THE MODE OF APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF MAGISTRATE OF THE UNITED STATES – the President – is almost the only part of the system of the Constitution to escape severe censure and receive only the slightest mark of disapproval from its opponents.
I will venture somewhat further – and not hesitate to affirm – that if the manner of appointment is not perfect, it is at least excellent, and unites in an eminent degree all possible advantages.
The People Must Have a Voice in Selection
It was determined the sense of the People should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided.
This end was answered by committing the right of making it to individuals chosen by the People for a special purpose at a particular conjuncture, rather than any preexisting body.
The Electors Will Be the Most Qualified
It was equally desirable that the immediate election be made by individuals who are the most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station of President, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, resulting in a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which are proper to govern their choice.
A small number of persons – selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass – will be the most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.
Nothing was more desired than to put in place every practicable obstacle to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally be expected to make their approaches from many quarters, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendancy in our councils.
Avoiding Tumult and Disorder Is a Priority
It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder, which are evils to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate who will have so important an agency in the administration of the government of the United States.
The precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system of the Constitution promise an effectual security against these mischiefs.
The choice of voting for several electors to an intermediate body will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than would the direct choice of the individual who was be the final object of the public wishes.
A further barrier to confusion is erected by requiring the electors to be chosen in each State, and to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen.
This detached and divided situation will expose the electors to far less of the heats and ferments that would naturally occur if they were all to be convened at one time and in one place, a situation that can increase public agitation.
The Highest Goal Is the Avoidance of Cabal, Intrigue or Corruption
Nothing was more desired than to put in place every practicable obstacle to cabal, intrigue, and corruption.
These most deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally be expected to make their approaches from many quarters, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendancy in our councils.
How could they better gratify this than by raising a creature of their own to the presidency of the United States?
The Constitution guards against all danger of this sort with the most provident and judicious attention.
A Special Body (the Electoral College) Will Appoint the President, Rather than a Preexisting (and Thus Corruptible) One
The election of the President does not to depend on any preexisting bodies of individuals, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes.
The election is referred in the first instance to an immediate act of the People of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment.
Excluded from eligibility to this trust are all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States can be of the numbers of the electors. Art. II, § 1, ¶ 2.
Another and no less important goal was that a President’s re-election to office should depend on nothing but the favor of the People themselves.
The immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias.
Their transient existence and detached situation afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so to the conclusion of it.
The business of corruption – when it is to embrace so considerable a number of individual electors – requires time as well as means.
It would not be found easy suddenly to embark them – dispersed as they would be over all the States – in any combinations founded upon motives of a nature to mislead them from their duty, if not to corrupt them.
A President Seeking Re-Election Need Depend Only on the Favor of the People
Another and no less important goal was that a President’s re-election to office should depend on nothing but the favor of the People themselves.
Otherwise the President might be tempted to sacrifice duty to complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the longevity of presidential service.
This advantage will be secured by making reelection also depend upon a special body of representatives – the newly-elected members of the Electoral College – who will again be deputed by the People for the single purpose of making the important choice of President.
The Electoral College Will Advance Outstanding Candidates and Suppress the Evils Attendant to the Election of a President
All these advantages happily combine in the plan set forth in the Constitution, which is: the People of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors that is equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the Federal government.
The electors shall assemble within their State, and vote for some fit person as President.
Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the Federal government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. Art. II, § 3.
But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to center on one individual – and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive – it is provided that in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes, the person who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office.
The process of presidential appointment affords a moral certainty that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any individual who is not endowed with the requisite qualifications in an eminent degree.
Talents for low intrigue or the simple art of popularity may alone suffice to elevate a person to the first honors in a single State, but it will require other talents – and a different kind of merit – to establish an individual in the esteem and confidence of the entire United States, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make for a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States.
There ought to be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by individuals of ability and virtue.
This is not an inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution to those persons who can accurately estimate the effect which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration.
Although I cannot agree with the political heresy of the poet who says: “For forms of government let fools contest, for that which is best administered is best,” I may safely pronounce that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.
Talents for low intrigue or the simple art of popularity may alone suffice to elevate a person to the first honors in a single State, but it will require other talents – and a different kind of merit – to establish an individual in the esteem and confidence of the entire United States, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make for a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States.
The Vice-President Shall Be Chosen Almost in the Same Manner as the President
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner as the President, by the electors delegated to that purpose, with the only difference being that the Senate, rather than the House of Representatives, will make the appointment if no candidate receives a majority of electoral votes.
Some objected to appointment of an extraordinary person to be Vice-President as superfluous, if not mischievous.
Others preferred to have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body a person to fill the office of Vice-President.
Two considerations justify the mechanism set forth in the Constitution.
First, the Vice-President is also President of the Senate, but in that capacity casts a vote only in the event of deadlock.
If a senator of any State were to become President of the Senate, it would exchange – in regard to the State from which that Senator came – a constant vote for a contingent vote.
The other consideration is that the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President in the supreme executive magistracy, so all the reasons recommending the mode of election prescribed for the President apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing a potential successor.
Those from New York who disputed the mode of selecting the Vice-President remarkably overlooked that their objections would lie against the constitution of their own States.
New York has a lieutenant governor, chosen by the electorate, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President.
Hamilton
[Ed. note: Following the 1800 election – in which two candidates from the same party received the same number of electoral votes for President – Amendment XII was ratified to distinguish between electoral votes for President and Vice-President. Article II (complete).]