These four essays form the fifth major division of The Federalist Papers and mark a clear shift in authorship and focus.
After Hamilton finished the case for energetic federal powers (military authority and taxation), Madison takes the lead.
He steps back from specific powers and addresses the deeper foundational questions:
How difficult was it to design this Constitution?
Was the Convention authorized to propose it?
And does the finished plan truly conform to republican principles?
Federalist 37 opens by candidly describing the enormous practical and theoretical difficulties the Convention faced—balancing energy with liberty, federal with national features, large states with small states, and the limits of human language itself when defining power.
Federalist 38 answers critics who attacked the Convention’s work by comparing it favorably to the chaotic history of other founding moments and exposing the incoherence of the opposition’s alternatives.
Federalist 39 then delivers one of Madison’s most important analyses: the new government is neither purely federal nor purely national, but a carefully mixed compound that is thoroughly republican.
Federalist 40 closes the block by defending the Convention’s authority, showing that its members acted within the spirit (if not the narrow letter) of their instructions and that the people themselves remain the final judges through the ratification process.
Together these four papers pivot the entire series from “why we need a stronger government” to “how the proposed Constitution was legitimately formed and why it is genuinely republican.”
Federalist 37: The Considerations Moving the Constitutional Convention
AS THE ULTIMATE OBJECT OF THESE PAPERS is to determine clearly and fully the merits of the Constitution, the plan cannot be complete without taking a more critical and thorough survey of the work of the Constitutional Convention, in which I examine all its sides, compare all its parts, and calculate its probable effects.
So that this remaining task is executed under impressions conducive to a just and fair result, some reflections must be indulged.
Public Measures Are Rarely Examined with Moderation
Inseparable from human affairs is the misfortune that public measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good.
This spirit is more apt to be diminished than promoted on those occasions which require an unusual exercise of it.
As evidenced in their own publications, some scanned the Constitution – not only with a predisposition to censure – but with a predetermination to condemn. Others betrayed the opposite predetermination or bias, which rendered their opinions also of little moment in the question.
The Constitution Was Not Excepted from Unjustified Criticism
To those who have experienced the tendency to abandon moderation with respect to public measures, it is unsurprising the Constitution excited dispositions unfriendly to a fair discussion and accurate judgment of its merits, both by its opponents and proponents.
The Constitution recommended so many important changes and innovations – which could be viewed in many lights and relations – that it touched upon the springs of many passions and interests.
As evidenced in their own publications, some scanned the Constitution – not only with a predisposition to censure – but with a predetermination to condemn.
Others betrayed the opposite predetermination or bias, which rendered their opinions also of little moment in the question.
In placing these different characters on a balance with respect to the weight of their opinions, I do not insinuate there was no material difference in the purity of their intentions.
The predetermined patron of what has been actually done may have taken his bias from the weight of the considerations that our situation was universally admitted to be peculiarly critical, and to require indispensably that something should be done for our relief.
Such a person also may have been motivated by considerations of a sinister nature.
The predetermined adversary, however, cannot claim that blind opposition was justified as an innocent mistake.
These Papers Are Directed to Impartial Readers, not Partisans
The truth is these papers are not addressed to persons falling under either of these characters.
My writings solicit the attention only of those having a sincere zeal for the happiness of our country, and a temper favorable to a just estimate of the means of promoting it.
Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the Constitution without having a predisposition to find or to magnify faults, but with the understanding that a faultless plan was not to be expected.
These persons will not assign liability for errors stemming from the fallibility of a convention of individuals, of which the Convention was one.
Rather, they will also keep in mind that they themselves are but individuals, and ought not to assume an infallibility in reexamining the fallible opinions of others.
The Convention Was Novel Historically
Aside from the difficulties just discussed, many allowances ought to be made for the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking referred to the Convention.
I am immediately struck by the novelty of the undertaking. The then-existing Confederation of States was founded on principles proven to be fallacious.
Consequently, it was necessary to rebuild this first foundation, and the superstructure resting upon it.
Other confederacies had been governed by or experienced the same erroneous principles.
These historical precedents were but beacons – giving warning of the course to be shunned, but without pointing out the course to be pursued. In such a situation, the most the Convention could do was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well as of our own; and to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors, as future experiences unfold them.
Energy in government is essential to that security against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws which are the very definition of good government.
Reconciling Energy versus Stability in Government
A very important difficulty encountered by the Convention was combining the requisite stability and energy in government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican form.
Without substantially accomplishing this part of their undertaking, the representatives would have very imperfectly fulfilled the object of their appointment, or the expectation of the public.
That this was not easily accomplished is denied only by those willing to betray ignorance of the subject.
Energy in government is essential to that security against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws which are the very definition of good government.
Stability in government is essential to national character and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the People, which are among the chief blessings of civil society.
Irregular and mutable legislation is more odious than evil to the People.
It may be pronounced with assurance that the People of this country – enlightened as they are with regard to the nature – and interested in the effects of good government (as the great body of them are) – will never be satisfied until a good remedy is applied to the vicissitudes and uncertainties which characterize the State administrations.
Stability in government is essential to national character and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the People, which are among the chief blessings of civil society.
Liberty Is Maintained by Comparatively Short Terms
Mingling the valuable ingredients of stability and regard for human nature in due proportion with the vital principles of republican liberty discloses two complementary views.
A republican government – composed of representatives – demands that all power should be derived from the People. But liberty insists that those entrusted with the power should be kept in independence from the People.
This can be done by limiting the duration of appointments to a relatively short period – and that even during this short period the trust should be placed in a number of hands, not a few.
Stability requires that the hands in which power is lodged should continue for the same length of time, while energy in government requires a certain duration of power, and the execution of it by a single hand.
A frequent change of representatives results from frequent elections, and a frequent change of measures results from a frequent change of representatives.
The Convention Undertook an Arduous Endeavor
How far the Convention succeeded in this part of their work will better appear on a more accurate view of it.
From the cursory one here taken, it clearly appears it was an arduous effort.
Not less arduous was the task of marking the proper line of partition between the authority of the Federal government and that of the State governments.
Every person will be aware of the difficulties in proportion to being accustomed to contemplate and discriminate objects extensive and complicated in their nature.
The Workings of the Human Mind Are Not Easily Classified
The faculties of the mind itself have not yet been distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical philosophers.
Sense, perception, judgment, desire, volition, memory, and imagination are found to be separated by such delicate shades and minute gradations that their boundaries have eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain a pregnant source of ingenious disquisition and controversy.
The boundaries between the great kingdom of nature, and still more, between the various provinces, and lesser portions, into which they are subdivided, afford another illustration of the same important truth.
The most sagacious and laborious naturalists have never yet succeeded in tracing with certainty the line which separates the district of vegetable life from the neighboring region of unorganized matter, or which marks the termination of vegetable life and the commencement of the animal empire.
A still greater obscurity lies in the distinctive characters by which the objects in each of these great departments of nature have been arranged and assorted.
When we pass from the works of nature – in which all the delineations are perfectly accurate and appear to be otherwise only from the imperfection of the eye which surveys them – to the institutions of humans, in which the obscurity arises from the object itself as from the organ by which it is contemplated – we must perceive the necessity of moderating still further our expectations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity.
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces the legislative, executive, and judicial; or even the privileges and powers of the different legislative branches.
Questions daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts at political science.
The Changing Limits of the Law Present their Own Difficulties
The experience of ages has been equally unsuccessful in delineating the several objects and limits of different codes of laws and different tribunals of justice, despite the continued and combined labors of the most enlightened legislatures and jurists.
The precise extent of the common law, statutory law, maritime law, ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations, and other local laws and customs, remains still to be clearly and finally established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such subjects has been more industriously pursued than in any other part of the world.
The jurisdiction of her general and local courts – whether of law, equity, admiralty, and others – is not less a source of frequent and intricate discussions, which denotes the indeterminate limits by which they are respectively circumscribed.
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning is liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.
Aside from the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties, the medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment. The use of words is to express ideas.
Perspicuity thus requires not only that the ideas be distinctly formed, but they be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appropriate to them.
But no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocal words denoting different ideas.
Hence it must happen that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered.
And this unavoidable inaccuracy is greater or less according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined.
When the Almighty Himself condescends to address mankind in their own languages, His meaning – luminous as it must be – is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.
Some features of the Constitution reflect these compromises, showing the Convention was compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety to the force of extraneous considerations.
The Three Main Sources of Ambiguity in Conveying Meaning
Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect definitions: (1) indistinctness of the object, (2) imperfection of the organ of conception, and (3) inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas.
Any one of these must produce a certain degree of obscurity.
The Convention experienced the full effect of them all in delineating the boundary between the Federal and State jurisdictions.
The Inherent Conflict Between Large and Small States
To the foregoing we may add the pretensions of the larger and smaller States.
We cannot err in supposing the larger States contended for a participation in the government fully proportioned to their superior wealth and importance, while smaller States were not less tenacious of the equality they enjoyed.
Neither side would entirely yield to the other, and consequently the struggle was terminated only by compromise.
And once the States agreed a ratio of representation, that very compromise produced a fresh struggle between the same parties concerning the organization of the Federal government and the distribution of its powers among the branches, with each State seeking to increase its importance and influence.
Some features of the Constitution reflect these compromises, showing the Convention was compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety to the force of extraneous considerations.
Nor were disputes limited to the large and the small. Combinations of States marshaled themselves in opposition to each other on various points.
Other combinations – resulting from a difference of local position and policy – created additional difficulties. Just as every State may be divided into different districts, and its citizens into different classes, which give birth to contending interests and local jealousies, so the different parts of the United States are distinguished from each other by a variety of circumstances, which produce a like effect on a larger scale.
And although this variety of interests may have a salutary influence on the administration of a government once formed, they were disruptive in the task of forming it.
Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect definitions: (1) indistinctness of the object, (2) imperfection of the organ of conception, and (3) inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas.
Providence Rescued the Convention More than Once
Would it have been wonderful if – under the pressure of all of these difficulties – the Convention had been forced into some deviations from that artificial structure and regular symmetry which an abstract view of the subject might lead – towards an ingenious theorist bestowing on the Convention a constitution planned in his closet or imagination?
The real wonder is that so many difficulties were surmounted, and surmounted with a unanimity almost as unprecedented as it was unexpected. It is impossible for any individual of candor to reflect on this circumstance without astonishment. No person of pious reflection failed to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty Hand was so frequently and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages of the Revolution.
In Federalist 20, I took notice of the repeated trials unsuccessfully made in the United Netherlands for reforming the baneful and notorious vices of their constitution.
Indeed, the histories of almost all the great councils and consultations held among mankind for reconciling their discordant opinions, assuaging their mutual jealousies, and adjusting their respective interests, is an account of factions, contentions, and disappointments.
They may be classed among the most dark and degraded pictures which display the infirmities and depravities of the human character. If, in a few scattered instances, a brighter aspect is presented, they serve only as exceptions to admonish us of the general truth; and by their luster to darken the gloom of the adverse prospect to which they are contrasted.
In resolving the causes from which these exceptions result, and applying them to the particular instances before us, we are necessarily led to two important conclusions.
The first is the Convention enjoyed a singular exemption from the pestilential influence of party animosities, a disease most incident to deliberative bodies, and most apt to contaminate their proceedings.
The second conclusion is that all the deputations composing the Convention were satisfactorily accommodated by the final act, or were induced to accede to it by a deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests to the public good, and by a despair of seeing this necessity diminished by delays or by new experiments.
The real wonder is that so many difficulties were surmounted, and surmounted with a unanimity almost as unprecedented as it was unexpected.
It is impossible for any individual of candor to reflect on this circumstance without astonishment.
No person of pious reflection failed to perceive in it a Finger of that Almighty Hand was so frequently and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages of the Revolution.
Madison
Federalist 38: The States Deputized Their Wisest Citizens to Form the Constitution
ANCIENT HISTORY REPORTS that in every case where a government was formed with deliberation and consent, the task was undertaken by some individual citizen of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity, rather than an assembly of individuals.
Minos founded the government of Crete, as Zaleucus did for the Locrians.
Theseus first – and after him Draco and Solon – instituted the government of Athens.
Lycurgus was the lawgiver of Sparta.
The foundation of the original government of Rome was laid by Romulus, and the work completed by two of his elective successors, Numa and Tullius Hostilius.
Upon the death of Julius Caesar, Brutus had the senate and people ratify a civil administration allegedly designed by Tullius Hostilius.
The same is true for confederate governments.
Amphictyon was the author of that which bore his name, and the Achaean league received its first birth from Achaeus, and its second from Aratus.
Throughout History, the Individuals Asked to Draft Plans for a Government often Represented the People
It is less certain whether all of these reputed lawgivers were clothed with the legitimate authority of the people, but in some cases there is no doubt.
Draco was entrusted by the people of Athens with indefinite powers to reform its government and laws.
The historian Plutarch reports the citizens of that city gave Solon the sole and absolute power to remodel their constitution.
The advocates for a regular reform in Sparta all turned toward the singular efforts of the celebrated patriot and sage Lycurgus, instead of seeking to bring about a revolution by the intervention of a deliberative body of citizens.
How could a people as jealous of their liberty as the Greeks abandon the rules of caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen?
How could the Athenians – a people who required at least ten generals to command its army – consider one illustrious citizen as a more eligible depositary of the fortunes of themselves and their posterity, rather than a select body of citizens, from whose common deliberations more wisdom, as well as more safety, might have been expected?
These questions cannot be fully answered without supposing that the fears of discord and disunion among a number of counselors exceeded the apprehension of treachery or incapacity in a single individual.
These lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire the improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and establishing regular plans of government. On the other hand, these lessons admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident to such experiments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily multiplying them.
History also informs us of the difficulties encountered by these celebrated reformers, and the expedients employed in order to carry their reforms into effect.
Solon, who indulged a more temporizing policy, confessed that he had not given to his countrymen the government best suited to their happiness, but most tolerable to their prejudices.
And Lycurgus, more true to his object, was under the necessity of mixing a portion of violence with the authority of superstition. He secured a final success by a voluntary renunciation, first of his country, and then of his life.
These lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire the improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and establishing regular plans of government.
On the other hand, these lessons admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident to such experiments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily multiplying them.
Almost All of the Proposed Amendments to the Former Articles of Confederation Overlooked Its Foundational Problem
It is reasonable to assume any arguable error in the new Constitution resulted from a defect of antecedent experience on this complicated and difficult subject, rather than a want of accuracy or care in the investigation of it, and that we must await an actual trial before any error appears.
This assumption is rendered probable by the particular case of the Articles of Confederation, as well as by many considerations of a general nature.
Among the numerous objections and amendments suggested by the several States when the Articles were submitted for their ratification, not one alluded to the great and radical error that became apparent on actual trial.
As immaterial as the objections were, there is abundant reason to suppose they would have been adhered to with a very dangerous inflexibility in some States, had not a zeal for their opinions and supposed interests been stifled by the more powerful sentiment of self-preservation.
Maryland persisted for several years in refusing her concurrence, although for the whole period the enemy remained in the very bowels of our country.
In the end, Maryland’s pliancy was effected by the fear of being chargeable with protracting the public calamities, and endangering the Revolution.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the United States Faced a Grave Disorder
Imagine the situation where a patient finds his disorder is daily growing worse and that an efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme danger.
After coolly reviewing his situation with different physicians, he selects and calls in those he judges most capable of administering relief, and best entitled to his confidence.
The physicians attend, the patient is carefully examined, a consultation is held, and they unanimously agree that the symptoms are critical, but that a proper and timely remedy may improve his constitution.
But the prescription is no sooner made known, than a number of persons (who do not deny the danger of the disorder) interpose and assure the patient that the prescription will be poison to his constitution, and forbid him to make use of it.
Might not the patient reasonably demand that the authors of this advice at least agree among themselves on some other remedy?
If they differed from one another as much as from his first physicians, he would act prudently in rejecting their advice.
The United States was the patient in such a situation before the Constitution was adopted.
She was sensible of her malady, and obtained a regular and unanimous advice from persons of her own deliberate choice.
She was warned by others against following this advice under pain of the most fatal consequences.
The Objections to the New Constitution Were Numerous and Contradictory
The objectors did not deny the reality of her danger or the necessity of some speedy and powerful remedy, but they could not agree on a substitute remedy.
One told us the Constitution ought to be rejected because it is not a confederation of the States, but a government over individuals.
Another admitted that there ought to be a government over individuals to a certain extent, but by no means to the extent proposed.
A third did not object to government over individuals, or to the extent proposed, but that a bill of rights was needed.
A fourth concurred in the absolute necessity of a bill of rights, but argued it ought not be declaratory of the personal rights of individuals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their political capacity.
A fifth argued a bill of rights of any sort would be superfluous and misplaced, but that a fatal flaw was allowing States to regulate the times and places of election.
An objector in a large State exclaimed loudly that equal representation in the Senate was unreasonable, while an objector in a small State complained equally loudly against a dangerous inequality in the House of Representatives.
From one quarter, we were alarmed with the amazing expense of the number of persons to administer the new government.
From another quarter – and sometimes from the same quarter – we heard cries that Congress would be but a shadow of a proper representation, and that the government would be far less objectionable if the number and the expense were doubled.
A patriot from a State that does not import or export discerned insuperable objections against the power of direct taxation.
A patriotic adversary in a State of great exports and imports was equally dissatisfied that the whole burden of taxes could be thrown on consumption.
As each delegate came forward with particular explanations, scarcely any two exactly agreed on the same subject.
One politician discovered in the Constitution a direct and irresistible tendency to monarchy, with a second convinced it surely will end in aristocracy, and a third was puzzled to say which of these shapes it will ultimately assume, but that clearly it must be one or other of them, while a fourth with no less confidence affirmed that the Constitution is so far from having a bias towards either of these dangers that it will be insufficient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite propensities.
Another class of adversaries asserted that the intermixing of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments contradicted all ideas of regular government and the requisite precautions in favor of liberty.
As each delegate came forward with particular explanations, scarcely any two exactly agreed on the same subject. In the eyes of one, the junction of the Senate with the President in appointing offices was erroneous, and should be vested in the executive alone.
To another, the exclusion of the House of Representatives was equally obnoxious, as its numbers would be a due security against corruption and partiality in the exercise of such a power.
With another, the admission of the President into any share of the appointment power would be a dangerous engine in the hands of an executive magistrate, and an unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican jealousy.
According to some, no part of the arrangement was more improper than the trial of impeachments by the Senate, for this power clearly belonged to the judicial department.
Others purported to “fully concur,” but disagreed that a reference of impeachments to the judiciary would cure the error, due to the extensive powers already lodged in that department.
Even among the zealous patrons of a council of state, the most irreconcilable variances were discovered concerning the mode in which it ought to be constituted.
One person demanded that the council should consist of a small number to be appointed by the most numerous branch of Congress, while another would prefer a larger number, with a fundamental condition that the appointment should be made by the President alone.
Would a New Convention Draft a Better Constitution?
Let us suppose the most zealous (and impliedly the most sagacious) adversaries of the Constitution think the delegates to Constitutional Convention were unequal to the task assigned them, and that a wiser and better plan might and ought to be substituted.
Let us further suppose the States concurred in their unfavorable opinion of the Constitutional Convention, and proceeded to form a second convention, with full powers, and for the express purpose of revising and remolding the work of the first.
Were the experiment to be seriously made – in light of the discord and ferment of the deliberations described above – would the new delegates depart so widely from the old?
I submit the Constitution as actually drafted by the Convention stands as fair a chance for immortality as the laws Lycurgus gave to Sparta before his departure.
The Adversaries of the Constitution Have Overlooked What Preceded It
It causes both wonder and regret that those opposed to the Constitution never call to mind the defects of that which it replaced.
The Constitution need not be perfect.
It is sufficient that the Articles of Confederation were more imperfect.
No person refuses to trade brass for silver or gold just because the latter has some alloy in it.
No person would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering habitation for a firm and commodious building, on the ground that the stronger structure had no porch, or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or ceilings a little higher or lower than the person would have planned them.
Putting these illustrations aside, it is clear the main objections urged against the Constitution lie with tenfold weight against the Articles of Confederation.
I submit the Constitution as actually drafted by the Convention stands as fair a chance for immortality as the laws Lycurgus gave to Sparta before his departure.
Is an indefinite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of a Federal government?
Under the Articles, Congress could make requisitions of any amount it pleased, and the States were bound to furnish them.
Congress also could emit bills of credit and borrow both at home and abroad, as long as a shilling would be lent.
Is an indefinite power to raise troops dangerous?
The Confederation gave to Congress that power also, which made use of it.
Is it improper and unsafe to intermix the different powers of government in the same body of individuals?
Congress under the Confederation was the sole depositary of all Federal powers.
Is it particularly dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and the command of the army, into the same hands?
The Confederation placed them both in the hands of Congress.
Is a bill of rights essential to liberty?
The Articles of Confederation had no bill of rights.
Is it a valid objection against the new Constitution, that it empowers the Senate, with the concurrence of the executive, to make treaties which are to be the laws of the land?
Under the Articles, Congress could make treaties which they declared to be the supreme law of the land, and which most of the States recognized.
Is the importation of slaves by the Constitution limited to twenty years?
By the old it was permitted forever.
Is the importation of slaves by the Constitution limited to twenty years? By the old it was permitted forever.
I am told that however dangerous in theory the mixture of powers was under the Articles of Confederation, it was rendered harmless by the dependence of Congress on the States for the means of carrying them into practice.
I respond in the first place that the Articles were chargeable with the still greater folly of declaring certain powers in Congress to be absolutely necessary, while at the same time rendering them absolutely nugatory.
In the next place, if no better government had been substituted, effective powers must either have been granted to (or assumed by) the Congress under the Articles.
But this is not all.
Out of the lifeless mass of the former Congress had already grown a power tending toward all the dangers that could arise from a defective national government.
It is now no longer a point of speculation or hope that our Western territory is a mine of vast wealth to the United States.
Although it is not of such a nature as to extricate us from our present distresses, or to yield any regular supplies for the public expenses for some time to come, under proper management it will effect a gradual discharge of the domestic debt and furnish liberal tributes to the Federal treasury.
A very large proportion of this fund has been already surrendered by individual States, and it reasonably may be expected that the remaining States will not persist in withholding similar proofs of their equity and generosity. Therefore, we may calculate a rich and fertile country of an area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States will soon become a national stock.
From before adoption of the Constitution, Congress had assumed the administration of this stock and begun to render it productive.
Congress also proceeded to form new States, to erect temporary governments, appoint officers for them, and prescribe the conditions on which such States shall be admitted into the United States.
All this was done without the least color of constitutional authority. Yet no blame has been whispered, nor alarm sounded.
A great and independent fund of revenue was passing into the hands of a single body of men, who could raise troops to an indefinite number, and appropriate money to their support for an indefinite period of time.
And yet there were men who were not only silent spectators of this prospect, but who were advocates for the system which caused it; while at the same time urging objections against the Constitution as proposed.
They would have acted with more consistency in advocating for the proposed Constitution as a necessary guard against the future powers and resources of the former Congress, than to save it from the dangers threatened by the impotency of that Assembly.
I mean not to throw censure on the measures which have been pursued by the former Congress by any thing here said.
I am sensible they could not have done otherwise.
The public interest and the necessity of the case imposed upon them the task of overleaping their constitutional limits.
But are not these facts an alarming proof of the dangers resulting when a government does not possess regular powers commensurate to its objects?
A dissolution or usurpation was the dreadful dilemma to which it was continually exposed.
Madison
Federalist 39: The Government of the United States Has Both Federal and National Characteristics, and Is Republican
Characteristics of Republican Governments
WHAT ARE THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS of republican government?
No satisfactory answer can be found in the application of the term by political writers to the constitutions of foreign governments.
Holland is almost universally denominated a republic, yet no particle of its supreme authority is derived from its People.
The same title is bestowed on Venice, but the absolute power over the great body of the people is exercised – in the most absolute manner – by a small body of hereditary nobles.
Poland has been dignified with the same appellation, though it is a mixture of aristocracy and monarchy in their worst forms.
With equal impropriety the government of England is frequently listed as a republic, though it has but one republican branch, combined with a hereditary aristocracy and monarchy.
These examples – as dissimilar to each other as to a genuine republic – show the extremely inaccurate use of the term in political disquisitions.
A far better definition of a republic is found by resorting to the different principles on which different forms of government are established.
The Best Definition of a Republic
A republic is a government deriving all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the People, and administered by persons holding their offices at the pleasure or the People, for either a limited period or during good behavior.
To qualify as a republic, it is essential the government must be derived from the great body of the society, and not from a limited proportion or a favored class of it.
Were it otherwise, a handful of tyrannical nobles – exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers – might claim for their government the honorable title of republic.
The People Must Be the Ultimate Source of Power
Whether directly or indirectly, the People must appoint the persons who are to administer the government, and whose tenures must be limited to fixed periods or during good behavior.
Were it otherwise, every popular government organized on republican principles would eventually be degraded.
A republic is a government deriving all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the People, and administered by persons holding their offices at the pleasure or the People, for either a limited period or during good behavior.
The constitutions of every one of the States require at least some of the officers of government be appointed by the People alone, albeit indirectly. In most of the States, the chief executive is so appointed.
At least one state constitution extends this mode of appointment to a coordinate branch of the legislature.
According to all the constitutions, the tenure of the highest offices is limited to a definite period. Appointments in the legislative and executive departments in many are limited to a period of years.
And in most, the members of the judiciary are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior, a practice condoned by the most respectable and well-received opinions on the subject.
The Constitution Meets Republican Standards
On examining the Constitution, we at once perceive it conforms to the standards here stated.
The House of Representatives is elected directly by the great body of the People, as is true in at least one branch of all the State legislatures.
The Senate derives its appointment indirectly from the People.
The President also is indirectly derived from the choice of the People, as is true with the executive magistrates in most States. Even the judges of the United States – along with all the other officers of the United States – will be the choice – though remote – of the People themselves.
To qualify as a republic, the government must be derived from the great body of the society, and not from a limited proportion or a favored class of it. Were it otherwise, a handful of tyrannical nobles – exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers – might claim for their government the honorable title of republic.
All Appointments Are for Limited Terms
The duration of their appointments is equally conformable to the republican standard as well as the model of State constitutions.
The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as are the popular assemblies in all States.
The terms of representatives are limited to two years, as in South Carolina.
Senators are elected to six-year terms, only one more than in the senate of Maryland, and two more than in the senates of New York and Virginia.
The President is to continue in office for the period of four years. In New York and Delaware, the chief executive is elected for three years, in South Carolina two, and in the other States annually.
Whether directly or indirectly, the People must appoint the persons who are to administer the government, and whose tenures must be limited to fixed periods or during good behavior. Were it otherwise, every popular government organized on republican principles would eventually be degraded.
Impeachment
Several of the States have no constitutional provision for impeachment of the chief executive, and in Delaware and Virginia the chief executive cannot be impeached until out of office.
The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office, thereby more strongly advancing the republican principle that the People control their government.
Judges
Judges of the United States are to hold their places during good behavior, as unquestionably must be the case.
The tenure of the ministerial offices in general will be a subject of legal regulations that conform to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions.
The Prohibition of Titles of Nobility Is a Republican Principle
If any further proof were required our republican form of government, the most decisive are the absolute prohibition of titles of nobility by both the Federal and State governments, and the Constitution’s express guaranty that every State enjoy a republican form of government.
The Government the Constitution Creates Is Both Federal and National
Adversaries of the Constitution say its adherence to the republican form of government is inadequate because it fails to preserve with equal care the federal form, which regards the United States as a confederacy of the sovereign States.
They argue it frames a national government, which regards the United States as an impermissible consolidation of the sovereign States.
And they ask: By what authority was this bold and radical innovation undertaken?
The objection requires a precise examination to form a just estimate of its force: first, to ascertain the real character of the government in question; second, to inquire how far the Constitutional Convention was authorized to propose such a government, and third, how far the duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of regular authority.
The instant paper conducts the first inquiry.
Federalist 40 conducts the other two inquiries.
In order to ascertain the real character of the government United States government, I will consider its relationship to the foundation on which it is established, the sources from which its ordinary powers are drawn, the operation and extent of those powers, and the authority by which future changes in that government are to be introduced.
As to the relationship of the government to its foundation, on the one hand it is founded on the assent and ratification of the People of America, given by their deputies elected for the special purpose.
On the other hand, the People’s assent and ratification is given not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as individuals composing the distinct and independent States to which they belong.
The Constitution Was Established as a Federal Act
The ultimate assent and ratification of the Constitution is by the several States, whose authority is in turn derived from the People themselves.
Therefore, the act of establishing the Constitution is a federal act, not a national one.
That ratification is a federal rather than national act is obvious upon viewing the requirement that ratification requires the unanimous assent of the several States that are parties to it.
Ratification cannot result from either the decision of a majority of the People of the union or a majority of the States.
If in this transaction the People themselves were regarded as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole People of the United States would bind the minority, just as the majority in each State would bind the minority, with that national will being determined by the majority of individual votes or by the majority of States.
But both of these approaches were rejected. In ratifying the Constitution, each State acts as a sovereign body – independent of all the others – and is bound only by its own voluntary act.
Thus the Constitution is a federal one, not a national one.
The House of Representatives Is a National Body
The sources of the ordinary powers of the Constitution are both national and federal.
The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the People of America.
The People will be represented in the same proportion – and on the same principle – as they are in the legislature of each particular State.
The House of Representatives will therefore be a national body rather than a federal one.
The Senate Is a Federal Body
The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States as political and coequal societies.
Each State will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate.
The Senate will therefore be a federal body rather than a national one.
Selection of a President Is Both Federal and National
The executive power embodied in the President will be derived from a compound of sources.
The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters.
The votes allotted to each State will be the sum of the equal number of senators and unequal number of representatives to which each is entitled in the Congress.
This compound ratio considers each State partly as distinct and coequal societies, and partly as unequal members of the same society.
The eventual election of the President is in turn to be made by the national House of Representatives, but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic.
The selection of the President is therefore of a mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as national features.
Federal and National Attributes in the Operation and Extent of the Federal Government
With respect to the operation of the government, it is federal to the extent its powers operate on the States in their capacities as political bodies, yet it is national to the extent its powers operate on the citizens of the United States in their individual capacities.
In several cases – particularly the trial of controversies to which States may be parties – it may be viewed as federal, since such actions involve States in their collective and political capacities only.
But on the whole, the operation of the government in its ordinary and most essential proceedings is upon the People in their individual capacities.
Therefore, as to the operation of the government, the Constitution has almost exclusively a national character.
But this national aspect is reversed when we contemplate the extent of the government’s powers.
The idea of a national government involves not only an authority over individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things so far as they are objects of lawful government.
Among a People consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature, in our case the Congress.
In this relation, the United States Government cannot be deemed a national one. Its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residual and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. The only real exception to this residual sovereignty of the States involves controversies relating to the boundary between two States.
Federal Authority Is Limited to Enumerated Powers
Among communities united for particular purposes – such as States and local (county and municipal) governments – governmental power is vested partly in the State legislatures and partly in the local legislatures.
Where certain powers are vested in lawful State legislatures, all local authorities are subordinate to the supremacy of the State legislatures, and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by those State legislatures at their pleasure.
Conversely, where the local municipal authorities retain distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, they are not subject to State supremacy within those spheres.
In this relation, the United States Government cannot be deemed a national one.
Its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residual and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.
But amendment of the Constitution is founded on neither of these principles. An amendment requires more than a majority, and it determines that majority by the votes of the States, rather than by the votes of individual citizens. In these respects it departs from the national and advances towards the federal character.
Amendments Will Be Neither Wholly Federal nor National
Finally, if we examine the how the Constitution may be amended, we find it neither wholly national nor wholly federal.
Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the People of the United States, and this authority would be competent at all times to alter or abolish its established government, as can be accomplished by a majority of every national society.
Were it wholly federal, the concurrence of all of the States would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all.
But amendment of the Constitution is founded on neither of these principles.
An amendment requires more than a majority, and it determines that majority by the votes of the States, rather than by the votes of individual citizens.
In these respects it departs from the national and advances towards the federal character.
Yet an amendment does not require a unanimous consent of all of the States to be binding upon all.
In this respect it loses again the federal and partakes of the national character.
Therefore, the Constitution is neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both.
In its foundation it is federal, not national.
In the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national.
In the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal.
In the extent of those powers, it is again federal, not national.
And in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.
Madison
original Federalist 39
[Ed. note: How could Madison assert the adoption of the Constitution would be unanimous if the assent of only nine of the thirteen States was required for ratification? Article VII provides: “The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.” Thus, under Article VII, the Constitution would be unanimous as to the States so ratifying. Once New Hampshire became the ninth State to ratify, the assent was unanimous among the nine ratifying States. The same principle applied when Virginia became the tenth, New York the eleventh, North Carolina the twelfth, and Rhode Island the thirteenth State to ratify.]
Federalist 40: The Convention Was Authorized to Propose a New Constitution
THE SECOND POINT to be examined is whether the Convention was authorized to frame and propose the Constitution.
The powers of the Convention are best determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents.
All of the commissions made reference either to the recommendations from the meeting of State delegates at Annapolis in September 1786, or from the Congress at Philadelphia in February 1787.
Thus it is sufficient to refer to these particular acts.
The Annapolis Resolution (September 1786)
The act from Annapolis recommended the “appointment of commissioners to take into consideration the situation of the United States; to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and to report such an Act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to, by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State, will effectually provide for the same.” (In the preceding and following excerpts I have added the emphasis for the benefit of the reader.)
The Philadelphia Congressional Resolution (February 1787)
The recommendatory act of Congress stated in part: “Whereas there is provision in the Articles of Confederation & perpetual Union, for making alterations therein by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of the legislatures of the several States; and whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects in the present Confederation, as a mean to remedy which, several of the States, and particularly the State of New York, by express instructions to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for the purposes expressed in the following resolution and such convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States a firm national government:
“Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient, that on the second Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union.”
The Principal Directives from the Annapolis and Philadelphia Resolutions
From these two acts, it appears:
1st. The object of the Constitutional Convention was to establish, in these States, a firm national government;
2d. This government was to be such as would be adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union;
3d. These purposes were to be effected by alterations of provisions in the Articles of Confederation, as it is expressed in the act of Congress, or by such further provisions as should appear necessary, as it stands in the recommendatory act from Annapolis; and
4th. The alterations and provisions were to be reported to Congress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the Congress and confirmed by the States.
From a comparison and fair construction of these several modes of expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the Convention acted. It was to frame a national government, adequate to the exigencies of government, and of the Union; and to reduce the articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these purposes.
Our Inquiry Is Aided by Common Sense Legal Maxims
There are several applicable rules of construction dictated by plain reason and legal axioms.
One is that every part of an expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to some common end.
Another is that – where several parts cannot be made to coincide – the less important should give way to the more important part.
In other words, the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the means.
The delegates were deeply and unanimously impressed with the crisis. With almost one voice, the country had made a singular and solemn experiment to correct the errors of the system. The delegates were no less deeply and unanimously convinced that the Constitution they proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their appointment.
The Convention’s View of Its Charge
The Convention formed the judgment that the expressions defining its authority appeared irreconcilably at variance with each other, since a national and adequate government could not possibly be effected by altering or adding provisions to the Articles of Confederation.
In these circumstances, which part of its directive ought the Convention have embraced, and which rejected? Which was the more important part, and which was the less important?
Which part was the end, and which part the means?
Some contended alterations of and additions to the Articles of Confederation could have molded an adequate national government, and that the Articles themselves were originally aimed at the end of national happiness.
Can the adversaries of the Constitution answer whether it was more conducive to the happiness of the People of America to preserve the Articles of Confederation and thereby omit an adequate government, or to disregard the Articles and provide for an adequate government?
Was preserving the Articles the end, and a reform of the government the means, or was the establishment of a government adequate to the national happiness the true end, for which the Articles – as an insufficient means – ought to have been sacrificed?
The title of the document upon which the delegates agreed – the “Constitution for the United States of America” – does not, by itself, demonstrate the exercise of a power that was not granted.
The Articles of Confederation expressly authorized alterations, as well as new provisions.
Here then existed a power to change the title, to insert new articles, and to alter old ones.
Were those powers infringed, so long as a part of the old articles remained?
Those who allege infringement at least ought to mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations, between the degree of change which lies within the compass of alterations and further provisions, and that which amounts to a transmutation of the government.
Will it be said that any alteration ought not to have touched the substance of the Articles of Confederation?
If so, the States never would have appointed a Convention with such solemnity – nor described its objects with so much latitude – if some substantial reform had not been contemplated.
Will it be said that the fundamental principles of the Confederation were not within the purview of the Convention, and ought not to have been varied?
I ask: What are these principles?
Did the fundamental principles of the Confederation require the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns?
They are so regarded by the Constitution.
Did principles require that members of the government derive their appointment from the State legislatures, and not from the People of the States?
One branch of the new government – the Senate – is to be appointed by these legislatures.
Even under the Confederation, all of the delegates to Congress could have been appointed immediately by the People, and actually were so appointed in Connecticut and Rhode Island.
Did the fundamental principles of the Confederation require the powers of the Federal government act on the States, but not immediately on individuals?
In some instances, the powers of the Federal government under the Constitution will act on the States in their collective characters.
In other instances – even under the Articles of Confederation – the powers of the government acted immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens: in cases of capture; of piracy; of the post office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the native tribes; of claims under grants of land by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which death could be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate.
Did fundamental principles require that no tax should be levied without the intermediate agency of the States?
The Confederation itself authorized a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the post office.
The power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source.
Putting aside these instances, it was an acknowledged object of the Convention – and universal expectation of the People – that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue.
The Congress under the Articles did not consider such a measure as inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Confederation. Every State but one had recognized the principle of the innovation.
Finally, did the fundamental principles of the Confederation require that the powers of the general government have a fixed limit, beyond which the States should be left in possession of their sovereignty and independence?
We have seen that in the new government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction.
The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the Convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the Articles of Confederation.
The misfortune under the Articles was that its principles were so feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency urged against them.
It was the degree of necessary enlargement which has given the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old.
The Constitution Is to Be Approved by the People Directly, rather than by the States
I admit the Convention departed from the tenor of its commission in several particulars.
Instead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation of the legislatures of all the States, it reported a plan which was to be confirmed by the People, and could be carried into effect through ratification by only nine States.
An objection on these grounds would have been the most plausible, but was the least urged in the publications which swarmed against the Convention.
This forbearance must have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth, Rhode Island, which inflexibly opposed any changes to the Articles.
This objection to the Constitution consisted of a “majority” of one sixtieth of the People of America to a measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the People of America.
Rhode Island’s recalcitrance is still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of this country.
Since any objection to the manner in which the Constitution was approved was in effect waived by those who criticized the powers of the Convention, I dismiss it without further observation.
The Extent of Implied Authority of the Convention
The third inquiry to which I alluded in Federalist 39 is how far considerations of duty arising out of the case itself could have supplied any defect of regular authority of the Convention.
In the preceding two inquiries – to ascertain the real character of the government in question and how far the Convention was authorized to propose such a government – the powers granted to the Convention have been analyzed and tried with the same rigor and by the same rules as if they had been real and final powers delegated for the establishment of a Constitution.
We have seen in what manner they have borne the trial on that supposition.
But we must recollect that the powers were merely advisory and recommendatory.
The Convention understood this, and accordingly planned and proposed a written Constitution which was to have no consequence unless stamped with the approval of those to whom it was addressed.
This reflection places the subject in an altogether different point of view.
It enables us to judge with propriety of the course taken by the Convention, and to view the ground upon which the delegates stood.
The delegates were deeply and unanimously impressed with the crisis.
With almost one voice, the country had made a singular and solemn experiment to correct the errors of the system.
The delegates were no less deeply and unanimously convinced that the Constitution they proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their appointment.
The hopes and expectations of the great body of citizens throughout this empire were turned with the keenest anxiety to the event of the deliberations.
The delegates had every reason to believe that the contrary sentiments of every external and internal foe to the liberty and prosperity of the United States was agitating the minds and bosoms of its citizens.
The delegates had seen that just a few deputies from just a few States who convened in Annapolis had assumed the liberty of recommending a great and critical object – ostensibly outside the scope of their commission – which was approved by public opinion and actually carried into effect by 12 of the 13 States in Congress.
The delegates also were cognizant that Congress had assumed both recommendatory and operative powers which were warranted, in the public estimation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by which their conduct was to be governed.
The delegates also had seen the introduction and rapid progress of the plan Virginia introduced during the Convention, towards a partial amendment of the Confederation.
Upon reflection, the delegates must have concluded – as is the case in all great changes of established governments – that forms ought to give way to substance.
Rigid adherence to forms would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the People to “abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness,” as a famous Congress declared in 1776.
The delegates knew it would be impossible for the People spontaneously and universally to move in concert towards their object.
Therefore, it became essential that such changes be initiated by some informal propositions made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or citizens.
Upon reflection, the delegates must have concluded – as is the case in all great changes of established governments – that forms ought to give way to substance. Rigid adherence to forms would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the People to “abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness,” as a famous Congress declared in 1776.
The delegates recollected that it was by this irregular and assumed privilege of proposing to the People plans for their safety and happiness that the States had first united against the dangers Britain had threatened to their ancient government, which stimulated formation of committees and congresses to concentrate their efforts and defend their rights, and to elect conventions to establish their constitutions.
No ill-timed scruples or zeal for adhering to ordinary forms was anywhere seen among the delegates, except in those who wished to indulge their secret enmity to the substance of reform under these specious masks.
The delegates bore in mind that the Constitution they framed was to be submitted to the People themselves.
The People’s disapproval would thereby destroy forever this potentially supreme authority. Approval, on the other hand, would blot out antecedent errors and irregularities.
Even in those delegates whose disposition to debate was dominant, there resided an awareness that neglecting to execute the degree of power vested in the Convention – and still more the failure to recommend any measure whatever – was unwarranted by their commission.
Neglect of duty would excite no less criticism than recommending a measure fully commensurate to the national exigencies.
In the midst of all these considerations, had the Convention taken the cold and sullen resolution of sacrificing substance to form and committing the dearest interests of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events, instead of pointing out a system capable of securing its happiness, what judgment ought to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on the conduct and character of this assembly?
Even if I grant that the delegates were neither authorized by their commission nor justified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution for their country, does it follow that the Constitution ought to be rejected?
If, according to the noble precept, it is lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends?
In all cases, the prudent inquiry ought surely to be, not so much from whom the advice comes, as whether the advice be good.
The charge against the Convention of exceeding its powers has no foundation to support it, except in the instance little urged by the objectors.
If the delegates exceeded their powers, they were warranted and arguably required – as the confidential servants of their country and by the circumstances – to exercise the liberty which they assumed.
Finally, even if the delegates violated both their powers and their obligations in proposing a Constitution, the result ought nevertheless be embraced as calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the People of America.
How far this character is due to the Constitution, is the subject under investigation.
Madison
[Ed. note: useful links: Proceedings and recommendations of the commissioners from the Annapolis Convention (11-14 September 1786)Report of the proceedings in Congress assembled at Philadelphia, 21 February 1787 Virginia Plan to revise the Articles of Confederation, introduced to the Constitutional Convention on 29 May 1787]