarchs extended to the representatives of the People in their popular assemblies.
Even in some States where this error was not expressly adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought not to be kept up, in time of peace, without the consent of the legislature.
Such declarations were unnecessary because the reason for introducing a similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is inapplicable to any of the State constitutions.
Under all of those State constitutions, the power of raising armies resides in the legislature. It would superfluous – if not absurd – to declare that a matter should not be done without the consent of the body which alone had the power of doing it!
No State Constitution Actually Prohibits a Standing Army
Even in the two states which seem to have meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of peace, the mode of expression is merely cautionary, not prohibitory.
The constitutions of Pennsylvania and North Carolina do not say standing armies shall not be kept up, but that they ought not to be kept up, in time of peace.
This ambiguity of terms appears to result from a conflict between jealousy and conviction, between the desire of excluding such establishments at all events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be unwise and unsafe.
In other State constitutions – including the celebrated constitution of New York – there is a total silence upon the subject.
Even If Standing Armies Were Disfavored on Paper, a Crisis Would Compel Their Existence
Can anyone doubt that a mere admonition against standing armies would yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of a state or nation when the People, through their representatives, demanded it?
What is the use of such a provision if it ceases to operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard it?
There can be no comparison between admonitions of State constitutions and the provision in the federal Constitution restraining the appropriations of money for military purposes to the period of two years.
Article I, section 8, clause 12, of the Constitution expressly grants to Congress this power: “To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; . . . .”
The State constitutional provisions purporting to limit standing armies aim at too much, and effect nothing.
The federal provision steers clear of this imprudent extreme and will have a salutary and powerful operation because it is perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the exigencies of the nation.
At least once every two years, the legislature of the United States will be obliged to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot, come to a new resolution on the point, and declare their sense of the matter by a formal vote in the face of their constituents.
They are not at liberty to vest permanent funds with the executive for the support of an army, even if they were to act so incautiously.
As the spirit of party infects all political bodies in different degrees, there will undoubtedly arise persons in the national legislature willing enough to advocate for providing permanent military funds to the executive department, and to label contrary views criminal.
As the spirit of party infects all political bodies in different degrees, there will undoubtedly arise persons in the national legislature willing enough to advocate for providing permanent military funds to the executive department, and to label contrary views criminal.
However, the provision for limiting the support of a military force will always be a topic favored by those inclined to warn of the dangers to liberty. If they be members of the party in opposition, they will arouse and attract public attention whenever the question comes forward.
Should the majority actually be disposed to exceed proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it.
State Legislatures Will Be the Voice – and If Necessary – the Arm of the People’s Discontent
And the State legislatures – being independent of parties in the national legislature – will always be vigilant, suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against encroachments from the Federal government.
They will constantly be awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and if any thing improper appears, will be ready enough to sound the alarm to the People.
The State legislatures will be the voice of the majority, and if necessary, the arm of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community to mature them for execution.
An army so large as seriously to menace those liberties could only be formed by progressive augmentations.
This would require a continued conspiracy over a period of time, not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive. Is it probable such a combination could exist at all, and then be persevered in and transmitted through all the successive variations of a representative body elected in whole or in part every two years?
Can we presume that the instant a representative took a seat in Congress that individual would commence as a traitor to constituents and country?
Can it be supposed that not one representative would be discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise constituents of their danger?
If such a presumption can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority.
The People would recall all the powers they have heretofore ceded, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are counties, in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in person.
Would Every Member of Congress Become a Traitor to a Conspiracy?
Even if we assume every representative made a pledge to become a traitor to constituents and country, still the concealment of the design would be impracticable for any duration.
The very circumstance of greatly augmenting the army in times of profound peace would itself announce the conspiracy.
What colorable reason could be assigned for such vast augmentations of the military force in a country situated like the United States?
It is impossible the People would be long deceived. The destruction of the project – and of its progenitors – would quickly follow the discovery.
Some have suggested the executive branch could circumvent the two-year limit on appropriations because once possessed of a force large enough to awe the People into submission, the President would find resources in that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the Congress.
But upon what pretense could the executive be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace?
If the force were created as a result of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then the objection thereto would not apply because if the objection is leveled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace.
Few persons could seriously contend military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion.
If defense of the community should require an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, it is one of those calamities having neither prevention nor cure.
No possible form of government can provide against it. It might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive with confederates or allies, should it be necessary to form an army for common defense.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than a disunited state.
And in a state of disunion (as discussed in Federalist 8), the evil of a standing army would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable.
It is not easy to conceive that dangers so formidable will assail the whole union as to demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if we take into our view the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary.
Hamilton
Federalist 27: A Properly Administered Federal Government Will Not Require Force to Execute Its Laws
SOME HAVE ARGUED THE CONSTITUTION CANNOT OPERATE without the aid of a military force to execute its laws.
The argument most likely originates in the assumption the People will be disinclined to the exercise of Federal authority on any internal State matter.
Why should we presuppose the People will be disinclined to the exercise of Federal power on internal State issues? Unless we presume the powers of the Federal government will be worse administered than those of the State governments, we should not presume the People’s ill-will, disaffection, or opposition. As a general rule, the People’s confidence in and obedience to the Federal government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration.
We should not presuppose the Federal government will be worse administered than State governments.
Consider first the Senate of the United States, which will be comprised of individuals selected by the State legislatures, whose members themselves are composed of individuals selected by the People.
The extension of the spheres of election will present a greater latitude of choice to the People.
If we should presuppose anything, it would be the Senate will be composed with peculiar care and judgment, with the promise of greater knowledge and more extensive information in the national councils.
As a result, the Senate would be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction. It would be more out of the reach of those occasional ill-humors or temporary prejudices and propensities which – in smaller societies – frequently contaminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of the community, and engender schemes which – though they gratify a momentary inclination or desire – terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust.
Unless someone can advance reasons why the Federal government will be so maladministered as to render it odious or contemptible to the People, the laws of the United States will neither meet with obstruction from the People, nor stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution than the laws of the particular States.
Extending Federal Law to Individuals Will Strengthen the United States
The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition, and the dread of punishment is a proportionably strong discouragement to it.
Will not the Federal government – possessed of a due degree of power which can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole country – be more likely to repress the hope of impunity and to inspire the dread of punishment – than that of a single State, which can only command the resources within herself?
A turbulent faction within a State might suppose itself able to contend with the opposition of the friends of the government in that State.
Yet such a faction can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the United States.
If this be true, it also is true that irregular combinations of individuals opposed to the authority of the United States will pose less resistance to that authority than that of a single State.
The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition, and the dread of punishment is a proportionably strong discouragement to it.
The more that the operations of the Federal government are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of State governments, the more the People will be accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life.
The more the Federal Government is familiarized to the sight and feelings of the People – and the more it acts sensibly and puts in motion the most active springs of the human heart – the greater the probability it will earn the respect and attachment of the People.
Man is very much a creature of habit.
A thing that rarely strikes his senses will generally little influence his mind.
A Federal government continually at a distance and out of sight will little interest the sensations of the People.
The authority of the Federal government – and the affections of the People towards it – will be strengthened by its extension to internal State matters.
The Federal government will have less occasion to resort to force in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency.
The more the Federal government circulates through those channels and currents in which the passions of the People naturally flow, the less will it require the perilous expedient of violent compulsion.
One thing is certain.
The Federal government as set forth in the Constitution will be less likely to need force to enforce the laws of the United States than a Federal authority which only operates on States in their political or collective capacities as States.
As I explained in Federalist 15, in that type of league, the only sanction for disobedience of Federal law is force. Frequent delinquencies of the States would be the natural offspring of the very frame of the government.
As often as they happen, the only redress – if any – would be by violence and war.
Extending the authority of the Federal government to the individual citizens of the several States will enable it to employ the ordinary administration of each State in the execution of its laws.
In practice this will destroy all distinctions between the sources of governmental power.
It will give the Federal government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority now enjoyed by the government of each State.
In addition to this influence on public opinion, the Federal government will benefit from the public knowledge that it has the power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the entire United States.
The laws of the United States will become the supreme law of the land as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction.
Every State officer – whether legislative, executive, or judicial – will be bound by the sanctity of oath to uphold those laws.
All State legislatures, courts, and officers will be incorporated into the operations of the Federal government – as far as its just and constitutional authority extends – and thus be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.
To those who argue this will tend to the destruction of the State governments, Federalist 41 and Federalist 44 give a complete reply.
Extending the authority of the Federal government to the individual citizens of the several States will enable it to employ the ordinary administration of each State in the execution of its laws. In practice this will destroy all distinctions between the sources of governmental power.
Anyone honestly reflecting on these circumstances will perceive the laws of the United States will be peacefully executed if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence.
If those laws be injudiciously administered, the best government that ever was or ever will be would provoke and precipitate the People into the wildest excesses.
The adversaries of the Constitution presumed that the Federal rulers would be insensitive to the motives of public good or to the obligations of duty.
To them I would ask: how can the interests of ambition or the views of encroachment be promoted by such a conduct?
Hamilton
Federalist 28: A Federal Standing Army Can Quell Insurrections
The Use of Force May Be Required to Quell Civil Disturbances
SEDITIONS AND INSURRECTIONS are maladies that are as inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions are from the natural body.
Thus, the idea of governing at all times with the simple force of law exists only in the reveries of those political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction.
Emergencies of this kind arise at times in all societies, no matter how they are constituted.
Our own experience corroborates the lessons taught by the examples of other nations. Should such an emergency arise under the Constitution, the only response must be by force, since an insurrection – whatever its immediate cause – eventually endangers all forms of government.
State Militias are Adequate to Control Minor Disturbances
The means employed to respond to such an event must be proportional to the mischief.
If it is but a slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the other States would be adequate suppress it.
The Federal government should presume that the State militias would be ready to do their duty, if only to preserve the public peace.
As for upholding the rights of the Federal government, it would be irrational to assume State militias would not assist – so long as the people find the practices of that government conducive to their prosperity and felicity.
Larger Disturbances Require a Force Greater than State Militias
If an insurrection should pervade a whole or principal part of a State, it might be unavoidable to employ a different kind of force.
Massachusetts found it necessary to raise troops for repressing the disorders within its borders.
Pennsylvania also thought it was proper to have recourse to the same remedy from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of her citizens.
If the State of New York had been inclined to reestablish her lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont, could she have hoped for success from the efforts of her militia alone?
Would she not have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force for the execution of her design?
In the event the representatives of the People betray their constituents, the only resource left is the exercise of the right of self-defense, a right paramount to all positive forms of government. The right of self-defense against the usurpations of the Federal government can be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than against an individual State government.
Dividing the United States into Three, Four or Thirteen Separate Parts Is No Solution
Those who object to a standing army for the Federal government presumably would also object to the existence of a standing army for three or four confederacies of States.
Would not each of them be exposed to the same insurrections as a Federal government?
Would not each confederacy have recourse to the same expedients for upholding its authority which are objected to in a Federal government for all the States?
Would a militia be more ready or more able to support the Federal authority than in the case of the general union under the Constitution?
The principle of the objection applies equally in both cases.
Whether we have one government for all of the States, or different governments for different parcels of them – or even if there should be an entire separation of the States – it might become necessary to use a force constituted differently from the militias, in order to preserve the peace of the community and maintain the just authority of the laws against those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections and rebellions.
To those who would require a more definite prohibition against military establishments in times of peace, it is a full answer to say that the whole power of the Federal government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the People.
This is the essential and only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the People attainable in a civil society.
It can be said without exaggeration that in a republican confederacy of State governments like ours, the People are entirely the masters of their own fate. Power is almost always the rival of power. Just as the Federal government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of State governments, the State governments will have the same disposition towards the Federal government. By throwing themselves onto either scale, the People will infallibly tip those scales in their favor. If their rights are invaded by either the Federal or State governments, the People can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.
The Innate Right of Self-Defense Is Available to Counter a Federal Usurpation
In the event the representatives of the People betray their constituents, the only resource left is the exercise of the right of self-defense, a right paramount to all positive forms of government.
The right of self-defense against the usurpations of the Federal government can be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than against an individual State government.
If the persons entrusted with control of a State government become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, and districts of the State – having no distinct government in each – can take no regular measure for defense.
The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, system, or resource, except in their courage and despair.
The usurpers – clothed with the forms of legal authority – can too often crush the opposition in embryo. In smaller States, it will be more difficult for the People to form a regular or systematic plan of opposition.
Hence it will be easier to defeat their initial efforts. It will be easier to obtain speedy intelligence of their preparations and movements.
Hence the military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part where the opposition has begun.
In this situation there must be a peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation – and the facilities of resistance – increase with the physical extent of a State, provided the individual citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend them.
The natural strength of the People – compared to the artificial strength of a government – is greater in a large community than in a small, and of course more competent to a struggle with the attempts of any government to establish a tyranny.
The People Can Tip the Balance against State or Federal Usurpations of Power
It can be said without exaggeration that in a republican confederacy of State governments like ours, the People are entirely the masters of their own fate.
Power is almost always the rival of power.
Just as the Federal government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of State governments, the State governments will have the same disposition towards the Federal government.
By throwing themselves onto either scale, the People will infallibly tip those scales in their favor.
If their rights are invaded by either the Federal or State governments, the People can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.
By supporting the creation of the United States, the People have wisely preserved to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the People’s liberty.
The projects of usurpation by the Federal government cannot be masked under pretenses that would likely to escape notice by the select bodies of individuals in the State governments, nor by the People at large.
The State legislatures will have access to more information regarding Federal plots to usurp power.
They can discover the danger at a distance. Since State governments possess all the organs of civil power – as well as the confidence of the People – they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition to the Federal government by combining all the resources of the community.
They also can readily communicate with each other in the different States, and thereby unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty.
The great extent of the country is a further security.
We have already experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign power.
And it would have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious rulers in the Federal government.
If the army of the Federal government should be able to quell the resistance of one State, it would be within the power of distant States to make head with fresh forces.
The Federal government would have to abandon the advantages obtained in one State to subdue the opposition in other States.
And upon the moment the State reduced to submission was left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.
In all events, the extent of a Federal military force is naturally limited by the resources of the States.
It will not be possible to create a large Federal army for many years, but as our means increase, so too will our means of increasing the Federal army. Of course, this increase in means can grow only in proportion to the increase of the population and natural strength of the People and their communities.
Will the time ever arrive when the Federal government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great body of the People of an immense empire?
Not so long as the People – through the medium of their State governments – take measures for their own defense, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of independent nations.
Those who fail to apprehend these facts may be viewed as suffering from a disease, for no cure can be found in the resources of argument and reasoning.
Hamilton
Federalist 29: Congress Must Fund and the President Must Control State Militias
The Federal Government Should Regulate State Militias
IF WELL-REGULATED MILITIAS are the most natural defenders of a free country, they certainly ought to be regulated by and be at the disposal of the Federal government, which the Constitution establishes as the guardian of the national security.
The power of regulating State militias – and of commanding their services in times of insurrection and invasion – are natural incidents to the power and duty of the Federal government to superintend the common defense and watch over the internal peace of the United States.
The State Militias Should Be Uniform and Ready to Defend
Even a person unskilled in the science of war can discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militias naturally would lead to the most beneficial effects whenever it was called to serve for the public defense.
Uniformity in organization and discipline of the State militias would fit them much sooner to the degree of military proficiency needed to discharge the duties of the camp and field with mutual intelligence.
The Constitution Expressly Provides for the Congress to Fund and Arm State Militias and for the President to Lead Them
Such uniformity can be accomplished only by confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the Federal government.
Thus, the Constitution empowers the Federal government “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by congress.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 16, emphasis added.
And the President “shall” be their Commander in Chief, which is in accordance with an enumerated power: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.” Art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
State Militias Are a Natural Bulwark Against Federal Tyranny
Militias are the bodies to whom we commit the protection of the individual States.
If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, a Federal power over the militias will lessen the inducement and the pretext to such armies.
If the Federal government cannot command the aid of State militias in those emergencies which call for military support of the President, it will more likely employ a different type of force, such as a standing army.
The most certain method of preventing a standing army is to render its existence unnecessary – a method more sure than a thousand prohibitions on paper.
The Absence of a Posse Comitatus Provision Proves Nothing
Those opposed to a power in the Federal government to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the United States point to the absence of any constitutional provision granting a Federal power to summon the posse comitatus of able-bodied individuals to assist with the execution of the President’s duties.
From this they infer the President’s only auxiliary is military force.
There appears a striking incoherence to an argument that in one breath tells us the power of the Federal government will be despotic and unlimited due to its military force, and in the next that the same government has not authority sufficient even to call out the posse comitatus.
The right to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute the Federal government’s declared powers undoubtedly includes requiring citizens to assist the officers entrusted with the execution of those laws.
There is no reason to infer the expression of a power to use a military force includes an intent that such force be the sole instrument of authority.
To summarize: the most to be reasonably aimed at with respect to the People at large is to see that they are properly armed and equipped. So this is not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.
The Citizenry Should Be Armed and Equipped Annually
It is unlikely the Federal power to discipline the militia would extend in practice to all the individual citizens of the United States.
The project would be as futile as it would be injurious, even if it were capable of being carried into execution.
A tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires time and practice. Neither a day nor a week would suffice to attain it.
It would be a real grievance to the People – and a serious public inconvenience and loss – to oblige all classes of citizens to be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions as often as necessary to acquire the degree of perfection that characterizes a well-regulated militia.
Even to attempt the thing would abridge the mass of labor and industry so considerably as to be unwise.
And if the experiment were made, it would fail as soon as endurance gave out.
To summarize: the most to be reasonably aimed at with respect to the People at large is to see that they are properly armed and equipped.
So this is not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.
Misuse of State Militias to Execute Federal Tyranny Is Unlikely
Another improbable and exaggerated claim is the Federal government will march one or more State militias to a distant State or States.
It is announced the militia of New Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain.
It is said that even the wartime debts due the French and Dutch are not to be paid in their native currencies but instead with able-bodied American militiamen.
At one moment the critics of the Constitution envisage a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the People, and at another they foresee the militia of Virginia being dragged from their homes to tame that obstinate resistance to authority habitual to the citizens of Massachusetts.
And then again the militia of Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance to subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians.
Can such mad and delirious arguments be expected to persuade the People of America to abandon infallible truth?
Assuming a State militia were called to undertake a distant and hopeless Federal expedition to rivet the chains of slavery upon a part of their countrymen, said militia – properly irritated by the order of so foolish and wicked a project – would more likely direct its course to the seat of the tyrants, in order to crush their grasping and imagined power, and make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed People.
A Misused Militia Would Probably First March on the Federal Capital
If a Federal standing army is to be made the engine of Federal despotism, what need is there of State militias to assist this scheme of tyranny?
If there be no Federal standing army, the chances of oppression are even less.
Assuming a State militia were called to undertake a distant and hopeless Federal expedition to rivet the chains of slavery upon a part of their countrymen, said militia – properly irritated by the order of so foolish and wicked a project – would more likely direct its course to the seat of the tyrants, in order to crush their grasping and imagined power, and make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed People.
State Militias Should Have a Ready Body of Individuals Who Can Serve
As for the composition of State militias, they should have an excellent body of well-trained members ready to take the field whenever the defense of a State requires it. This will lessen the call for military establishments.
If circumstances should oblige the Federal government to form an army of any magnitude, that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the People so long as a large body of individual citizens – little if at all inferior to the army in discipline and the use of arms – stand ready to defend their own rights and those of the People.
Well-regulated State militias are the only substitutes for a Federal standing army, and the best possible security against such an army should it exist.
As for the far-fetched fear that conjures danger to liberty from militias, one is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or raillery. Is the argument a mere trial of skill – like the paradoxes of rhetoricians – a disingenuous artifice to instill prejudices at any price? Or is it simply the offspring of political fanaticism?
State Militias Must Be Available to Quell Neighboring Disturbances
When we finally arrive at the true facts, it would be natural and proper – in times of insurrection or invasion – for the militia of a State to be marched into a neighboring State in order to resist a common enemy or to guard the republic against the violence of faction or sedition.
Resisting a common enemy was frequently the case for utilizing State militias in the course of the Revolutionary War.
This mutual succor is indeed a principal end of our political association.
Placing the power over such forces in Federal hands will lessen the risk State governments will lapse into a listless inattention to the dangers of a neighboring force until its near approach had awakened the feeble impulses of duty and the urge to self-preservation.
As for the far-fetched fear that conjures danger to liberty from militias, one is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or raillery.
Is the argument a mere trial of skill – like the paradoxes of rhetoricians – a disingenuous artifice to instill prejudices at any price?
Or is it simply the offspring of political fanaticism?
The States Retain the Important Power of Appointing All Officers to Their Militias
In the name of common sense, where are our fears to end if we cannot trust our sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, neighbors, and fellow-citizens?
What shadow of danger can be cast from individuals daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen, and who experience the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests?
How can the Federal power over State militias be a vehicle to tyranny while the particular States have the sole and exclusive appointment of its officers, as the Constitution declares?
The appointment of militia officers by the States should extinguish any fear the Federal government will establish tyranny by means of State militias.
By reserving to the States the sole and exclusive power to appoint officers, the States will always maintain a preponderating influence over their respective militias.
Hamilton