Federalist Papers Nos. 52–61 form a focused examination of the House of Representatives – the branch designed to be closest to the people.
After establishing the broader principles of separation of powers and the distribution of authority between the federal and state governments, these essays turn to the practical details of the popular chamber: who may vote, who may serve, how often elections occur, how seats are apportioned, how large the body should be, and what safeguards prevent it from becoming either an oligarchy or a chaotic mob.
Most of the papers (52–58) are by Madison; Hamilton contributes the final two (59–60).
Together they answer Anti-Federalist fears that the House would be too remote, too small, too aristocratic, or insufficiently accountable, while also defending the Convention’s choices as both safe for liberty and practical for effective national legislation.
● No. 52 sets the foundation by defining the qualifications of electors (the same as those for the most numerous branch of each state legislature) and of the elected (age 25, seven years a citizen, inhabitant of the state, and barred from holding other federal office during service). It introduces the two-year term as the proper balance between dependence on the people and sufficient time for learning the business of legislation.
● No. 53 defends biennial elections against the popular maxim “where annual elections end, tyranny begins.” Madison shows that a one-year term would be too short for the broader knowledge required of a federal representative and would actually increase opportunities for election fraud.
● No. 54 addresses the sensitive question of apportionment, explaining why both free persons and “other persons” (the three-fifths ratio) are counted for representation and taxation, and why a uniform federal rule is preferable to leaving the matter entirely to the states.
● Nos. 55–56 consider the proper size of the House. They reject the charge that the body will be too small to possess adequate knowledge of local interests, arguing that a moderate number of representatives can still be well informed and that an excessively large assembly would become disorderly and easily manipulated.
● No. 57 confronts the claim that the House will elevate the few at the expense of the many. Madison demonstrates that the electoral system itself – open to merit without property, birth, or religious qualifications – together with frequent elections and the equal application of laws to representatives and constituents, supplies the strongest possible securities against oligarchy.
● Nos. 59–60 (Hamilton) defend the power given to Congress to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. Without this residual authority, a few hostile state legislatures could cripple or dissolve the national government by refusing to hold elections. Hamilton shows that the power is both necessary and carefully limited, and that the composition of Congress will naturally reflect the composition of the state legislatures themselves.
Taken together, these nine papers present the House of Representatives as a body that is genuinely popular in origin, sufficiently stable and informed for national business, and structurally guarded against both aristocratic capture and democratic excess.
They complete the detailed portrait of the legislative branch begun in the preceding essays and prepare the ground for the subsequent discussion of the Senate.
Federalist 52: Qualifications of the Electors and Elected of the House of Representatives
THE DEFINITION OF THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE – the right of an individual (elector) to vote – is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government.
It was therefore incumbent on the Convention to define and establish this right in the Constitution.
The Qualification of Voters Is Determined by Existing State Rules
The Convention decided the qualifications of electors are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” Art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
To have left the qualification of electors open for the occasional regulation of Congress or the legislative discretion of the States would have been improper due to the importance of the right.
Delegating qualifications to State legislatures also would have rendered the House of Representatives too dependent on state officials.
The composition of the House of Representatives ought to be dependent on the People alone.
Any attempt to reduce to one uniform rule the different qualifications to vote in the different States would have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the Convention.
The provision the Convention chose was the best option.
The rule the Convention established must be satisfactory to every State because it conforms to the standard already enacted (or may be enacted) by the State itself.
It will be safe to the United States because – being fixed by the State constitutions – it is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the People of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution.
Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the Federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.
The Qualification of Representatives Was Set by the Convention
The qualifications of the elected – being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity – were very properly considered and regulated by the Convention.
A representative of the United States must meet four standards: (1) at least twenty five years old, (2) seven years a citizen of the United States, (3) on the date of election an inhabitant of the State represented, and (4) during the time of service, must be in no office under the United States. Art. I, §2, cl. 2.
Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the Federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.
The Convention Selected a Two-Year Term as Optimum
In order to decide on the length of a representative’s term, two questions were considered: first, whether biennial elections will be safe, and second, whether they be necessary or useful.
As it is essential to liberty that a government should have a common interest with the People, it is particularly essential that the House of Representatives should have an immediate dependence on the People, and an intimate sympathy with them.
Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectively secured.
However, the particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances.
Experience is the guide that ought always be followed whenever it can be found.
As it is essential to liberty that a government should have a common interest with the People, it is particularly essential that the House of Representatives should have an immediate dependence on the People, and an intimate sympathy with them. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectively secured.
The scheme of representation – as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person – was at most very imperfectly known to ancient polity. Instructive examples are thus found only in more modern times.
And even here, in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it is proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case.
Length of Terms in the House of Commons
The first example is the House of Commons in Great Britain. Prior to adoption of the Magna Carta in 1215, the history of this branch of the English Constitution is too obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of a representative branch is still questioned among political antiquaries. The earliest records of subsequent date prove that parliaments were to sit only every year, not that they were to be elected every year. And even these annual sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch that very long and dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition.
To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of Charles II (1660-1685) that the intermissions should not be protracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of William III in 1689 – following a revolution in the government – the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the fundamental rights of the People that parliaments ought to be held frequently. By another statute passed a few years later in the same reign, the term “frequently” was reduced to a precise meaning: parliament shall be called within three years after the termination of the preceding parliament. This three-year period was lengthened to seven years earlier this century under alarm for the Hanoverian succession.
From these facts, it appears the greatest frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom for binding the representatives to their constituents, does not exceed three years.
And if we argue from the degree of liberty retained even under elections held every seven years, a reduction of the period from seven to three years – with the other necessary reforms – would so far extend the influence of the People over their representatives as to satisfy us that federal elections held every two years cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their constituents.
Elections in Ireland
Until recently, elections in Ireland were regulated entirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the accession of a new prince or some other contingent event. The parliament which commenced with George II (1727-1760) continued throughout his whole reign of more than 30 years. The only influence the People had on representatives consisted in the People’s right to supply occasional vacancies by the election of new members, and in the chance of some event which might produce a general new election.
The Irish parliament’s ability to maintain the rights of their constituents was extremely shackled by the crown’s control over the subjects of their deliberation. Recently these shackles were broken, and octennial parliaments established. What effect to be produced by this partial reform must be left to further experience.
The example of Ireland can throw but little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be that even though the People of that country have been under disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty which depends on a due connection between their representatives and themselves.
The definition of the right of suffrage – the right of an individual (elector) to vote – is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was therefore incumbent on the Convention to define and establish this right in the Constitution.
Examples from the States when They Were British Colonies
I bring my inquiry nearer home. The example of the States while British colonies claims particular attention. In all of them, the principle of representation was established in at least one branch of the legislature. But the periods of election were different.
They varied from one to seven years.
There is no reason to infer – from the spirit and conduct of the representatives of the People prior to the Revolution – that biennial elections would have been dangerous to the public liberties.
The spirit which everywhere displayed itself at the commencement of the struggle – and which vanquished the obstacles to independence – is the best of proofs that a sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement.
This remark also holds good with regard to the former colonies whose elections were least frequent, as well as to those whose elections were most frequent.
Elections in Virginia
Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain.
It was the first also in espousing the resolution of independence by public act.
In Virginia, nevertheless, elections under the former government were septennial.
This particular example is not brought into view as a proof of any advantage in septennial elections, but merely as a very substantial proof that the liberties of the People can be in no danger from biennial elections.
Three Additional Circumstances Confirm Biennial Elections Are Best
These examples are strengthened by three important circumstances.
The first is the House of Representatives will possess only a part of that supreme legislative authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament, and which (with a few exceptions) was exercised by the colonial assemblies and the Irish legislature. It is a well-founded maxim that – where no other circumstances affect the case – the greater the power is, the shorter its duration ought to be.
Conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted.
In the second place, the House of Representatives will not only be restrained by its dependence on the People, it will be watched and controlled by collateral legislatures, which other legislative bodies are not.
And in the third place, no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the Federal government for seducing – if they should be disposed to seduce – the House of Representatives from their duty to the People, and the means of influence over this popular branch possessed by these more permanent branches of the government.
With less power to abuse, the House of Representatives will be less tempted on one side, and doubly watched on the other.
Hamilton or Madison
Federalist 53: Biennial House Elections Are Optimum, and Will Reduce Fraud
“Where annual elections end, tyranny begins,” is a maxim currently popular.
If it be true that proverbial sayings are generally founded in reason, it is not less true they are often applied to cases to which the reason does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us.
On what reason is this proverbial observation founded?
No one will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between the sun or seasons and the period within which human virtue can resist the temptations of power.
Happily for mankind, liberty is not confined to any single point of time, but lies between extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations required by the situations and circumstances of civil society.
If it were found expedient, the election of magistrates of a government might be annual, monthly, weekly or even daily – and all have been tried. Among the periods established among ourselves for the election of the most numerous branches of the State legislatures, they no more coincide than in the elections of other civil magistrates.
Length of Terms in the Most Numerous Legislative Bodies in the Several States
In Connecticut and Rhode Island, elections are half-yearly.
In the other States they are annual, with the exception of South Carolina, which has biennial elections, as the Constitution declares for the House of Representatives.
The difference between the longest period (two years) and shortest period (six months) is four to one, yet it is not easy to show Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty than South Carolina, or that any one of these three States is distinguished for its liberty in comparison to States whose elections are annual.
“Where annual elections end, tyranny begins,” is a maxim currently popular. If it be true that proverbial sayings are generally founded in reason, it is not less true they are often applied to cases to which the reason does not extend.
Annual Elections Arose from the Desire for Stability of Government
In searching for the reasons for the maxim that tyranny begins when annual elections end, I can discover only one, yet it is wholly inapplicable to our case.
An important distinction exists between a law established by a government – and therefore alterable by that or a later government – and a Constitution established by the People, which is unalterable by the government.
This distinction – so well understood in America – seems little understood and less observed in any other country.
In other countries, the full power to change the form of the government resides with the person or body possessing the supreme power of legislation.
Even in Great Britain – where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear the most about the rights of the Constitution – it is maintained that the authority of parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, both with regard to its constitution and the ordinary objects of legislative provision.
Accordingly, parliament has in several instances actually changed some of the most fundamental articles of the government by mere legislative acts. Parliament has on several occasions changed the period of election.
Most recently, parliament substituted septennial elections in place of triennial elections, and by the same act continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the British people!
An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of free government, and led them to seek some security to liberty against the danger to which exposes the People.
In the absence of a constitution paramount to the government, some other security was needed.
Since elections are the cornerstone of liberty, what better security would the case admit than appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time to measure the danger of innovations, fixing the national sentiment, and uniting patriotic exertions?
The most simple and familiar portion of time applicable to the subject was one year.
From this the maxim of annual elections has been inculcated by a laudable zeal, in order to erect a barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited government, and to hinder the advance towards tyranny that longer election periods may allow.
But what necessity is there of applying the expedient of a one-year election limit to a Federal government already limited by the authority of a paramount Constitution?
Who will pretend the liberties of the People of America will be less secure under biennial elections unalterably fixed the Constitution, than those of any other nation would be under annual or even more frequent elections, subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the government?
Biennial Elections Favor Increased Knowledge of Important Issues
Another important question is whether biennial elections are necessary or useful.
The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative appears from several very obvious considerations.
No person can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which legislation is to be enacted.
A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of individuals in private as well as public stations.
Another part can only be attained – or at least thoroughly attained – by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it.
In all cases, therefore, the period of service ought to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of the service.
As we have seen, the period of legislative service established in most of the States for the more numerous legislative branch is one year.
The question then may be put into this simple form: does a period of two years result in a greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for legislation than a period of one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation?
The very statement of the question suggests the answer is yes.
No person can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which legislation is to be enacted. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of individuals in private as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained – or at least thoroughly attained – by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it.
In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to existing (and largely uniform) laws – with which all the citizens are more or less conversant – and to the general affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conversation of every class of citizen.
The great theater of the United States presents a very different scene.
The laws are far from uniform, as they may vary in every State. The public affairs of the union are extremely diversified and spread throughout a very extensive region.
The local affairs connected with them can only with difficulty be correctly learned in any place other than in the central councils to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every part of the empire.
Some knowledge of the affairs of all of the States – and even of their laws – ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States.
Foreign trade cannot properly be regulated by uniform laws without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, usages, and regulations of the different States. Trade between the different States cannot be duly regulated without some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other respects.
How can taxes be judiciously imposed and effectually collected if they be not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in the different States?
Can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided without a similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each other?
These are the principal objects of legislation, and suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the representatives ought to acquire.
Other objects will require a proportional degree of information with regard to them. By degrees, all these difficulties will be very much diminished.
The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of a code. Improvements on first drafts will every year become easier and fewer.
Past transactions of the government will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members.
The affairs of the United States more and more will become objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large.
And the increased intercourse among the different States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws.
But even with all these abatements, the business of legislation must continue to exceed – both in novelty and difficulty – the legislative business of a single State, which justifies the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it.
Knowledge of Foreign Affairs Also Is Essential
A branch of knowledge which must belong to the acquirements of a representative is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce, a representative must be acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, and also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations.
A representative ought not be altogether ignorant of the laws of other nations, as far as it is a proper object legislation submitted to the government.
Although the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements, the connection between the several branches of government will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation, and sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and cooperation.
Some portion of this knowledge may be acquired from personal advisors, but some of it can be derived only from the public sources of information. Both sources will be required to effect a practical attention to the subject during the period of actual service in the House of Representatives.
Travel Distance for Representatives Favors Biennial Elections
There are other considerations not unworthy of notice, although perhaps of less importance, such as the distance which many representatives will be obliged to travel – and the arrangements rendered necessary by that circumstance – which might raise a serious objection from some fit candidates for service, if limited to a one-year term, than one extended to a two-year term.
An inconvenience mingled with the advantages of annual elections is that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. Whatever the unlawful means actually used, an irregular member who is seated is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. A very pernicious encouragement is thus given to the use of unlawful means to obtain an irregular return.
No argument can be drawn on this subject from the case of representatives selected prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
These delegates were elected annually by their State legislatures, but reelection was considered by the legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course, subject to a limit of three terms in a six-year period.
The election of the representatives by the People will not be governed by the same principle.
As happens in all such assemblies, a few of the members will possess superior talents.
By frequent reelections, they will become members of long standing, thoroughly mastering the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages, such as ensnaring newer members who possess less information.
This last remark also applies to the relation which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Limiting Terms to a Single Year Will Encourage Fraud
An inconvenience mingled with the advantages of annual elections is that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect.
Whatever the unlawful means actually used, an irregular member who is seated is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes.
A very pernicious encouragement is thus given to the use of unlawful means to obtain an irregular return.
Were elections for the House of Representatives held annually, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States.
Each chamber is the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members, as it necessarily must be.
Whatever improvements may be suggested by experience for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, a great portion of a single year would unavoidably elapse before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of a seat.
The prospect of such an event would be little check to an unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat.
All these considerations warrant us affirming that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as they will be safe to the liberty of the People.
Hamilton or Madison
Federalist 54: Apportionment of Representatives and Taxes Will Be Determined by a Uniform Federal Standard Encompassing Both Persons and Property
I NOW CONSIDER the number of representatives each State shall have, together with the apportionment of direct taxes, which will be determined using the same rule: “Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons.” Art. I, § 2, form. cl. 3.
The Three-Fifths Compromise
The reference to “three fifths of all other persons” refers to slaves in the southern States, and was agreed to as a compromising expedient between the northern and southern States.
I shall refer to it as the Three-Fifths Compromise, for it regards slaves as inhabitants, but divested of two fifths of the rights of a free citizen or one bound to service for a term of years.
Using the number of individual citizens in each State as the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the People of each State was unobjectionable.
The establishment of the same rule for the apportionment of taxes also was little contested.
Though similar in effect, the rules are not founded on the same principle.
In the case of counting actual inhabitants, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of citizens, with which it has a natural and universal connection.
In the case of apportioning taxes, it has reference to the proportion of wealth attributable to those citizens.
It is by no means a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one.
But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it was the least objectionable rule proposed, and had gained support in a recent Congress as an amendment to the Articles of Confederation.
Assuming all this is admitted, does it follow that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation?
The initial argument against counting slaves towards representation was a legal one: since slavery is lawful in the southern States, and slaves are there considered as property – not as persons – slaves ought to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of persons, but be included in estimates of taxation founded on property.
A number of southern delegates countered that their laws of their States do not consider slaves merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons.
They argued that slaves partake of both these qualities: being considered by their laws as persons in some respects, and in other respects as property.
In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another, the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property.
On the other hand, a slave is protected – in life and limb – against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and liberty. The slave himself is punishable for all violence committed against others.
The slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property.
Equitable Considerations Precluded Treating Slaves Solely as Property
The question of slaves may be placed in another light.
It was agreed on all sides that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, and that numbers are the only proper scale of representation.
Would the Convention have been impartial or consistent if it had rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants when the shares of representation were to be calculated, and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted?
Could it be reasonably expected the Southern States would concur in a system which considered their slaves in some degree as men when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in the same light when advantages were to be conferred?
Might not some surprise also be expressed that those who reproach the southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as property a part of their human brethren, should themselves contend that the Federal government – to which all the States would be parties – ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely in the unnatural light of property than the very laws of which they complain?
These questions tended to expose the inconsistency of those who abhorred slavery, but nonetheless were willing to accept its beneficial legal definitions when arguably applicable.
The response of northern delegates to these questions was with a question of their own: since slaves are not included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States possessing them, and they neither vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters, upon what principle ought they to be taken into the Federal estimate of representation?
These Questions Were Resolved by a Uniform Federal Rule that Each State Is to Determine the Number of Its Inhabitants
If the Convention had wholly rejected counting slaves as inhabitants to determine representation, it would have appeared to have been following the laws of the southern States.
But this approach was rejected by the Convention as against a more fundamental principle of the Constitution – which holds that the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several States ought to be determined by a uniform Federal rule which aggregates the inhabitants of each State – as counted by each State.
States Have Different Voting Requirements
At present, the count of inhabitants will vary from State to State, based on numbers and qualifications.
The qualifications upon which the right of suffrage depend are not the same in any two States, and in some States the difference is very material.
In every State a certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of the right to vote by their respective State constitutions, yet these individuals will still be included in the allotted number of inhabitants each State reports in the first census.
Southern States observed that the principle laid down by the Convention would require that no regard should be had to the policy of particular States towards their own inhabitants, and that slaves – as inhabitants – could have been admitted into the census according to their full number, in like manner with other inhabitants who are not admitted (by the policy of their own State) to all the rights of citizens.
But the southern States did not insist on a rigorous adherence to the principle; all they asked was that equal moderation be shown by the northern States.
At bottom, the case of slaves is a peculiar one.
The Three-Fifths Compromise counts each slave as an individual inhabitant, but debased by servitude below the level of free inhabitants.
The Three-Fifths Compromise regards a slave as divested of two fifths of the value of a free inhabitant or those bound to service for a term of years.
The Federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety when it views slaves in the mixed character of persons and of property.
This is in fact the true character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live, since it is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed Negroes into subjects of property, leaving their place disputed in the computation of numbers.
It is further admitted that if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the Negro slaves could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants.
Representation Properly Encompasses Property Rights
There is another ground on which the Three-Fifths Compromise will admit of a still more ready defense.
I have hitherto proceeded on the idea that representation is related to persons only, and not at all to property.
But is it a just idea?
Government is instituted no less for the protection of the property than of the protection of persons.
Both protection of property and protection of persons may be considered interests to be represented by those who are charged with guiding the government.
Upon this principle, in several States – particularly New York – one branch of the government is intended more especially to be the guardian of property, and is accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of government.
The Federal Constitution differs, however, because it commits the rights of the person and the rights of property and into the same hands.
From this it follows that those in charge ought to direct some of their attention to property rights as well as to personal rights.
Additionally, the representatives allocated to each State should bear some proportion to the comparative wealth of each State, which would include slaves, even though they are disenfranchised.
The Influence of One State over Another Will Be in Superior Numbers Alone
Unlike individuals, one State cannot possesses influence over another, except in having a higher number of representatives.
It is not probable that the richest State in the United States will ever influence the choice of a single representative in any other State.
Nor will the representatives of larger and richer States possess any other advantage in Congress over the representatives of other States, other than what may result from their superior number alone.
Therefore, as far as their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it will be secured to them by a superior share of representation.
Federal Laws Will Be Enacted by Representatives, Not States
In this respect, the new Constitution is materially different from the Articles of Confederation, as well as the laws of the United Netherlands.
In that and other similar confederacies, the efficacy of Federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary resolutions of the states composing the union.
Hence some states have an unequal influence (even though each state possesses but an equal vote in the public councils), corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions.
Under the Federal Constitution, the Federal acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the individual States.
These acts will depend merely on the majority of votes in the Federal legislature, without regard to which State the representative represents.
As a consequence, each vote – whether proceeding from a larger or smaller State – or a State more or less wealthy or powerful – will have an equal weight and efficacy.
This is not dissimilar to how votes are given individually in State legislatures by the representatives of unequal counties or districts.
Each vote has precise equality of value and effect. If there be any difference, it usually proceeds from differences in the personal character of the individual representative, rather than from any regard to the extent of the district represented.
Using the Same Formula of Counting for Both Representation and Taxation Will Have Beneficial Consequences
The establishment of a common measure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect.
The accuracy of the initial census obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend on the disposition and cooperation of the States.
It thus is greatly important that the States should feel as little bias as possible to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers.
Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants.
Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail.
By extending the rule to both objects, the States will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each other, and produce the requisite impartiality.
Madison
Federalist 55: Total Membership of the House of Representatives
THE MEMBERSHIP AND SIZE of the House of Representatives was assailed by critics.
The weight of character and the apparent force of their arguments renders this aspect of the Constitution worthy of attention.
The Constitution requires a census within three years of the first meeting of Congress and every decade thereafter.
It then provides for no more than one representative for every 30,000 counted: “The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.” Art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
Summary of Objections to Number of Representatives
There are four charges against this aspect of Article 1, section 2:
(1) the small number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests;
(2) those representatives will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents;
(3) representatives will be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the People, and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the depression of the many; and
(4) as defective as the number will be in the first instance, it will grow more disproportionate through increases in population and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent increase of the representatives.
In this paper I answer the first objection, and in Federalist 56 through Federalist 58 I answer the other three.
Using State Ratios of Representatives to Inhabitants in order to Determine the Number of House Members Would Result in the Confusion of a Multitude
No political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative legislature.
There is no point on which the policy of the several States is more at variance, whether I compare their legislative assemblies directly with each other, or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their constituents.
The most numerous branch in Delaware consists of 21 representatives, while in Massachusetts it amounts to between 300 and 400.
A very considerable difference also is observable among States nearly equal in population.
The Convention determined Pennsylvania and Massachusetts initially would be granted 8 representatives, yet the number of members in Pennsylvania’s largest popular chamber is not more than one fifth of that in Massachusetts.
New York, whose population is to that of South Carolina as six to five, has little more than one third of the number of representatives.
As great a disparity prevails between Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island.
In Pennsylvania, the representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents than of 1 for every 4,000 or 5,000.
In Rhode Island, they bear a proportion of at least 1 for every 1,000.
And according to the constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to 1 to every 10 electors, thereby far exceeding the proportion in any of the other States.
Another general remark worth making is that the ratio between representatives and constituents ought not be the same where the constituents are very numerous as where they are very few.
Were the ratio of representatives to constituents in Virginia regulated by the standard in Rhode Island, Virginia’s representatives would amount to between 400 and 500 – and twenty or thirty years hence – to 1,000.
On the other hand, applying the ratio Pennsylvania to Delaware would reduce Delaware’s representative assembly to seven or eight members.
Nothing is more fallacious than founding our political calculations on arithmetical principles.
Sixty or seventy individuals may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven.
But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would proportionably be a better depositary.
And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand representatives, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed.
Avoiding the Confusion of the Multitude, Where Passion Reigns
The truth revealed by experience demands – in all cases – that a certain number is necessary at least to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes.
On the other hand, the number must be kept within a certain limit to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude.
In all very numerous assemblies – of whatever character composed – passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason.
Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.
The truth revealed by experience demands – in all cases – that a certain number is necessary at least to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes. On the other hand, the number must be kept within a certain limit to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude.
The More Restricted Scope of Federal Legislation Justifies Fewer Representatives
The observations I made in Federalist 53 and Federalist 54 concerning the benefits of biennial elections extend to the number of representatives needed in the House.
For the same reason that less frequent elections than the public might otherwise require are justified by the limited powers of the Congress – as well as by the control of State legislatures – the members of the Congress need be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation, and were under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies.
With these general ideas in mind, I here respond to the objections stated against the number of members proposed for the House of Representatives.
Anticipated Increases in Population Will Increase the Number of House Members to 400, which Ought Eliminate Fears of Too Few Representatives
At the outset of the Federal government, the number of representatives will be 65. It is said 65 are too few individuals to safely entrust with so much power.
However, a census will be taken within three years, after which the number may be augmented to 1 for every 30,000 inhabitants. With every successive 10-year renewal of the census, augmentations may continue under the above limitation.
It is not extravagant or conjectural to estimate the first census will – at the rate of 1 for every 30,000 – raise the number of representatives to at least 100. Estimating the Negroes in the proportion of three fifths, the population of the United States will by that time amount to three million.
At the expiration of 25 years, the number of representatives may amount to 200, and by 50 years increased to 400. Four hundred is a number which ought put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the House of Representatives.
I take for granted here that the number of representatives will be augmented from time to time in the manner provided by the Constitution.
If I were to assume the contrary, I should admit the objection would have very great weight indeed.
The true question to be decided then, is whether the smallness of the number – as a temporary regulation – is dangerous to the public liberty.
Will 65 members for a few years – and 100 or 200 for a few more – be a safe depositary for a limited and well-guarded power of legislating for the United States?
In order to say these numbers would be insufficient, I would first have to obliterate every impression I have received with regard to the present genius of the People of America, the spirit actuating State legislatures, and the principles which are incorporated with the political character of every class of citizens.
I am unable to conceive that the People of America – in their present temper or under any circumstances which can speedily happen – will choose and every second year reelect 65 or 100 individuals who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery.
I am unable to conceive that the State legislatures – which must feel so many motives to watch, and which possess so many means of counteracting, the Federal legislature – would fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the Federal government against the liberties of their common constituents.
I am equally unable to conceive there are in the United States – at this time or any short time – any 65 or 100 individuals capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the People at large, who would either desire or dare – within the short space of two years – to betray the solemn trust committed to them.
What may be produced by changed circumstances, time, and an increase in population requires a prophetic spirit to declare, and makes no part of my pretensions.
But judging from the circumstances now before us – and from the probable state of them within a moderate period of time – I must pronounce the liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of hands proposed by the Constitution.
Sixty or seventy individuals may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would proportionably be a better depositary. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand representatives, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed.
Our Recent History Provides Evidence that Bribery and Treachery Are Scant Risks
From what quarter can a danger to our liberties proceed?
Are we afraid of foreign gold?
If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our Federal leaders and enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how are we at this time a free and independent nation?
The Congress which conducted us through the Revolution had less members than any Congress will have under the Constitution.
Further, the members were not chosen by – nor responsible to – their fellow citizens at large.
Although they were appointed from year to year (and recallable at the pleasure of their States), they were generally continued for three years, and for still longer terms prior to ratification of the Articles of Confederation.
The Congress always held its consultations under the veil of secrecy.
It had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign nations; through the whole course of the war they had the fate of their country more in their hands than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with our future representatives.
From the greatness of the prize at stake – future control of the United States – and the eagerness of Great Britain to reclaim it – one may well suppose that the use of means other than force would not have been scrupled.
Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not betrayed; nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers of calumny.
The Prospect of a Appointment to a Preexisting Civil Office Holds Little Allurement to Corruption
Is danger to the House of Representatives to be apprehended from other branches of the Federal government?
Where are the means to be found by the President, or the Senate, or both?
Their emoluments of office will not suffice without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives.
Their private fortunes – as is the case for all American citizens – cannot possibly be sources of danger.
The only means the President and Senate and President may possess will be in the dispensation of appointments.
Is it here that suspicion rests her charge?
Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate.
Now we are told the fidelity of the other chamber is to be the victim.
The improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of government – standing on as different foundations of republican principles and at the same time accountable to the society over which they are placed – ought alone to quiet this apprehension.
The Constitution fortunately provides a still further safeguard.
The members of the Congress are ineligible for any civil office that may be created (or of which the emoluments may be increased) during the term of their election.
Therefore no offices can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties.
To suppose such preexisting offices would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the People – who are selected by the People themselves – is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all reasoning must be vain.
Republican Government Assumes There Is More Virtue than Depravity in Humanity
The sincere friends of liberty who give themselves up to the extravagancies of jealousy are not aware of the injury they do their own cause.
There is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, but other qualities in human nature justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.
Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.
Were the pictures inspired by the political jealousy of some faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be there is insufficient virtue among men for self-government, and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain humans from destroying and devouring one another.
Madison or Hamilton
Federalist 56: Representatives Will Be Satisfactorily Apprised of Local and National Conditions
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES will not be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents, contrary to the second objection lodged against this body.
The objection proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the number of its inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests.
The objection overlooks the circumstances which distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies.
The Principal Objects of Federal Legislation Are Commerce, Taxation, and the Militia
It is a sound and important principle that a representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents.
But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate.
An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects that are not within the compass of legislation is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust.
In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority, recourse must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority.
What are to be the objects of Federal legislation?
Those which are of most importance – and seem most to require local knowledge – are commerce, taxation, and the militia.
Commerce
A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual State, a very few representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the Federal councils.
Taxation
In a great measure, taxation will consist of the duties which are involved in the regulation of commerce.
As far as it may consist of internal collections within a State, a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the State may be necessary.
This knowledge of internal collections also will be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent individuals diffusively elected within the State.
Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of the district.
Besides this source of information, the laws of a State (as framed by representatives from every part of it) almost will be of themselves a sufficient guide.
Furthermore, in every State there have been made (and must continue to be made) regulations on taxes which in many cases will leave little more to be done by the Federal legislature than to review the different laws and reduce them to one general act.
A skillful individual with access to all the local codes might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole union, without any aid from oral information.
It may be expected that whenever internal taxes may be necessary – and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the States – the more simple objects will be preferred.
An analogy may be drawn between local and State codes on the one side, and State and Federal codes on the other.
Suppose for a moment that New York or any other State were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within itself a power of local legislation.
A degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labors of the State legislature, and render a much smaller number of members sufficient for it.
The Federal government will derive a great advantage from another circumstance.
The representatives of each State will bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws and a local knowledge of their respective districts.
Many representatives will have been members of the State legislature, where all the local information and interests of the State are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States.
It is a sound and important principle that a representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects that are not within the compass of legislation is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust.
State Militias
The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater force to the case of State militias.
However different the rules of discipline may be in different States, they are the same throughout each particular State, and depend on circumstances which can differ but little in different parts of the same State.
The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning used here and in Federalist 55 to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives does not in any respect contradict what was urged in Federalist 53 with regard to the extensive information which the representatives ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it.
This information – so far as it may relate to local objects – is rendered necessary and difficult not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single State – but of those among different States.
Taking each State by itself, its laws are the same and its interests but little diversified.
A few individuals therefore will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them.
Were the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would include a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole State might be competently represented by a single member taken from any part of it.
But on a comparison of the different States taken together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances connected with the objects of Federal legislation, with all of which the Federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance.
While a few representatives from each State may bring with them a due knowledge of their own State, every representative will have much information to acquire concerning all of the other States.
The Passage of Time Will Increase the Population and Will Diversify State Economies
The changes of time will have an assimilating effect on the comparative situation of the different States.
But the effect of time on the internal affairs of individual States will be more rapid.
Some of the States are presently little more than a society of farmers.
Only a few of the States have made much progress in those branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation.
These industries will grow as population in all the States increases, as will the number of representatives.
The foresight of the Convention has taken care that the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the government.
The True Ratios of Representative to Constituent in Britain Show Ours to Be Valid
The experience of Great Britain – which presents to mankind so many exemplary and monitory political lessons – corroborates the reflections I have made regarding the proper number of representatives.
The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland is not less than eight million. The representatives of these eight million in the House of Commons amount to 538. Of this number, one ninth are elected by 364 persons, and one half by 5,723 persons. Of the one half, it is well known they are more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights.
One cannot suppose that the half thus elected – and who do not even reside among the people at large – can add any knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative councils, or to the security of the British people against the government.
They might therefore be deducted from the total representatives of the nation, to reach a more accurate total of what I denominate the real number of representatives in those kingdoms.
In doing so, I will not extend the deduction to a considerable number of others who do not reside among their constituents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs.
Dividing the House of Commons membership of 538 in half leaves 279 persons as the depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight million.
Comparing the example of the House of Commons with House of Representatives, the Constitution’s specification of no more one representative for every 30,000 inhabitants, Art. I, § 2, ¶ 3, cl. 3, will render our House both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which are confided to it.
In other words, for every 28,670 constituents, only one representative will maintain their rights and explain their situation in an assembly of the kingdoms (the House of Commons) which is exposed to the whole force of executive influence while at the same time it extends its authority to every object of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated.
Nonetheless, it is very certain that a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, and that the defects in the British code are in some instances chargeable to the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the People in those kingdoms.
Comparing the example of the House of Commons with House of Representatives, the Constitution’s specification of no more one representative for every 30,000 inhabitants, Art. I, § 2, ¶ 3, cl. 3, will render our House both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which are confided to it.
Madison or Hamilton
Federalist 56: Representatives Will Be Satisfactorily Apprised of Local and National Conditions
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES will not be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents, contrary to the second objection lodged against this body.
The objection proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the number of its inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests.
The objection overlooks the circumstances which distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies.
The Principal Objects of Federal Legislation Are Commerce, Taxation, and the Militia
It is a sound and important principle that a representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents.
But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate.
An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects that are not within the compass of legislation is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust.
In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority, recourse must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority.
What are to be the objects of Federal legislation?
Those which are of most importance – and seem most to require local knowledge – are commerce, taxation, and the militia.
Commerce
A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual State, a very few representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the Federal councils.
Taxation
In a great measure, taxation will consist of the duties which are involved in the regulation of commerce.
As far as it may consist of internal collections within a State, a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the State may be necessary.
This knowledge of internal collections also will be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent individuals diffusively elected within the State.
Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of the district.
Besides this source of information, the laws of a State (as framed by representatives from every part of it) almost will be of themselves a sufficient guide.
Furthermore, in every State there have been made (and must continue to be made) regulations on taxes which in many cases will leave little more to be done by the Federal legislature than to review the different laws and reduce them to one general act.
A skillful individual with access to all the local codes might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole union, without any aid from oral information.
It may be expected that whenever internal taxes may be necessary – and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the States – the more simple objects will be preferred.
An analogy may be drawn between local and State codes on the one side, and State and Federal codes on the other.
Suppose for a moment that New York or any other State were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within itself a power of local legislation.
A degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labors of the State legislature, and render a much smaller number of members sufficient for it.
The Federal government will derive a great advantage from another circumstance.
The representatives of each State will bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws and a local knowledge of their respective districts.
Many representatives will have been members of the State legislature, where all the local information and interests of the State are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States.
It is a sound and important principle that a representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects that are not within the compass of legislation is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust.
State Militias
The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater force to the case of State militias.
However different the rules of discipline may be in different States, they are the same throughout each particular State, and depend on circumstances which can differ but little in different parts of the same State.
The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning used here and in Federalist 55 to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives does not in any respect contradict what was urged in Federalist 53 with regard to the extensive information which the representatives ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it.
This information – so far as it may relate to local objects – is rendered necessary and difficult not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single State – but of those among different States.
Taking each State by itself, its laws are the same and its interests but little diversified.
A few individuals therefore will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them.
Were the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would include a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole State might be competently represented by a single member taken from any part of it.
But on a comparison of the different States taken together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances connected with the objects of Federal legislation, with all of which the Federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance.
While a few representatives from each State may bring with them a due knowledge of their own State, every representative will have much information to acquire concerning all of the other States.
The Passage of Time Will Increase the Population and Will Diversify State Economies
The changes of time will have an assimilating effect on the comparative situation of the different States.
But the effect of time on the internal affairs of individual States will be more rapid.
Some of the States are presently little more than a society of farmers.
Only a few of the States have made much progress in those branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation.
These industries will grow as population in all the States increases, as will the number of representatives.
The foresight of the Convention has taken care that the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the government.
The True Ratios of Representative to Constituent in Britain Show Ours to Be Valid
The experience of Great Britain – which presents to mankind so many exemplary and monitory political lessons – corroborates the reflections I have made regarding the proper number of representatives.
The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland is not less than eight million. The representatives of these eight million in the House of Commons amount to 538. Of this number, one ninth are elected by 364 persons, and one half by 5,723 persons. Of the one half, it is well known they are more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights.
One cannot suppose that the half thus elected – and who do not even reside among the people at large – can add any knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative councils, or to the security of the British people against the government.
They might therefore be deducted from the total representatives of the nation, to reach a more accurate total of what I denominate the real number of representatives in those kingdoms.
In doing so, I will not extend the deduction to a considerable number of others who do not reside among their constituents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs.
Dividing the House of Commons membership of 538 in half leaves 279 persons as the depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight million.
Comparing the example of the House of Commons with House of Representatives, the Constitution’s specification of no more one representative for every 30,000 inhabitants, Art. I, § 2, ¶ 3, cl. 3, will render our House both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which are confided to it.
In other words, for every 28,670 constituents, only one representative will maintain their rights and explain their situation in an assembly of the kingdoms (the House of Commons) which is exposed to the whole force of executive influence while at the same time it extends its authority to every object of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated.
Nonetheless, it is very certain that a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, and that the defects in the British code are in some instances chargeable to the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the People in those kingdoms.
Comparing the example of the House of Commons with House of Representatives, the Constitution’s specification of no more one representative for every 30,000 inhabitants, Art. I, § 2, ¶ 3, cl. 3, will render our House both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which are confided to it.
Madison or Hamilton
Federalist 57: The House of Representatives Will Not Be an Oligarchy, since the Voters are the Greatest Defense to It
THE THIRD CHARGE against the House of Representatives asserts it will be composed of that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the People, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few.
Of all the objections framed against the Constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary.
The objection is leveled against a pretended oligarchy.
The principle of it also strikes at the very root of republican government.
The first aim of every political constitution is (or ought to be) to obtain for rulers individuals who possess the most wisdom to discern the common good of the society and the most virtue to pursue it.
In the next place, a political constitution must take the most effectual precautions for keeping rulers virtuous while they continue to hold their public trust.
Republican Government Is Signified by Representative Elections
The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government.
The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and various.
The most effectual one is a limitation of the term of appointments such as will maintain a proper responsibility to the People.
The Great Body of the People of America Will Choose their Representatives
What part of the constitution of the House of Representatives violates the principles of republican government, or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the many?
Let me ask whether every circumstance is not, on the contrary, strictly conformable to these principles, and scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of every class and description of citizens?
Who are to be the electors of the Federal representatives?
Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune.
The electors are to be the great body of the People of the United States.
They are to be the same who exercise the right in every State of electing the corresponding branch of the legislature of the State.
The first aim of every political constitution is (or ought to be) to obtain for rulers individuals who possess the most wisdom to discern the common good of the society and the most virtue to pursue it. In the next place, a political constitution must take the most effectual precautions for keeping rulers virtuous while they continue to hold their public trust.
House Membership Is Open to All
Who are to be the objects of popular choice?
Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country.
No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgement or disappoint the inclination of the People.
If we consider the situation of the individuals on whom the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens may confer the representative trust, we shall find it involving every security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity to their constituents.
Representatives Will Be Distinguished by the Traits which Earned Them Election
In the first place, representatives will be distinguished by the preference of their fellow-citizens, and in general we ought to presume they will be distinguished also by those qualities which earned that preference, and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to the nature of their engagements.
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the People. If we consider the situation of the individuals on whom the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens may confer the representative trust, we shall find it involving every security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity to their constituents.
Representatives Will Have the Favor of their Constituents
In the second place, representatives will enter into the public service under circumstances which cannot fail to produce a temporary affection, at least to their constituents.
There is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor, of favor, of esteem, and of confidence, which – apart from all considerations of interest – is some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns.
Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation against human nature; and it must be confessed that instances of it are but too frequent and flagrant, both in public and in private life.
But the universal and extreme indignation which it inspires is itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment.
Self-interest in Self-Preservation Will Foster Reliance on the People’s Choices
In the third place, those ties which bind representatives to constituents are strengthened by motives of a more selfish nature.
Pride and vanity will attach the representative to a form of government favoring those pretensions and give a share in its honors and distinctions.
Whatever hopes or projects may be entertained by a few aspiring characters, the great proportion of individuals deriving their advancement from their influence with the People would have more to hope from a preservation of the favor, than from innovations in the government subversive of the authority of the People.
All these securities are strengthened by the restraint of frequent elections.
The House Is Designed for Dependence on the People
Hence, in the fourth place, the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the People.
Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised, where they will remain forever unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.
The Laws Will Apply Equally to House Members and Citizens Alike
As a fifth circumstance favoring the fidelity of representatives to the People, they will make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society.
This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and the People together, for it creates between them a communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments.
Few governments have furnished examples in history, but without it every government degenerates into tyranny.
The House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the People. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised, where they will remain forever unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.
If one asks what restrains the House of Representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of the society, I would answer: the genius of the whole system, the nature of just and constitutional laws, and above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the People of America, a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished by it.
If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the Congress as well as the People, the People will be prepared to tolerate anything but liberty.
Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their constituents.
Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the People.
We Must Trust Republican Principles
It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of man.
But are they not all that government will admit, and that human prudence can devise?
Are they not the genuine and the characteristic means by which republican government provides for the liberty and happiness of the People?
Are they not the identical means on which every State government relies for the attainment of these important ends?
What then is the basis of the objection this paper has combated?
What are we to say to the individuals who profess the most flaming zeal for republican government, yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of it?
Are those who pretend to be champions for the right and the capacity of the People to choose their own rulers also maintaining that the People will prefer only those who will immediately and infallibly betray the trust committed to them?
Were the objection that the House will be an oligarchy be heard by an individual who had not seen the mode prescribed by the Constitution for the choice of representatives, that individual would reasonably suppose that a prerequisite to House membership required family or fortune, or that the right to vote was unreasonably restricted, or that some other gross departure from the standards prevalent in the States existed. But none of these is true.
The only difference between State and Federal elections is that each representative of the United States will be elected initially by 5,000 or 6,000 citizens, while some elections the States are left to 500 or 600 electors.
Will it be pretended that this difference is sufficient to justify an attachment to the State governments, and an abhorrence to the Federal government?
If this be the point on which the objection turns, it deserves to be examined. Is it supported by reason?
Representatives will make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society. This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and the People together, for it creates between them a communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments. Few governments have furnished examples in history, but without it every government degenerates into tyranny.
Are 5,000 or 6,000 citizens less capable of choosing a fit representative – or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one – than 500 or 600?
On the contrary, reason assures us that a fit representative would most likely be found in the greater number, and that the choice would less likely be diverted by the intrigues of the ambitious or the bribes of the rich.
Further, if we are to assume that 500 or 600 is the highest number of citizens who can jointly exercise the right to elect representatives, does it not follow we must deprive the People of the immediate choice of their public servants in those instances where the administration of the government does not require as many of them as will amount to one for that number of citizens?
It was shown in Federalist 56 that the real representation in the British House of Commons very little exceeds the proportion of 1 for every 30,000 inhabitants.
Besides a variety of powerful causes not existing here – and which in Britain favor the pretensions of rank and wealth – no person there is eligible as a representative of a county unless he possess real estate of the value of £600 per year. To represent a city or borough, one must possess real estate of £300 per year. A further qualification in Britain is that the voters in county elections must possess a freehold estate generating an annual value of more than £20,000.
Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances and other unequal laws in the British code, it cannot be said that the representatives of the nation have elevated the few on the ruins of the many.
Several States Already Have Large Voting Districts
We need not even resort to foreign experience on this subject. Our own is explicit and decisive.
The districts for election senators in the State of New Hampshire are nearly as large as will be necessary for election of her representatives in the Congress. The districts of Massachusetts also are larger than will be necessary for that purpose, and those of New York still more so.
The Ratio of Electors to Elected in New York Is Comparable to the Federal Ratio
In New York, the members of the senate for the cities and counties of New York and Albany are elected by very nearly as many voters as will be entitled to a representative in the Congress.
In these districts and counties, an elector votes for a number of representatives at the same time.
If the same electors at the same time are capable of choosing four or five representatives for State offices, they cannot be incapable of choosing one Federal representative.
The Same Is True in Pennsylvania and Other States
Pennsylvania is an additional example. Some of the counties which elect her State representatives are almost as large as the districts which will elect Federal representatives. The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between 50,000 and 60,000 souls. It will therefore form nearly two districts for the choice of Federal representatives.
The city, however, forms but a single county, in which all electors therein vote for each of its representatives in the State legislature. And what may appear to be still more directly to our purpose, the whole city actually elects a single member to that State’s executive council. This also is the case in all the other counties in Pennsylvania.
These facts are the most satisfactory proofs of the fallacy of the argument that the Federal districts are too large for the election of representatives.
Has it appeared on trial that the senators of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, or the executive council of Pennsylvania, or the members of the assemblies in New York and Pennsylvania, have betrayed any peculiar disposition to sacrifice the many to the few, or are in any respect less worthy of their places than the representatives and magistrates appointed in other States by very small divisions of the People?
There also are cases of a stronger complexion elsewhere.
One branch of the legislature of Connecticut is so constituted that each of its members is elected by the entire electorate of the State.
The same is true for the governors of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York, and the president of New Hampshire.
I leave every individual to decide whether the result of any one of these experiments can be said to countenance a suspicion that a diffusive mode of choosing representatives of the People tends to elevate traitors and to undermine the public liberty.
Hamilton or Madison
Federalist 58: The Number Representatives Will Increase as the Growth of Population Demands; and the House Power over the Purse Examined
THE REMAINING CHARGE against the House of Representatives is grounded on the erroneous supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of population will demand.
This objection would have had great weight if it were supported, but like most of the other objections against the Constitution, proceeds from a partial view of the subject, or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures every object which it beholds.
The Federal Constitution Compares Favorably to State Constitutions
Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the Federal Constitution provides the security of a gradual augmentation of the number of representatives, and therefore does suffer by a comparison with the provisions of State constitutions.
The number of representatives in the first instance – 65 – is declared to be temporary, with its duration limited to the short term of three years, when an initial census is to be completed. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
Within every successive term of ten years a census of inhabitants is to be repeated.
One unequivocal object of these regulations is to readjust, from time to time, the apportionment of representatives to the number of inhabitants, with the single exception that each State shall have at least one representative.
A second object to augment the number of representatives at the same periods, under the sole limitation that the whole number shall not exceed one for every 30,000 inhabitants.
In reviewing the constitutions of the several States, we find that some of them contain no determinate regulations on this subject, others correspond pretty much on this point with the Federal Constitution, and the most effectual security in any of them is resolvable into a mere directory provision.
As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual increase of representatives under the State constitutions has at least kept pace with the increase of the constituents.
It appears State representatives have been as ready to concur in augmentations as constituents have called for them.
The House – Representing the People – and the Senate – Representing States – Will Concur in Necessary Augmentations to House Membership
There is a peculiarity in the Constitution which ensures a majority of the People and their representatives will ensure a constitutional augmentation of those representatives.
The peculiarity is that one branch of the legislature (the House) is a representation of citizens, while the other branch (the Senate) represents the States.
In the House, the larger States will have most weight.
The advantage in the Senate will be in favor of the smaller States.
Larger States Will Advocate for More Representatives
From this circumstance, the larger States will be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of that part of the legislature in which their influence predominates.
As it happens only four of the largest States will have a majority of the all the votes in the House of Representatives.
Should the representatives or the People of the smaller States at any time oppose a reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few States will be sufficient to overrule the opposition.
A coalition would not fail to take place – notwithstanding rivalries and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary occasions – prompted by a common interest and justified by equity and the principles of the Constitution.
Those favoring a steady augmentation of representatives apprehend that smaller States in the Senate may coalesce to oppose augmentation, in order to preserve the power of their current representation.
Since Senate concurrence would be indispensable to augmentation, their argument proceeds, the just and constitutional views of the House might be defeated.
Fortunately these fears are among the difficulties which – existing only in appearance – vanish on a close and accurate inspection. The following reflections will be admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory on this point.
The House Will Have the Advantage on Speaking for the People
Notwithstanding the equal authority which subsists between the two chambers of Congress on all legislative subjects (excepting only that the House of Representatives must originate bills requiring appropriation of money), the House of Representatives will have the advantage in a question depending on the comparative firmness of the two houses.
The House of Representatives has the greater number of members, and will speak with the known and determined sense of a majority of the People, especially when supported by the more powerful States.
This advantage will be increased by the consciousness felt by the one side of being supported in its demands by right, reason, and the Constitution.
The consciousness on the opposite side must contend against the force of all these solemn considerations.
The People can never err more than in supposing that – by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit – they will strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. On the contrary, experience will forever admonish that – after securing a sufficient number of representatives for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society – additional representatives will counteract those views.
Augmentation Will Lead to Reapportionment
It is by no means certain that a majority of votes – even in the Senate – would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of representatives.
In the gradation between the smallest and largest States, there are several which – although generally likely to arrange themselves among the smaller States – are too little removed in extent and population from the larger States to support an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions.
It will not be looking too far to add that an expedient too obvious to be overlooked will persuade senators from new States to favor augmentation of House membership.
As these new States will advance in population with peculiar rapidity for a great length of time, they will be interested in frequent reapportionments of the representatives to the number of inhabitants.
The Power over the Purse Will Secure the Necessary Reapportionment
The large States prevailing in the House of Representatives will have nothing to do but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of each other.
The senators from the growing States will be bound to contend for augmentations by the interest their States will have in reapportionment.
These considerations will afford ample security on augmentations and reapportionments, and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been voiced.
However, should the smaller States pursue an unjust policy against augmentation due to their predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, the larger States will have a constitutional and infallible resource to accomplish their just purposes, for only the House of Representatives can propose the supplies requisite for the support of government.
The Power over the Purse Led to the Ascendancy of the House of Commons
The House holds the power over the purse.
In the history of the British Constitution, the power over the purse aided an infant and humble representation of the People in the House of Commons to enlarge the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally to reduce – as far as it seems to have wished – all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of that government.
The power over the purse may be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the People, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
It was argued that the House of Representatives would be as much interested as the Senate in maintaining the Federal government in its proper functions, and thus be unwilling to stake its existence or reputation on the pliancy of that chamber.
In a trial of firmness between the two chambers, it was asked, would not the House be as likely as the Senate to yield first?
These concerns created no difficulty with those who reflected that the Senate – with its smaller membership and the more permanent and conspicuous the station – would have a stronger interest in the concerns of the Federal government, since those who represent the dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations will be particularly sensible to every prospect of public danger or of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs.
To these causes we may ascribe the continual triumph of the British House of Commons over the other branches of the government, whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed.
An absolute inflexibility in the other branches – although it would have involved every department of the state in general confusion – has neither been apprehended nor experienced.
In the United States, the utmost degree of firmness the Senate or President can display will not be more than equal to a resistance in which they will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles.
In this review of the constitution of the House of Representatives, I have passed over the circumstances of the present condition of economy, which had some effect in lessening the temporary number of representatives.
A disregard of economic conditions would probably have been as rich a theme of declamation against the Constitution as has been shown by the smallness of the number proposed.
I also omit any remarks on the difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in engaging in the Federal service a large number of such characters as the People will probably elect.
In the history of the British Constitution, the power over the purse aided an infant and humble representation of the People in the House of Commons to enlarge the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally to reduce – as far as it seems to have wished – all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of that government. The power over the purse may be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the People, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
The Larger the Popular Assembly, the Fewer the Individuals Controlling It
I must be permitted to add one observation on this subject claiming a very serious attention, in my judgment.
This observation is that in all legislative assemblies, the greater the number of members, the fewer will be the individuals who will in fact direct their proceedings.
Passion, Not Reason, Rules Large Assemblies
In the first place, the more numerous an assembly may be – and of whatever characters composed – the greater is known to be the ascendency of passion over reason.
In the next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities. It is precisely on characters of this description that the eloquence and address of the few are now known to act with all their force.
In the ancient republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a scepter had been placed in a single hand.
On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative assembly becomes, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the People.
Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation.
The People can never err more than in supposing that – by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit – they will strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. On the contrary, experience will forever admonish that – after securing a sufficient number of representatives for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society – additional representatives will counteract those views.
The People can never err more than in supposing that – by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit – they will strengthen the barrier against the government of a few.
On the contrary, experience will forever admonish that – after securing a sufficient number of representatives for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society – additional representatives will counteract those views.
When a deliberative assembly increases in size, the countenance of the government may appear to become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic.
The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.
When a deliberative assembly increases in size, the countenance of the government may appear to become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.
A Quorum Requiring More than a Majority Is Inconvenient
A quorum is the number of representatives made competent for legislative business.
The Constitution sets the quorum for conducting business as a majority of each chamber: “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.” Art. I, § 5, cl 1.
It was said that more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision.
It cannot be denied that some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution.
It might have been an additional shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures.
But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale.
In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed.
It would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority.
If more than a majority were required in particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal.
In some emergencies, a minority might attempt to extort unreasonable indulgences.
In the ancient republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a scepter had been placed in a single hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative assembly becomes, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the People. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation.
Secessions
Lastly, requiring more members for a quorum or particular votes would foster and facilitate the baneful practice of secessions.
This practice has shown itself even in States where only a majority is required.
The practice is subversive of all the principles of order and regular government, and has led more directly to public convulsions and the ruin of popular governments than any other which has yet been displayed among us.
Madison or Hamilton
Federalist 59: Congress Must Have the Power to Regulate the Election of its Members
THE CONSTITUTION AUTHORIZES THE CONGRESS to regulate, in the last resort, the election of its own members.
It is in these words: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
This provision was declaimed against not only by those who condemned the Constitution in gross, but by those who objected with less latitude and moderation.
In one instance, an individual who advocated every other part of the system found this provision exceptionable.
But there is no article in the whole plan more completely defensible, since its propriety rests upon the plain proposition that every government ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation.
Every just reasoner must approve an adherence to this rule upon first sight, and disapprove every deviation from it which is not dictated by the necessity of incorporating into it some particular ingredient incompatible with a rigid conformity to the rule, as with the construction of the Senate.
And even though a just reasoner may acquiesce in that necessity, yet that reasoner will not cease to regret a departure from so fundamental a principle, and regard it as an imperfection in the system, which may prove the seed of future weakness and perhaps anarchy.
A Discretionary Power over Federal Elections Is Necessary
No one asserted an election law could have been framed and inserted into the Constitution which would apply always to every probable change in the situation of the United States.
Therefore, it must be conceded that a discretionary power over elections ought to exist, and that this discretion be placed somewhere.
There are only three ways in which this power reasonably could have been modified and disposed. It could have been lodged:
(1) wholly in the Federal legislature (the Congress),
(2) wholly in the State legislatures, or
(3) primarily in the State legislatures, but ultimately in the Federal legislature.
The regulation of elections for the Federal government in the first instance is delegated to State legislatures because the administration by State legislatures may be both more convenient and satisfactory in ordinary cases. Nonetheless, the Convention reserved to Congress a right to alter State regulations when extraordinary circumstances or improper views might render such interposition necessary to preserve representation.
Congress Must Be the Ultimate Arbiter of Federal Elections
The third mode was preferred by the Convention, and for good reasons.
The regulation of elections for the Federal government in the first instance is delegated to State legislatures because the administration by State legislatures may be both more convenient and satisfactory in ordinary cases.
Nonetheless, the Convention reserved to Congress a right to alter State regulations when extraordinary circumstances or improper views might render such interposition necessary to preserve representation.
Nothing is more evident than that leaving the exclusive power of regulating elections to the House of Representatives in the hands of State legislatures would leave the very existence of the Federal government entirely at the mercy of those legislatures.
At any moment, State legislatures could annihilate the Federal government by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer its affairs.
It is to little purpose to say that a neglect or omission of this kind is unlikely.
The constitutional possibility of the thing – without an equivalent for the risk – is an unanswerable objection.
No satisfactory reason was ever given for incurring the risk of a complete delegation of Federal election control to State legislatures.
All that was offered were the extravagant surmises of a distempered jealousy.
If we are in a humor to presume abuses of power, it is as fair to presume them on the part of the State governments as on the part of the Federal government.
Is it not more consonant to the rules of a just theory to trust the Federal government with the care of its own existence, than to transfer that care to any other hands?
Nothing is more evident than that leaving the exclusive power of regulating elections to the House of Representatives in the hands of State legislatures would leave the very existence of the Federal government entirely at the mercy of those legislatures. At any moment, State legislatures could annihilate the Federal government by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer its affairs. It is to little purpose to say that a neglect or omission of this kind is unlikely. The constitutional possibility of the thing – without an equivalent for the risk – is an unanswerable objection.
Just as the Federal Government Cannot Control State Elections, State Governments Cannot Control Federal Elections
Suppose an article had been introduced into the Constitution which empowered the Federal government to regulate the elections of the particular States.
Would anyone have hesitated to condemn it, both as an unwarrantable transposition of power, and as a premeditated engine for the destruction of the State governments?
To an unbiased observer, the same would be true for the project of subjecting the regulation of Federal elections to State legislatures.
The very existence of the Federal government would be subject to the pleasure of State governments.
An impartial view of the matter cannot fail to result in a conviction that any government – whether State or Federal – ought to depend on itself for its own preservation, as far as possible.
The Construction of the Senate Does Not Justify State Regulation of House Elections
As an objection to having Congress be the final authority to regulate the times, places and manner of holding Federal elections, some might say the system applicable to the Senate gives rise to the same danger which could flow from an exclusive power in the State legislatures to regulate Federal elections.
That is, by declining the appointment of senators, State legislatures might at any time give a fatal blow to the United States.
From this premise it could be argued there ought to be no objection to entrusting State legislatures with the power of regulating elections to the House of Representatives, especially since each State has an interest in maintaining its representation in the national councils.
Taken together, the argument might conclude, these factors would be a complete security against State legislatures abusing the trust that a delegation of final regulatory authority would entail.
Though attractive initially, upon examination this argument will not be found solid. It is certainly true that State legislatures – by forbearing the appointment of senators – have the power to destroy the Federal government.
But the existence of a power to do so with respect to senatorial appointment does not compel granting the power in every other instance.
There are cases in which the harmful tendency of such a power may be far greater, such as with the regulation of elections for the House of Representatives.
In the absence of a reason that was equally cogent to the one that supported appointment of senators by State legislatures, the Convention could not recommend ultimate regulation of House members by State legislatures into the system.
So far as the construction of the Senate may expose the Federal government to the possibility of injury from the State legislatures, it is an evil.
But it is an evil which could not have been avoided without excluding the States, in their political capacities, wholly from a place in the organization of the Federal government.
Had the Convention taken this view, and excluded the States from representation in the Federal government, it would doubtless have been interpreted into an entire dereliction of the federal principle, and would certainly have deprived the State governments of that absolute safeguard which they will enjoy under this provision.
However wise it may have been to submit to the inconvenience of having States appoint senators (in order to attain a necessary advantage or a greater good), no inference can be drawn from thence to favor an accumulation of the evil with respect to the House, where neither necessity urges, nor any greater good invites.
The Adverse Risk of State Regulation of House Elections Is Greater than the Risk of State Malfeasance in the Appointment of Senators
The Federal government would run a much greater risk from a power in the State legislatures over the elections of members to the House of Representatives, than from the power of appointing members of the Senate.
Senators are to be chosen by State legislatures for a period of six years.
This is three times as long as the two-year terms of members of the House of Representatives.
Senators are divided into three classes in order to ensure a rotation, by which the seats of a third part of them are to be vacated and replenished every two years.
No State is entitled to more than two senators, and a quorum of the body is to consist of a majority of members, as in the House of Representatives.
The joint result of these circumstances is that a temporary combination of a few States to intermit the appointment of senators can neither annul the existence of the Senate nor impair its activity.
We have nothing to fear except from either a general or permanent combination of the States with respect to the Senate.
A temporary combination to annul a quorum in the Senate might proceed from sinister designs in the leading members of a few of the State legislatures.
A permanent combination of States would suppose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the People.
A permanent combination will either never exist, or proceed from an experience of the ineptitude of the Federal government to the advancement of their happiness, in which event no good citizen could desire its continuance.
State Legislative Control of Federal Elections Would Invite Disorder
With regard to the House of Representatives, there will be a general election of members once in two years.
If the State legislatures were invested with an exclusive power of regulating these elections, every period of making them would be a delicate crisis in the national situation.
The United States might dissolve if the leaders of a few of the most important States should have entered into a previous conspiracy to prevent an election.
Even when the People of America find themselves warmly attached to the Federal government, particular rulers of particular States – stimulated by the natural rivalries of power and hopes of personal aggrandizement – and supported by a strong faction in each of those States – may be in a very opposite temper.
There is a degree of weight in the observation that the interests of each State – which are to be represented in the Federal councils – will be a security against abuse of Federal elections by State legislatures.
But this security will not be considered complete by those who attend to the force of the obvious distinction between the interest of the People in the public felicity, and the interest of the People’s local rulers in the power and consequence of their offices.
Even when the People of America find themselves warmly attached to the Federal government, particular rulers of particular States – stimulated by the natural rivalries of power and hopes of personal aggrandizement – and supported by a strong faction in each of those States – may be in a very opposite temper.
At the present moment on the present question, a diversity of sentiment between the majority of the People, on the one hand, and the individuals who have the greatest credit in their councils, on the other, is exemplified in some of the States.
The Prospect of Separate Confederacies Is Contrary to the Common Good
The scheme of separate confederacies – which will always multiply the chances of ambition – will be a never-failing bait to all such influential characters in the State administrations who are as capable of preferring their own emolument and advancement to the public weal.
With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive power of regulating elections for the Federal government, a combination of a few such individuals – in a few of the most considerable States (where the temptation will always be the strongest) – might attempt to accomplish the destruction of the United States.
These actors might seize the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among the People – which the members of the combination may themselves have excited – to discontinue the choice of members for the House of Representatives.
Foreign Governments Will Attempt to Subvert the Federal Government
It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm union of this country – under an efficient government – will be an increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of Europe.
Enterprises to subvert the United States will sometimes originate in the intrigues of foreign powers.
Such enterprises will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by one or more foreign governments.
Preservation of the United States ought to be committed to the guardianship of any but those whose situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and vigilant performance of the trust.
Hamilton
Federalist 60: The Composition of Congress Will Likely Reflect the Composition of State Legislatures
WE HAVE SEEN THAT AN UNCONTROLLABLE POWER over the elections to the Federal government could not – without hazard – be committed to the State legislatures.
But what would be the danger on the other side – that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Federal government itself?
It is not pretended that the Federal government would ever use the right to superintend Federal elections to exclude any State from its share in the representation. In this respect at least, the interest of all would be the security of all.
Nonetheless, some alleged that Federal superintendence of Federal elections might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of a favorite class of individuals – to the exclusion of others – by confining the places of election to particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice.
Of all chimerical suppositions, this appears the most chimerical.
The clause which guides our inquiry provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
Unreasonable Restrictions on Voting Locations Would Lead to a Popular Revolt
On the one hand, no rational calculation of probabilities leads one to imagine that such a violent and extraordinary disposition could ever find its way into the national councils.
On the other hand, if so improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into our national councils, it would display itself in a form altogether different and far more decisive.
It is conceivable that the right to vote may be violated in regard to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing majority, during certain turbulent and factious seasons.
But it is altogether inconceivable and incredible that so fundamental a privilege of freedom (in a country so situated and enlightened as ours) could be invaded by a deliberate policy of the Federal government, to the prejudice of the great mass of the People, without occasioning a popular revolution.
An attempt to restrict unreasonably the places of election could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the People, headed and directed by the State governments.
From this alone, one may satisfactorily infer the improbability of any attempted restriction.
It is conceivable that the right to vote may be violated in regard to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing majority, during certain turbulent and factious seasons. But it is altogether inconceivable and incredible that so fundamental a privilege of freedom (in a country so situated and enlightened as ours) could be invaded by a deliberate policy of the Federal government, to the prejudice of the great mass of the People, without occasioning a popular revolution.
The Federal Government Is Structured in a Way that Decreases the Possibility of Unreasonable State Restrictions on Voting Locations
Considerations of a more precise nature forbid all apprehension on the subject of voting locations.
The dissimilarity in the ingredients composing the Federal government – and still more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches – erect powerful obstacles to a concert of views in any scheme to alter locations of elections.
To begin with, there is sufficient diversity in the distribution of property – and in the genius, manners, and habits of the People of the different States and regions – to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society.
Although an intimate intercourse under one Federal government will promote a gradual assimilation in some of these respects, there are physical and moral causes which may (in a greater or less degree) permanently nourish different propensities and inclinations.
But the circumstance most likely to have the greatest influence in the matter will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the government.
Consider that the House of Representatives is elected immediately by the People, the Senate by the State legislatures, and the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the People.
There is little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors.
Any Attempt to Control the Location of Senate Appointments Would Fail
As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of “time and manner” can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members.
The collective sense of the State legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of this sort, a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended would never be attempted.
And what could induce the Senate to concur in a preference in which itself would not be included?
To what purpose would it be established, in reference to the House of Representatives, if it could not be extended to the Senate?
The composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other.
We can never suppose that any restrictions on the time and manner of elections – which is all that is submitted to the Federal government with respect to the Senate – would embrace legislative appointments to that body, unless at the same time we suppose State legislatures were to cooperate in a restrictive scheme.
If we assume State legislatures were inclined to so cooperate, it would become immaterial whether the power in question is placed in their hands or in those of the Federal government.
The Supposed Objects of a Scheme to Skew Representation Are Ill-Defined
What is to be the object of a capricious partiality in the national councils?
Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of property?
Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the monied interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest?
Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of “the wealthy and the well-born,” to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?
If a partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in any particular description of industry or property, the competition for it undoubtedly will lie between landed individuals and merchants.
But it is infinitely less likely that either landowners or merchants should gain an ascendant in the national councils, than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local councils.
The most reasonable inference is that a conduct tending to give an undue preference to either landowners or merchants is much less to be dreaded from the Federal government than from State and local councils.
The Geographical Distribution of Property Will Naturally Mitigate the Influence of One Group over Another
The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and commerce.
Agriculture is predominant in almost all of them.
But in a few, commerce nearly divides its empire.
And in most States, commerce has a considerable share of influence.
In proportion as either prevails, it will be conveyed into the national representation.
For this reason, national representation will emanate from a greater variety of interests – and in differing proportions – than are to be found in any single State.
The national representation thus will be much less apt to espouse positions that favor landowners or merchants with a decided partiality, than would the representation of any single State.
What is to be the object of a capricious partiality in the national councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the monied interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of “the wealthy and the well-born,” to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?
In a country consisting chiefly of cultivators of land – where the rules of an equal representation obtain – the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government.
So long as the landed interest prevails in most of the State legislatures, so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national Senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies.
It follows that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will never be a favorite object of the Senate.
In making these observations, I am governed by the consideration that the credulous votaries of State power cannot suspect the State legislatures would be warped from their duty by any external influence.
The same situation will have the same effect in the initial composition House of Representatives.
An improper bias towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this quarter as from the other.
It Is Unlikely Congress Will Be Partial to Landowners
In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the Federal government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the Federal administration to the landed class?
First, it is less likely that any decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the United States than in any individual States.
Second, there is little temptation to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would enjoy – in the natural course of things – as great a preponderancy as itself could desire.
And third, individuals accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale are too convinced of the utility of commerce to be inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share in the management of them.
The stream of Federal revenue derived from commerce is an effectual guard against the enmity of Congress, which will be continually importuned by urgent calls of public necessity.
A Supposed Preference for “the Wealthy and the Well-Born” Ignores Reality
I rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and property.
As far as I understand the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind.
They appear to have in view – as the objects of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us – those whom they designate by the description of “the wealthy and the well-born.”
These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious preeminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens.
But the contention fails internally.
At one time the elevation of this class is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the House of Representatives, while at another time the preference it is to be effected by depriving the People at large of the opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of their representatives.
Upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the preference for the wealthy and the well-born?
Are the wealthy and the well-born confined to particular spots in the several States?
Have they – by some miraculous instinct or foresight – set apart in each State a common place of residence?
Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities?
Are not the wealthy and well-born scattered over the face of the country, as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors?
If they are scattered – as every intelligent person knows it to be – it is evident that a policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account.
The truth is that there is no method of securing the preference in favor of wealth or birth without prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect, or those who may be elected.
Yet no such power is included in the authority conferred to Congress, which is expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections.
The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the Congress.
Upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the preference for the wealthy and the well-born? Are the wealthy and the well-born confined to particular spots in the several States? Have they – by some miraculous instinct or foresight – set apart in each State a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Are not the wealthy and well-born scattered over the face of the country, as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors? If they are scattered – as every intelligent person knows it to be – it is evident that a policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account.
For the sake of argument, I will assume all the scruples which a sense of duty or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire were overcome in the breasts of the national rulers, and that restrictions on the location of elections were enacted.
Nonetheless, it will hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the People.
Military Force Is Better Suited to Usurpation than Election Rigging
The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers.
To show in the strongest light the futility of restricting the locations of elections, I shall concede for a moment that such a military force might exist in the Federal government.
What will be the conclusion?
With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community – and with the means of gratifying that disposition – would the persons actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class of individuals?
Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement?
Would they not boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients which – in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them – might terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors?
Would the persons attempting to restrict the location of elections not fear that citizens – not less tenacious than conscious of their rights – would flock from the remote extremes of their respective States to the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to substitute individuals who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the People?
Hamilton
Federalist 60: The Composition of Congress Will Likely Reflect the Composition of State Legislatures
WE HAVE SEEN THAT AN UNCONTROLLABLE POWER over the elections to the Federal government could not – without hazard – be committed to the State legislatures.
But what would be the danger on the other side – that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Federal government itself?
It is not pretended that the Federal government would ever use the right to superintend Federal elections to exclude any State from its share in the representation. In this respect at least, the interest of all would be the security of all.
Nonetheless, some alleged that Federal superintendence of Federal elections might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of a favorite class of individuals – to the exclusion of others – by confining the places of election to particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice.
Of all chimerical suppositions, this appears the most chimerical.
The clause which guides our inquiry provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
Unreasonable Restrictions on Voting Locations Would Lead to a Popular Revolt
On the one hand, no rational calculation of probabilities leads one to imagine that such a violent and extraordinary disposition could ever find its way into the national councils.
On the other hand, if so improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into our national councils, it would display itself in a form altogether different and far more decisive.
It is conceivable that the right to vote may be violated in regard to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing majority, during certain turbulent and factious seasons.
But it is altogether inconceivable and incredible that so fundamental a privilege of freedom (in a country so situated and enlightened as ours) could be invaded by a deliberate policy of the Federal government, to the prejudice of the great mass of the People, without occasioning a popular revolution.
An attempt to restrict unreasonably the places of election could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the People, headed and directed by the State governments.
From this alone, one may satisfactorily infer the improbability of any attempted restriction.
It is conceivable that the right to vote may be violated in regard to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing majority, during certain turbulent and factious seasons. But it is altogether inconceivable and incredible that so fundamental a privilege of freedom (in a country so situated and enlightened as ours) could be invaded by a deliberate policy of the Federal government, to the prejudice of the great mass of the People, without occasioning a popular revolution.
The Federal Government Is Structured in a Way that Decreases the Possibility of Unreasonable State Restrictions on Voting Locations
Considerations of a more precise nature forbid all apprehension on the subject of voting locations.
The dissimilarity in the ingredients composing the Federal government – and still more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches – erect powerful obstacles to a concert of views in any scheme to alter locations of elections.
To begin with, there is sufficient diversity in the distribution of property – and in the genius, manners, and habits of the People of the different States and regions – to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society.
Although an intimate intercourse under one Federal government will promote a gradual assimilation in some of these respects, there are physical and moral causes which may (in a greater or less degree) permanently nourish different propensities and inclinations.
But the circumstance most likely to have the greatest influence in the matter will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the government.
Consider that the House of Representatives is elected immediately by the People, the Senate by the State legislatures, and the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the People.
There is little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors.
Any Attempt to Control the Location of Senate Appointments Would Fail
As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of “time and manner” can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members.
The collective sense of the State legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of this sort, a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended would never be attempted.
And what could induce the Senate to concur in a preference in which itself would not be included?
To what purpose would it be established, in reference to the House of Representatives, if it could not be extended to the Senate?
The composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other.
We can never suppose that any restrictions on the time and manner of elections – which is all that is submitted to the Federal government with respect to the Senate – would embrace legislative appointments to that body, unless at the same time we suppose State legislatures were to cooperate in a restrictive scheme.
If we assume State legislatures were inclined to so cooperate, it would become immaterial whether the power in question is placed in their hands or in those of the Federal government.
The Supposed Objects of a Scheme to Skew Representation Are Ill-Defined
What is to be the object of a capricious partiality in the national councils?
Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of property?
Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the monied interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest?
Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of “the wealthy and the well-born,” to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?
If a partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in any particular description of industry or property, the competition for it undoubtedly will lie between landed individuals and merchants.
But it is infinitely less likely that either landowners or merchants should gain an ascendant in the national councils, than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local councils.
The most reasonable inference is that a conduct tending to give an undue preference to either landowners or merchants is much less to be dreaded from the Federal government than from State and local councils.
The Geographical Distribution of Property Will Naturally Mitigate the Influence of One Group over Another
The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and commerce.
Agriculture is predominant in almost all of them.
But in a few, commerce nearly divides its empire.
And in most States, commerce has a considerable share of influence.
In proportion as either prevails, it will be conveyed into the national representation.
For this reason, national representation will emanate from a greater variety of interests – and in differing proportions – than are to be found in any single State.
The national representation thus will be much less apt to espouse positions that favor landowners or merchants with a decided partiality, than would the representation of any single State.
What is to be the object of a capricious partiality in the national councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the monied interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of “the wealthy and the well-born,” to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?
In a country consisting chiefly of cultivators of land – where the rules of an equal representation obtain – the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government.
So long as the landed interest prevails in most of the State legislatures, so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national Senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies.
It follows that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will never be a favorite object of the Senate.
In making these observations, I am governed by the consideration that the credulous votaries of State power cannot suspect the State legislatures would be warped from their duty by any external influence.
The same situation will have the same effect in the initial composition House of Representatives.
An improper bias towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this quarter as from the other.
It Is Unlikely Congress Will Be Partial to Landowners
In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the Federal government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the Federal administration to the landed class?
First, it is less likely that any decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the United States than in any individual States.
Second, there is little temptation to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would enjoy – in the natural course of things – as great a preponderancy as itself could desire.
And third, individuals accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale are too convinced of the utility of commerce to be inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share in the management of them.
The stream of Federal revenue derived from commerce is an effectual guard against the enmity of Congress, which will be continually importuned by urgent calls of public necessity.
A Supposed Preference for “the Wealthy and the Well-Born” Ignores Reality
I rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and property.
As far as I understand the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind.
They appear to have in view – as the objects of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us – those whom they designate by the description of “the wealthy and the well-born.”
These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious preeminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens.
But the contention fails internally.
At one time the elevation of this class is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the House of Representatives, while at another time the preference it is to be effected by depriving the People at large of the opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of their representatives.
Upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the preference for the wealthy and the well-born?
Are the wealthy and the well-born confined to particular spots in the several States?
Have they – by some miraculous instinct or foresight – set apart in each State a common place of residence?
Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities?
Are not the wealthy and well-born scattered over the face of the country, as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors?
If they are scattered – as every intelligent person knows it to be – it is evident that a policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account.
The truth is that there is no method of securing the preference in favor of wealth or birth without prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect, or those who may be elected.
Yet no such power is included in the authority conferred to Congress, which is expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections.
The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the Congress.
Upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the preference for the wealthy and the well-born? Are the wealthy and the well-born confined to particular spots in the several States? Have they – by some miraculous instinct or foresight – set apart in each State a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Are not the wealthy and well-born scattered over the face of the country, as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors? If they are scattered – as every intelligent person knows it to be – it is evident that a policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account.
For the sake of argument, I will assume all the scruples which a sense of duty or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire were overcome in the breasts of the national rulers, and that restrictions on the location of elections were enacted.
Nonetheless, it will hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the People.
Military Force Is Better Suited to Usurpation than Election Rigging
The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers.
To show in the strongest light the futility of restricting the locations of elections, I shall concede for a moment that such a military force might exist in the Federal government.
What will be the conclusion?
With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community – and with the means of gratifying that disposition – would the persons actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class of individuals?
Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement?
Would they not boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients which – in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them – might terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors?
Would the persons attempting to restrict the location of elections not fear that citizens – not less tenacious than conscious of their rights – would flock from the remote extremes of their respective States to the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to substitute individuals who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the People?
Hamilton
Federalist 61: The Federal Power over Voting Locations and Time Compared to the Same Power in New York
WE CONTINUE TO EXAMINE THE OBJECTIONS to the provision regarding Federal elections: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
It Was Unnecessary to Declare Elections Should Be Held in the Counties Where the Electors Reside
The more candid individuals opposed to this provision – when pressed in argument – will sometimes concede its propriety, but add the qualification that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided.
This, say they, is a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power.
A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless.
So far as it would have had the effect of quieting apprehensions, it might not have been undesirable.
But in fact it would have afforded little or no additional security against the danger apprehended.
An impartial and judicious examiner would never consider the absence of a provision directing elections be held in the county where the elector resided as a serious – still less as an insuperable – objection to the plan.
The different views taken of the subject in Federalist 59 and Federalist 60 satisfy all dispassionate and discerning individuals that if the public liberty should ever be the victim of the ambition of the national rulers, the power to set election locations will be guiltless of the sacrifice.
Those inclined to consult only their jealousy would find greater disquietude and alarm from the latitude which most of their own States allow in respect to elections, than from the latitude which is granted to the Federal government in the same respect.
New York’s Constitution Offers No Greater Protection than the Federal Constitution
A review of State constitutions removes any ill impressions which may remain in regard to this matter, but as that review would lead into long and tedious details, I shall content myself with the single example of the State of New York.
The constitution of New York makes no provision for locality of elections other than (1) the members of the Assembly shall be elected in the counties, and (2) the members of the Senate shall be elected in the great districts into which the State is or may be divided.
At present these are four in number, and each includes from two to six counties.
It is readily perceived that it would be no more difficult for the legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New York by confining elections to particular places, than for the Congress to defeat by like expedient the suffrages of the citizens of the United States.
The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws furnishes a ready answer to this question: when the place of election is at an inconvenient distance from the elector, the effect will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty thousand miles.
Suppose, for instance, the city of Albany was appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is a part.
Would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors of the members both of the senate and assembly for that county and district?
Can we imagine that the electors who reside in the remote subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge – or any part of the county of Montgomery – would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany vote for members of the State assembly or senate, sooner than they would repair to the city of New York, to participate in the choice of the members of the House of Representatives?
The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws furnishes a ready answer to this question: when the place of election is at an inconvenient distance from the elector, the effect will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty thousand miles.
It is apparent that the objections to the Federal power of regulating elections apply with equal force to the like power in the Constitution of New York, and for this reason it is impossible to acquit one and condemn the other.
A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion in respect to the constitutions of most of the other States.
If it should be said that these defects in State constitutions furnish no apology for the comparable Federal provisions, I answer that the State constitutions have never been thought chargeable with inattention to the security of liberty.
It is apparent the objections to the Federal power to regulate election locations are the caviling refinements of a predetermined opposition than the well-founded inferences of a candid research after truth.
To those who are inclined to excuse as innocent omissions in the State constitutions what they view as an unpardonable blemish in the Federal Constitution, it is fair to ask them for a substantial reason why the representatives in a single State should be more impregnable to the lust of power (or other sinister motives) than the representatives of all of the United States?
If they cannot do this, they ought at least prove to us it is easier to subvert the liberties of over three million people in the United States – who have the advantage of local governments to head their opposition – than the liberties of two hundred thousand in the State of New York.
Finally, they ought to convince us that is less probable for a predominant faction in a single State – in order to maintain its superiority – to prefer a particular class of electors, than for a similar spirit to take possession of the representatives of all the States, which are spread over a vast region and in several respects distinguishable from each other by a diversity of local circumstances, prejudices, and interests.
The Advantage of Uniformity in the Time of Federal Elections
Hitherto my observations have aimed at a vindication of the provision in question only on theoretical grounds, the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and the safety of placing it in the manner proposed.
But there is also a positive advantage which will result from this provision, and which could not have been obtained as well from any other: I allude to the circumstance of uniformity in the time of elections for the Federal House of Representatives.
This uniformity may prove to be of great importance to the public welfare, both as a security against the perpetuation of an improper spirit in the House of Representatives, and as a cure for the diseases of faction.
If each State were permitted to choose its own time for holding a Federal election, there could be at many different periods as months in the year.
The times of election in the several States – as they are now established for local purposes – vary between extremes as wide as March and November.
The consequence of these different election times – if applied to the House of Representatives – would mean there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time.
If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they come forward in succession.
As there is a contagion in example – which few individuals have sufficient force of mind to resist – the mass of members would likely remain nearly the same, assimilating constantly to itself its gradual accretions.
I am inclined to think that a six-year term for representatives – with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time – might be less formidable to liberty than a two-year term subject to gradual and successive alterations.
Nonetheless, since the dangers inherent in a gradual change in membership are merely speculative, it was hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish – as a fundamental point – what would deprive several States of the convenience of having the elections for their own governments and the Federal government at the same epochs.
In respect to the Senate, uniformity in the time of elections is no less requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation of senators, and for conveniently assembling the Congress at a stated period each year.
The consequence of these different election times – if applied to the House of Representatives – would mean there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they come forward in succession.
The Omission of a Precise Time for Federal Elections Leaves It to the Discretion to Congress
If the need for a uniform time is so important, it may be asked: Why was no time fixed in the Constitution?
The question may be answered in part with the observation New York’s own constitution – so admired by the most zealous adversaries of the Federal Constitution – also omits a fixed time for the like purpose.
The best answer for the omission is that the power to fix the time for election is a matter which might safely be entrusted to legislative discretion. If a time had been appointed, upon experiment, it might have been found less convenient than some other time.
Hamilton