THAT THE POWERS TRANSFERRED to the Federal government are necessary and proper was shown in Federalist 33 and Federalist 44.
Now I turn to a secondary issue: whether the whole mass of those Federal powers will be dangerous to that portion of authority left in the States.
Opponents of the Constitution tend to exhaust themselves in this secondary inquiry, thereby overlooking or confusing the principal goal, which is to ensure the Constitution has invested the Federal government with the minimum degree of power absolutely necessary for it to function successfully.
I have already shown that the Federal government is essential to the security of the People of America against
(1) foreign dangers,
(2) contentions and wars among the different States,
(3) violent and oppressive factions, which embitter the blessings of liberty, and
(4) military establishments, which gradually poison the very fountain of liberty.
In a word, the Federal government is essential to the happiness of the People of America.
It is preposterous object to a Federal government because it may lessen the importance of individual State governments.
We Fought the Revolution for Peace, Liberty and Safety, Not to Protect State Officers
Was the precious blood of thousands spilt and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished in the Revolution – not so the People of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety – but that State and local governments might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty?
We have heard of the impious doctrine of the Old World, that the people were made for kings, and not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New World in another shape?
Must the solid happiness of the People be sacrificed to the views of political institutions?
Should politicians presume we will forget that the public good – which is the real welfare of the great body of the People – is the supreme object to be pursued?
Was the precious blood of thousands spilt and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished in the Revolution – not so the People of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety – but that State and local governments might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty?
The Public Good and Happiness Must Be the Goals of Any Sound Government
No form of government has any value other than as it is fitted for attainment of the public good.
I would have rejected the Constitution and the United States if either had been adverse to the public happiness.
If the sovereign powers of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the People, the sovereign powers must be sacrificed.
The Extent of the Federal Government Will Not Endanger the Unsacrificed Residue of State Sovereignty
I have in the course of these papers touched upon important considerations which discountenance the supposition that the operation of the Federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State governments.
The more I resolve the subject, the more fully I am persuaded that the balance of sovereignty is much more likely to be disturbed by the States rather than by the Federal government.
Historical Examples Demonstrate the Disruptive Power of Subordinate States
In all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies I have studied, the member states themselves continually demonstrated the strongest tendency to despoil the authority of the general governments, which lacked the capacity to defend themselves against the encroachments.
Since the States retain a very extensive portion of active sovereignty under the Constitution, we should not disregard these historical examples.
We have heard of the impious doctrine of the Old World, that the people were made for kings, and not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New World in another shape? Must the solid happiness of the People be sacrificed to the views of political institutions? Should politicians presume we will forget that the public good – which is the real welfare of the great body of the People – is the supreme object to be pursued?
The Achaean League and Lycian Confederacy
In the Achaean league, for instance, the federal head probably had a degree and species of power which gave it a considerable likeness to the government framed by our Constitutional Convention.
The Lycian Confederacy bears a still greater analogy to it.
Yet history does not inform us that either of these federal leagues ever degenerated – or tended to degenerate – into a single consolidated government, even though external forces pressing the component parts together were much more numerous and powerful than in our case.
On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority to prevent the dissensions – and finally the disunion – of its subordinate governments.
The Feudal System Failures
We have seen a similar propensity exemplified in the feudal system.
Even with the want of proper sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns and the people, and in some instances between the general sovereign and the people, the local sovereigns usually prevailed in the rivalry for encroachments.
Had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the people, the great kingdoms in Europe would today consist of as many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons.
State Governments Have Multiple Advantages over the Federal Government
In the United States, State governments have advantages over the Federal government, whether I compare them in respect to:
(1) the immediate dependence of the one on the other,
(2) the weight of personal influence which each side will possess,
(3) the powers respectively vested in them,
(4) the predilection and probable support of the People, and
(5) the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other.
The State governments will be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the Federal government, while the Federal government will in no way be essential to the operation or organization of the State governments.
For example, without the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all.
State governments must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and in most cases they will themselves determine it.
The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures.
Even the House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the People, will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of individuals whose influence over the People obtains for themselves an election into the State legislatures.
Thus, each of the principal branches of the Federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State governments.
It follows that each branch of Federal government will feel a dependence on State governments, and that dependence will likely beget a disposition that is more obsequious than overbearing towards the State governments.
Due to the number and proximity of State government employees, there will be more personal influence on the side of the States than on the side of Federal government.
On the other side, the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the Federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members.
The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much smaller than the number employed under the particular States.
Personal Influence with the People Favors State Officials
Due to the number and proximity of State government employees, there will be more personal influence on the side of the States than on the side of Federal government.
The members of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the States, together with the State justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, as well as all the county, corporation, and town officers, will intermix with and have particular acquaintance with every class and circle of persons.
They must therefore exceed – beyond all proportion, both in number and influence – those of every description who will be employed in the administration of the Federal system.
If we compare the number of members of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the States with the members of the corresponding departments of the United States, and also compare the number of State militia officers with the number of Federal military officers established now and in futurity, the advantage of the States is decisive.
States Will Have More Revenue Collectors
If the Federal government is to have collectors of revenue, the State governments will have theirs also.
Since the Federal collectors of revenue will be principally on the seacoast, and not very numerous, and State collectors of revenue will be spread over the face of the country and much more numerous, the advantage lies with the States.
It is true the Federal government will possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States.
Resort to this power is improbable except for supplemental purposes of revenue.
An option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of their own. The power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected with the power to regulate foreign commerce.
The actual collection of revenue pursuant to the immediate authority of the United States will generally be made by officers appointed by the several States.
The powers reserved to the States will extend to all the objects which – in the ordinary course of affairs – concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the People, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of each State.
State Officers Will Be Clothed with Federal Authority
Just as the exercise of Federal authority by State officers appears in the organization and exercise of the judicial power – where the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the United States – the influence of the whole number of collectors of internal revenue appointed by the Federal government would not compare with that exercised by the multitude of corresponding State officers.
For every Federal collector allotted to a district, there would be at least 30 officers of different descriptions – many of them persons of character and weight – whose influence would lie on the side of the State.
The powers delegated by the Constitution to the Federal government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.
The Federal power will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce.
The Powers Reserved to the States Are Substantial
The powers reserved to the States will extend to all the objects which – in the ordinary course of affairs – concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the People, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of each State.
The operations of the Federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger, and those of State governments in times of peace and security.
Since times of war and danger will probably bear a small proportion to times of peace and security, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the Federal government.
Assuming adequate Federal powers are rendered to the national defense, then less frequently will appear those scenes of danger which might favor the ascendancy of the Federal government over the governments of the particular States.
The changes the new Constitution proposes consist much less in the addition of new powers to the Union than in the invigoration of its original powers.
The Constitution Reinvigorates the Powers the People Originally Granted
The changes the new Constitution proposes consist much less in the addition of new powers to the Union than in the invigoration of its original powers.
While the regulation of commerce is a new power, it seems to be an addition few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained.
The powers relating to war and peace, armies and fleets, and treaties and finance were all vested in the existing Congress by the former Articles of Confederation.
The proposed changes do not enlarge these powers; they merely substitute a more effectual mode of administering them.
Direct Taxation of Individuals Is Authorized
The changes relating to taxation are the most important, yet the Congress under our former government had complete authority to require of the States indefinite supplies of money for the common defense and general welfare, and so too will future Congresses have to same power over individuals.
Had the States complied punctually with the Articles of Confederation – or their obligations enforced through peaceable collection from individuals – it is highly doubtful State governments would have thereby lost their constitutional powers and gradually undergone an entire consolidation, as opponents assert will happen to the Federal government.
To make such an argument is to say the existence of State governments is incompatible with any system whatever that accomplishes the essential purposes of the United States.
Madison