The Senate Will Aid in the Development and Stability of Our National Character
A FIFTH DESIDERATUM illustrating the utility of the Senate is our want of a due sense of national character.
Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, which will proceed from the causes already mentioned.
Furthermore, our national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, an opinion which is initially necessary to merit – and thereafter to obtain – its respect and confidence.
The Judgment of Other Nations
Attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons.
First – and independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure – it is desirable on various accounts that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy.
The second reason is the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed in doubtful cases, particularly where our national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest.
How many errors and follies would America have avoided if the justice and propriety of all of her measures had been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?
The Example of Rhode Island
In Rhode Island, its half-yearly representatives would have been little affected in their deliberations of various iniquitous measures by arguments drawn from the light in which such would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by sister States.
It can scarcely be doubted that if the concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to national character alone would have prevented the calamities under which that misguided State is now laboring.
Attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons. First – and independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure– it is desirable on various accounts that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy.
The second reason is the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed in doubtful cases, particularly where our national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest.
A Numerous and Changeable Body Cannot Supply the Requisite Stability
However requisite a sense of national character may be, it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body like the House of Representatives.
The requisite stability can be found only in a number so small that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual, or in an assembly so durably invested with public trust that the pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community.
The Senate Will Foster and Sustain a Due Responsibility of the Federal Government to the People
A sixth reason favoring creation of a Senate is that the Federal government may lack a due responsibility to the People in some important cases.
This lack of responsibility can arise as a result of the frequency of elections.
Since elections establish a due responsibility in the first place, this remark may appear not only new, but paradoxical. When explained, it must nevertheless be acknowledged to be as undeniable as it is important.
However requisite a sense of national character may be, it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body like the House of Representatives.
Legislative Responsibility to the Objects of Government
The objects of government may be divided into two general classes.
In the first class are measures which singly have an immediate and sensible operation.
The second class of governmental objectives requires a succession of well-chosen and well-connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation.
The importance of the second class of measures to the collective and permanent welfare of every country needs no explanation.
It is evident that an assembly elected for a term of two years will be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures on which the general welfare may essentially depend.
The membership of the House ought not to be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward or tenant for a one-year period could be justly made to answer for places or improvements which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years.
Since it is sufficiently difficult to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a numerous body for acts of the first class – those having an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on constituents – it is practically impossible for citizens to estimate the share of influence which their annual or biennial assemblies may have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years.
Responsibility – in order to be reasonable – must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party.
In order to be effectual, responsibility must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by constituents.
What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have overcome the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens hemlock on one day and statues on the next.
The Senate Will Be a Check on House Excesses
Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a well-constructed Senate only insofar as they relate to the House of Representatives.
As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought to prevail in all governments – and actually will, in all free governments – so too are there particular moments in public affairs when the People themselves – stimulated by some irregular passion, seeking some illicit advantage, or having been misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested persons – may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn.
In these critical moments, the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens may suspend the blow meditated by the People against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth have regained their authority over the public mind.
To this I will add that an institution such as the Senate sometimes may be necessary as a defense to the People against their own temporary errors and delusions.
What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions?
Popular liberty might then have overcome the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens hemlock on one day and statues on the next.
To this I will add that an institution such as the Senate sometimes may be necessary as a defense to the People against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought to prevail in all governments – and actually will, in all free governments – so too are there particular moments in public affairs when the People themselves – stimulated by some irregular passion, seeking some illicit advantage, or having been misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested persons – may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn.
The Geographical Size of the United States Will Not Prevent Popular Delusions
Some may suggest that – unlike the crowded inhabitants of a small district – a people spread over an extensive region like the United States cannot be subject to the infection of violent passions or to the danger of combining in pursuit of unjust measures.
I do not deny that this is a distinction of peculiar importance, and in Federalist 10, I endeavored to show it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated republic.
At the same time, this advantage ought not be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions.
The same extended situation which will exempt the People of America from some of the dangers incident to lesser republics, also will expose the People to the inconvenience of remaining for a longer time under the influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested individuals may succeed in distributing among them.
The same extended situation which will exempt the People of America from some of the dangers incident to lesser republics, also will expose the People to the inconvenience of remaining for a longer time under the influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested individuals may succeed in distributing among them.
The Senate Will Add Longevity to Our Republic
It adds no small weight to all these considerations that history informs us of no long-lived republic which did not have a senate.
Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are the only states to whom that character can be applied.
In both Sparta and Rome there was a senate for life.
The constitution of the senate in Carthage is less known.
Circumstantial evidence makes it probable that it was not different in this particular from the two others.
It is at least certain that it had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor against popular fluctuations. In addition, a smaller council – drawn out of the senate itself – was appointed not only for life, but filled up its own vacancies.
Although these examples are unfit for imitation, as they are repugnant to the genius of America, they are very instructive proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend stability with liberty, especially when compared with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics.
Although the People can never willfully betray their own interests, they may possibly be betrayed by their representatives.
The circumstances which distinguish the American from other popular governments – ancient as well as modern – render extreme circumspection necessary in reasoning from the one case to the other.
But after allowing due weight to this consideration, there are many points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention.
As we have seen, many of the defects common to a numerous assembly frequently elected by the People – and to the People themselves – can only be remedied by a senatorial institution.
There are others peculiar to a numerous assembly which require the control of such an institution.
Although the People can never willfully betray their own interests, they may possibly be betrayed by their representatives.
The danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of only one body of individuals, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public act.
The Principle of Representation Was Present in Long-Lived Republics
Those who question the analogy of our own republic to ancient ones assert the principle of representation was unknown in those ancient states. But this is by no means precisely true in the latitude commonly given to it.
Without entering into a disquisition which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts.
The Archons of Athens
In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive functions were performed, not by the people themselves, but by officers elected by the people, and representing the People in their executive capacity.
Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine Archons, annually elected by the people at large.
The degree of power delegated to them seems to be left in great obscurity.
Subsequent to that period, we find an assembly – first of four hundred members, later increased to six – annually elected by the people; and partially representing the people in their legislative capacity.
The Archons were not only associated with the people in the function of making laws, but had the exclusive right of originating legislative propositions to the people.
The Senate of Carthage
The senate of Carthage – whatever the scope of its power or duration of appointments – appears to have been elective by the suffrages of the people.
Similar instances might be traced in most (if not all) the popular governments of antiquity.
The Ephori of Sparta, the Tribunes of Rome, and the Cosmi of Crete
Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in numbers, but annually elected by the whole body of the people, and considered as the representatives of the people, almost in their plenipotentiary capacity.
The Cosmi of Crete were also annually elected by the people, and have been considered by some authors as an institution analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only: that in the election of that representative body the right of suffrage was communicated only to a part of the people.
From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions.
The representatives of the people were not totally excluded from the administration of ancient republics.
The true distinction between these and our Federal government lies in the total exclusion of the People – in their collective capacity – from any share in the Federal government, and not in the total exclusion of the representatives of the people from the administration of the government in the ancient republics.
This distinction leaves a most advantageous superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from our other advantage: an extensive territory.
For it is unbelievable that any form of representative government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.
In answer to all these arguments – suggested by reason, illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own experience – the jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably be content repeating that a Senate – not appointed immediately by the People and for the term of six years – must gradually acquire a dangerous preeminence in the government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.
From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions. The representatives of the people were not totally excluded from the administration of ancient republics.
To this general answer, a general reply is sufficient: that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power; history offers numerous instances of both; and that abuses of liberty (rather than of power) are most to be apprehended by the United States.
But a more particular reply may be given.
Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate must in the first place corrupt itself. In the next place it must corrupt the State legislatures.
The Senate must then corrupt the House of Representatives, and finally it must corrupt the voting public.
It is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny.
Without corrupting the State legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body.
Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the House of Representatives, the opposition of that coequal branch of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and without corrupting the People themselves, a succession of new representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine order.
Is there anyone who can be persuaded to believe the Senate can arrive (by any possible means within the compass of human address) at the object of a lawless ambition, through all these obstructions?
The Experience of the Senate of Maryland Disproves Fears of Tyranny
If reason condemns the suspicion of potential tyranny, the same sentence is pronounced by experience.
The constitution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite example.
The Senate of Maryland is elected indirectly by the People, for a five-year term, which is only one year less than the Federal Senate.
It is also distinguished by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment.
At the same time, it is not under the control of any such rotation as is provided for the Federal Senate.
If the Federal Senate really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate of Maryland, but no such symptoms have appeared.
On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by individuals of the same description with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the Federal Constitution, have been gradually extinguished by the progress of the experiment.
From the salutary operation of this part of it, the Maryland constitution is daily deriving a reputation which will probably not be rivaled by that of any State in the Union.
It is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny.
The British Example of an Upper House
But if any thing could silence the jealousies on this subject, it ought to be the British example of the House of Lords, which is that nation’s equivalent to the Federal Senate.
Instead of being elected for a term of six years and of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes (as with our Federal Senate), the House of Lords is a hereditary assembly of opulent nobles.
The British popular assembly – its House of Commons – instead of being elected for two years and by the whole body of the people (as in the United States) – is elected for seven years, and often by a very small proportion of the people.
In these circumstances, we ought to see on full display the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which are predicted to be exemplified in the United States at some future period.
British history, on the contrary, informs us that this hereditary assembly has been unable to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the House of Commons, and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch.
As far as antiquity can instruct us, its examples support the reasoning we have employed. In Sparta, the Ephori – the annual representatives of the people – were found an overmatch for the senate for life, and continually gained on its authority and finally drew all power into their own hands.
British history, on the contrary, informs us that this hereditary assembly has been unable to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the House of Commons, and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch.
It is well known that the Tribunes of Rome – the representatives of the people – prevailed in almost every contest with the senate for life, and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it.
This fact is the more remarkable because unanimity was required in every act of the Tribunes, even after their number was augmented to ten. It proves the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free government, which has the people on its side.
To these examples might be added that of Carthage, whose senate – according to the testimony of Polybius – instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had lost almost the whole of its original portion by the commencement of the second Punic War.
The Senate Will Never Become an Aristocracy
The conclusive evidence presented above establishes the Senate will never be able to transform itself – by gradual usurpations – into an independent and aristocratic body.
If such a revolution should ever happen – from causes against which the foresight of man cannot guard – we are warranted in believing the House of Representatives – with the People on their side – will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles.
Against the force of the immediate representatives of the People, nothing will be able to maintain the constitutional authority of the Senate except a display of enlightened policy and attachment to the public good as will divide with that branch of the legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the People themselves.
Madison or Hamilton