WE HAVE SEEN THAT AN UNCONTROLLABLE POWER over the elections to the Federal government could not – without hazard – be committed to the State legislatures.
But what would be the danger on the other side – that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Federal government itself?
It is not pretended that the Federal government would ever use the right to superintend Federal elections to exclude any State from its share in the representation. In this respect at least, the interest of all would be the security of all.
Nonetheless, some alleged that Federal superintendence of Federal elections might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of a favorite class of individuals – to the exclusion of others – by confining the places of election to particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice.
Of all chimerical suppositions, this appears the most chimerical.
The clause which guides our inquiry provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
Unreasonable Restrictions on Voting Locations Would Lead to a Popular Revolt
On the one hand, no rational calculation of probabilities leads one to imagine that such a violent and extraordinary disposition could ever find its way into the national councils.
On the other hand, if so improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into our national councils, it would display itself in a form altogether different and far more decisive.
It is conceivable that the right to vote may be violated in regard to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing majority, during certain turbulent and factious seasons.
But it is altogether inconceivable and incredible that so fundamental a privilege of freedom (in a country so situated and enlightened as ours) could be invaded by a deliberate policy of the Federal government, to the prejudice of the great mass of the People, without occasioning a popular revolution.
An attempt to restrict unreasonably the places of election could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the People, headed and directed by the State governments.
From this alone, one may satisfactorily infer the improbability of any attempted restriction.
It is conceivable that the right to vote may be violated in regard to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing majority, during certain turbulent and factious seasons. But it is altogether inconceivable and incredible that so fundamental a privilege of freedom (in a country so situated and enlightened as ours) could be invaded by a deliberate policy of the Federal government, to the prejudice of the great mass of the People, without occasioning a popular revolution.
The Federal Government Is Structured in a Way that Decreases the Possibility of Unreasonable State Restrictions on Voting Locations
Considerations of a more precise nature forbid all apprehension on the subject of voting locations.
The dissimilarity in the ingredients composing the Federal government – and still more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches – erect powerful obstacles to a concert of views in any scheme to alter locations of elections.
To begin with, there is sufficient diversity in the distribution of property – and in the genius, manners, and habits of the People of the different States and regions – to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society.
Although an intimate intercourse under one Federal government will promote a gradual assimilation in some of these respects, there are physical and moral causes which may (in a greater or less degree) permanently nourish different propensities and inclinations.
But the circumstance most likely to have the greatest influence in the matter will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the government.
Consider that the House of Representatives is elected immediately by the People, the Senate by the State legislatures, and the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the People.
There is little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors.
Any Attempt to Control the Location of Senate Appointments Would Fail
As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of “time and manner” can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members.
The collective sense of the State legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of this sort, a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended would never be attempted.
And what could induce the Senate to concur in a preference in which itself would not be included?
To what purpose would it be established, in reference to the House of Representatives, if it could not be extended to the Senate?
The composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other.
We can never suppose that any restrictions on the time and manner of elections – which is all that is submitted to the Federal government with respect to the Senate – would embrace legislative appointments to that body, unless at the same time we suppose State legislatures were to cooperate in a restrictive scheme.
If we assume State legislatures were inclined to so cooperate, it would become immaterial whether the power in question is placed in their hands or in those of the Federal government.
The Supposed Objects of a Scheme to Skew Representation Are Ill-Defined
What is to be the object of a capricious partiality in the national councils?
Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of property?
Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the monied interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest?
Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of “the wealthy and the well-born,” to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?
If a partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in any particular description of industry or property, the competition for it undoubtedly will lie between landed individuals and merchants.
But it is infinitely less likely that either landowners or merchants should gain an ascendant in the national councils, than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local councils.
The most reasonable inference is that a conduct tending to give an undue preference to either landowners or merchants is much less to be dreaded from the Federal government than from State and local councils.
The Geographical Distribution of Property Will Naturally Mitigate the Influence of One Group over Another
The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and commerce.
Agriculture is predominant in almost all of them.
But in a few, commerce nearly divides its empire.
And in most States, commerce has a considerable share of influence.
In proportion as either prevails, it will be conveyed into the national representation.
For this reason, national representation will emanate from a greater variety of interests – and in differing proportions – than are to be found in any single State.
The national representation thus will be much less apt to espouse positions that favor landowners or merchants with a decided partiality, than would the representation of any single State.
What is to be the object of a capricious partiality in the national councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the monied interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of “the wealthy and the well-born,” to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?
In a country consisting chiefly of cultivators of land – where the rules of an equal representation obtain – the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government.
So long as the landed interest prevails in most of the State legislatures, so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national Senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies.
It follows that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will never be a favorite object of the Senate.
In making these observations, I am governed by the consideration that the credulous votaries of State power cannot suspect the State legislatures would be warped from their duty by any external influence.
The same situation will have the same effect in the initial composition House of Representatives.
An improper bias towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this quarter as from the other.
It Is Unlikely Congress Will Be Partial to Landowners
In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the Federal government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the Federal administration to the landed class?
First, it is less likely that any decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the United States than in any individual States.
Second, there is little temptation to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would enjoy – in the natural course of things – as great a preponderancy as itself could desire.
And third, individuals accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale are too convinced of the utility of commerce to be inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share in the management of them.
The stream of Federal revenue derived from commerce is an effectual guard against the enmity of Congress, which will be continually importuned by urgent calls of public necessity.
A Supposed Preference for “the Wealthy and the Well-Born” Ignores Reality
I rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and property.
As far as I understand the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind.
They appear to have in view – as the objects of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us – those whom they designate by the description of “the wealthy and the well-born.”
These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious preeminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens.
But the contention fails internally.
At one time the elevation of this class is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the House of Representatives, while at another time the preference it is to be effected by depriving the People at large of the opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of their representatives.
Upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the preference for the wealthy and the well-born?
Are the wealthy and the well-born confined to particular spots in the several States?
Have they – by some miraculous instinct or foresight – set apart in each State a common place of residence?
Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities?
Are not the wealthy and well-born scattered over the face of the country, as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors?
If they are scattered – as every intelligent person knows it to be – it is evident that a policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account.
The truth is that there is no method of securing the preference in favor of wealth or birth without prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect, or those who may be elected.
Yet no such power is included in the authority conferred to Congress, which is expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections.
The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the Congress.
Upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the preference for the wealthy and the well-born? Are the wealthy and the well-born confined to particular spots in the several States? Have they – by some miraculous instinct or foresight – set apart in each State a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Are not the wealthy and well-born scattered over the face of the country, as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors? If they are scattered – as every intelligent person knows it to be – it is evident that a policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account.
For the sake of argument, I will assume all the scruples which a sense of duty or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire were overcome in the breasts of the national rulers, and that restrictions on the location of elections were enacted.
Nonetheless, it will hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the People.
Military Force Is Better Suited to Usurpation than Election Rigging
The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers.
To show in the strongest light the futility of restricting the locations of elections, I shall concede for a moment that such a military force might exist in the Federal government.
What will be the conclusion?
With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community – and with the means of gratifying that disposition – would the persons actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class of individuals?
Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement?
Would they not boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients which – in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them – might terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors?
Would the persons attempting to restrict the location of elections not fear that citizens – not less tenacious than conscious of their rights – would flock from the remote extremes of their respective States to the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to substitute individuals who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the People?
Hamilton