THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES will not be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents, contrary to the second objection lodged against this body.
The objection proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the number of its inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests.
The objection overlooks the circumstances which distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies.
The Principal Objects of Federal Legislation Are Commerce, Taxation, and the Militia
It is a sound and important principle that a representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents.
But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate.
An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects that are not within the compass of legislation is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust.
In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority, recourse must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority.
What are to be the objects of Federal legislation?
Those which are of most importance – and seem most to require local knowledge – are commerce, taxation, and the militia.
Commerce
A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual State, a very few representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the Federal councils.
Taxation
In a great measure, taxation will consist of the duties which are involved in the regulation of commerce.
As far as it may consist of internal collections within a State, a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the State may be necessary.
This knowledge of internal collections also will be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent individuals diffusively elected within the State.
Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of the district.
Besides this source of information, the laws of a State (as framed by representatives from every part of it) almost will be of themselves a sufficient guide.
Furthermore, in every State there have been made (and must continue to be made) regulations on taxes which in many cases will leave little more to be done by the Federal legislature than to review the different laws and reduce them to one general act.
A skillful individual with access to all the local codes might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole union, without any aid from oral information.
It may be expected that whenever internal taxes may be necessary – and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the States – the more simple objects will be preferred.
An analogy may be drawn between local and State codes on the one side, and State and Federal codes on the other.
Suppose for a moment that New York or any other State were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within itself a power of local legislation.
A degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labors of the State legislature, and render a much smaller number of members sufficient for it.
The Federal government will derive a great advantage from another circumstance.
The representatives of each State will bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws and a local knowledge of their respective districts.
Many representatives will have been members of the State legislature, where all the local information and interests of the State are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States.
It is a sound and important principle that a representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects that are not within the compass of legislation is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust.
State Militias
The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater force to the case of State militias.
However different the rules of discipline may be in different States, they are the same throughout each particular State, and depend on circumstances which can differ but little in different parts of the same State.
The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning used here and in Federalist 55 to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives does not in any respect contradict what was urged in Federalist 53 with regard to the extensive information which the representatives ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it.
This information – so far as it may relate to local objects – is rendered necessary and difficult not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single State – but of those among different States.
Taking each State by itself, its laws are the same and its interests but little diversified.
A few individuals therefore will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them.
Were the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would include a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole State might be competently represented by a single member taken from any part of it.
But on a comparison of the different States taken together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances connected with the objects of Federal legislation, with all of which the Federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance.
While a few representatives from each State may bring with them a due knowledge of their own State, every representative will have much information to acquire concerning all of the other States.
The Passage of Time Will Increase the Population and Will Diversify State Economies
The changes of time will have an assimilating effect on the comparative situation of the different States.
But the effect of time on the internal affairs of individual States will be more rapid.
Some of the States are presently little more than a society of farmers.
Only a few of the States have made much progress in those branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation.
These industries will grow as population in all the States increases, as will the number of representatives.
The foresight of the Convention has taken care that the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the government.
The True Ratios of Representative to Constituent in Britain Show Ours to Be Valid
The experience of Great Britain – which presents to mankind so many exemplary and monitory political lessons – corroborates the reflections I have made regarding the proper number of representatives.
The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland is not less than eight million. The representatives of these eight million in the House of Commons amount to 538. Of this number, one ninth are elected by 364 persons, and one half by 5,723 persons. Of the one half, it is well known they are more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights.
One cannot suppose that the half thus elected – and who do not even reside among the people at large – can add any knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative councils, or to the security of the British people against the government.
They might therefore be deducted from the total representatives of the nation, to reach a more accurate total of what I denominate the real number of representatives in those kingdoms.
In doing so, I will not extend the deduction to a considerable number of others who do not reside among their constituents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs.
Dividing the House of Commons membership of 538 in half leaves 279 persons as the depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight million.
Comparing the example of the House of Commons with House of Representatives, the Constitution’s specification of no more one representative for every 30,000 inhabitants, Art. I, § 2, ¶ 3, cl. 3, will render our House both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which are confided to it.
In other words, for every 28,670 constituents, only one representative will maintain their rights and explain their situation in an assembly of the kingdoms (the House of Commons) which is exposed to the whole force of executive influence while at the same time it extends its authority to every object of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated.
Nonetheless, it is very certain that a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, and that the defects in the British code are in some instances chargeable to the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the People in those kingdoms.
Comparing the example of the House of Commons with House of Representatives, the Constitution’s specification of no more one representative for every 30,000 inhabitants, Art. I, § 2, ¶ 3, cl. 3, will render our House both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which are confided to it.
Madison or Hamilton