The 14 opening essays form the foundation of The Federalist Papers.
Written primarily by Alexander Hamilton and John Jay (with James Madison’s landmark contribution in No. 10), they make the urgent case that the survival, safety, prosperity, and liberty of the American people depend on a strong, lasting Union under the proposed Constitution.
Hamilton begins in Federalist 1 by framing the decision before the nation as a historic test: whether societies of free people can deliberately create good government through reflection and choice, or whether they are forever doomed to accident and force. He then outlines the plan for the entire series and calls readers to judge the Constitution on its merits rather than passion, prejudice, or local interest.
What follows is a sustained, methodical argument for the utility of the Union:
John Jay (Nos. 2–5) shows why a single national government is far safer against foreign force and influence than a collection of separate or loosely confederated States. Division would invite war, intrigue, and foreign manipulation; unity would deter them.
Hamilton (Nos. 6–8) turns to the dangers of dissension among the States themselves – territorial disputes, commercial rivalries, public debt, and the near-certainty of hostilities that would produce standing armies, loss of liberty, and eventual despotism.
Nos. 9 and 10 demonstrate that a well-constructed Union is the best safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection. Madison’s Federalist 10 remains one of the most profound treatments ever written of the problem of factions and the superiority of an extended republic over pure democracy.
Hamilton then details the concrete advantages of Union for commerce and a navy (No. 11), revenue (No. 12), and economy in government (No. 13). Madison answers the objection that the territory is simply too large for a republic (No. 14).
Hamilton shows that a government which can only recommend – not act directly on individuals – is no government at all. It produces anarchy, unpaid debts, commercial paralysis, and national humiliation. He observes that applying federal law to individual citizens – rather than merely to State governments – is not a path to unlimited power, since State governments will retain the affections of the people through their control of ordinary justice and local affairs.
Taken together, Federalist 1–14 establish the indispensable necessity of Union, expose the dangers of disunion, and begin the critique of the Confederation that will continue in later numbers. They remain essential reading for anyone who wants to understand why the Founders believed a stronger Federal government was required—not to destroy liberty, but to preserve it.
Begin with Federalist 1 and read straight through. The logic is cumulative, powerful, and still urgently relevant.
[Ed. note: On this site the full modern-English text of each paper appears below. The language has been carefully updated for clarity while remaining completely faithful to every original argument. Most paragraphs have been broken into shorter sentences for easier reading and study.]
Federalist 1: A Question for the Ages
THE FATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA presents the most interesting and important question in the world: whether societies really are capable of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. We have finally reached the era in which that decision can be made.
The Breadth of the Constitution
The Constitution for the United States of America comprehends in its consequences nothing less than the existence of a nation, the safety and welfare of its parts, and the fate of its empire.
Its construction was directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations unconnected to the public good. Its passage adds to the good fortune of mankind.
To this philanthropic spirit we can add the spirit of patriotism that we and our posterity must all feel for the event.
Some Invariably Oppose Change, Some Favor Confusion, and Some Hope for Impossible Alternatives
The Constitution affected too many particular interests and local institutions for its opponents not to have raised issues foreign to its merits. Their views, passions, and prejudices little favored the discovery of truth.
Resistance arose from those officeholders whose power, emolument, or consequence would be diminished.
Some harbored the perverted ambition to aggrandize themselves by confusion of the issues.
Others flattered themselves with fairer prospect of elevation to higher positions in separate confederacies than from union under one Federal government.
The design of these papers, however, is not to dwell upon observations of this nature.
The fate of the United States of America presents the most interesting and important question in the world: whether societies really are capable of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. We have finally reached the era in which that decision can be made.
Minds Are often Led Astray by Preconceived Jealousies and Fears
It is unfair to question the motives of interested or ambitious individuals merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion.
Such individuals are frequently motivated by upright intentions.
Opposition often springs from the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears.
The causes of false bias to the judgment are so numerous and powerful that wise and good individuals are on the wrong as well the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society.
This circumstance furnishes a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy.
Base Instincts Operate Alike on Those Who Support the Truth as well as Those Who Oppose It
A further reason for caution is the uncertainty whether those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists.
Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and less laudable motives operate alike on those who support as well as those who oppose the right side of any question.
To these can be added the spirit of intolerance that political parties sometimes promote.
In politics as in religion, it is absurd to persuade by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.
The causes of false bias to the judgment are so numerous and powerful that wise and good individuals are on the wrong as well the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance furnishes a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy.
Be Wary of the Populist Who Jealously Champions the Rights of the People
A vigorous government is essential to liberty.
In all cases of great national discussion, moderation is besieged with torrents of angry and malignant passions.
Each side evinces the justness of its opinions and seeks to increase converts by loudness of declamation and bitterness of invective.
On the one hand, a zeal for energetic and efficient government will be branded the offspring of a despotic temperament.
On the other hand, those who appear overly solicitous of the dangers to the rights of the People can be denounced as pretentious populists opposed to the public good.
Of the two, history teaches the more certain road to the introduction of despotism is paved by those who appear the most jealous of any danger to the rights of the People.
Jealousy is a defect which results from intense love. It originates in the head rather than the heart.
Jealousy can infect a noble enthusiasm for liberty with a narrow-minded spirit of distrust.
A dangerous ambition for honor or preference can lurk behind the specious mask of zealous advocacy for the rights of the People.
Of those who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number began their careers paying obsequious court to the People.
They commenced as demagogues, and ended as tyrants.
But in the private circles of those who oppose the Constitution, we will always hear whispered how one part might be “improved” or even “removed.’ Doctrines like these are quietly propagated until they have enough votaries to countenance their open avowal. Such doctrines are calculated to fan dissension and promote dismemberment of the United States. They are as clear in object as unsound in practice.
Those Who Oppose the Constitution Are Subtle, So Be Wary of Any Campaign to “Improve” It
It might now be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of forming the United States.
But in the private circles of those who oppose the Constitution, we will always hear whispered how one part might be “improved” – or even “removed.”
Doctrines like these are quietly propagated until they have enough votaries to countenance their open avowal.
Such doctrines are calculated to fan dissension and promote dismemberment of the United States.
They are as clear in object as unsound in practice.
The Objects of the 85 Papers
Our Constitution plots the safest course for the liberty, dignity, and happiness of the People. These papers will discuss the following particulars:
The utility of the Constitution to our political prosperity –
The insufficiency of the Articles of Confederation to preserve that prosperity –
The necessity of an energetic Federal government to attain this object –
How the Constitution conforms to the true principles of republican government –
How the Constitution is based on State constitutions – and lastly –
The additional security its adoption affords to the preservation of republican government, liberty and prosperity.
In Federalist 2, I examine the advantages of creating the United States, and explain the evils and dangers to every State from its dissolution.
Hamilton
Federalist 2: The Need for Government and a Single Union
WHENEVER OR HOWEVER INSTITUTED, government is indispensable.
And to vest it with the requisite powers, the People must cede some natural rights.
This was done at a very early period in our history, when the value and blessings of a union of the States induced the People’s representatives to institute a Federal government to preserve and perpetuate those advantages.
It was formed when homes were in flames and many were bloodied. It is therefore unsurprising the government they instituted was found greatly deficient, since time was insufficient to undertake a calm and mature reflection on what would constitute a wise and well balanced government for a free People.
Here I respond to those who seek to divide the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties and thereby forsake the safety and happiness of our constitutional union.
A Single Union Is Greatly Preferable to Several
A multitude of circumstances favor a single union over several.
America consists of a single, connected, fertile, and expansive country, with a variety of soils and productions, watered by innumerable streams and navigable waters, forming natural highways for easy communication and the mutual transportation and exchange of various commodities.
Providence also has given America one united People, who are descended from the same ancestors, speak the same language, profess the same religion, are attached to the same principles of government, and by their joint counsels, arms and efforts, fought side by side through a long and bloody revolutionary war, and nobly established general liberty and independence.
This country and this People seem to have been made for each other, and they should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.
Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and denominations of individuals among us.
We have uniformly been one People, with each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protections.
As a nation, we have made peace and war, vanquished our common enemies, formed alliances, and adopted treaties, compacts, and conventions with foreign states.
The Constitutional Convention Was the Greatest Ever Convened to Establish a Government
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was composed of intelligent people committed equally to union and liberty.
They were persuaded that security for both could only be found in a national government, wisely framed and articulated with one voice.
The Convention itself was composed of individuals who possessed the confidence of the People.
Many were highly distinguished by patriotism, virtue, and wisdom.
They undertook the arduous task in the mild season of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects. They passed many months in cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation.
Without being awed by power or influenced by any passion except love of country, they finally presented and recommended to the People the constitutional plan produced by joint and unanimous councils.
The composition of the 1787 Constitutional Convention resembled that of the memorable Continental Congress of 1774, which the majority of citizens believed was composed of wise and experienced individuals who – being convened from different parts of the country – brought with them and communicated to each other a variety of useful information.
During the time shared together in the Congress – and inquiring into and discussing the true interests of the colonies – they undoubtedly acquired a very accurate knowledge of those interests.
Each member of the 1774 Congress was individually interested in public liberty and prosperity.
Each was thus induced by inclination as much as by duty to recommend only those measures found prudent and advisable after the most mature of deliberations.
These and similar considerations induced the People to rely greatly on the judgment and integrity of that Congress – and to follow its advice – although only a few of its members were generally known or fully tested – and notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors employed to defeat its proposals.
With even greater reason we can respect the judgment and advice of the 1787 Convention that composed the Constitution.
Several of the most distinguished members of the 1774 Congress also served as members of the Constitutional Convention.
Those individuals – who had proven their patriotism and ability – were familiar with the acquisition of political information, and they carried into the Convention their accumulated knowledge and experience.
Their plan was recommended only – and not imposed – so that it would receive neither blind approval nor blind disapproval, in the hope that it would encourage the sedate and candid consideration the magnitude and importance of the subject demand.
But this was more of a wish or hope than an expectation, as shown by opposition to ratification of the Constitution.
The Constitutional Convention, every Congress before it, and the People have invariably believed the prosperity of America depended upon its union. Those who deprecate its importance have no good purpose in mind. Every citizen should see that this will be the end of our greatness.
The People Ought to Reject Arguments Against the Constitution Just As They Rejected the Arguments Against the Proposals of the Congress of 1774
The Continental Congress of 1774 recommended certain measures whose wisdom was ultimately proven true.
But their proposals soon were attacked by the press, by officers of the government who obeyed the dictates of personal interest, and by others still – who from mistake, ambition, or the undue influence of former attachments – were unstoppable in their efforts to persuade the People to reject the advice of that patriotic Congress.
Although many were deceived and deluded, the great majority of the People reasoned and decided judiciously, to their happiness.
The Constitutional Convention, every Congress before it, and the People have invariably believed the prosperity of America depended upon its union.
Those who deprecate its importance have no good purpose in mind. Every citizen should see that this will be the end of our greatness.
In Federalist 3, I explain why a Federal government will provide greater safety, less war, and more peace.
Jay
Federalist 3: A Federal Government Will Provide Greater Safety, Less War, and More Peace
AN INTELLIGENT AND WELL-INFORMED PEOPLE seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests.
The People of America – intelligent and well-informed – have for a long period uniformly entertained the importance of their continuing firmly united under one Federal government vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.
Their opinion merits great respect.
Here I examine whether a cordial union under one efficient Federal government affords the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad, or whether this can be more perfectly and punctually done by thirteen or more separate States or by three or more distinct confederacies.
A Federal Government Will Provide the Greatest Safety from All Sources of Conflict
The attention of wise and free individuals necessarily turns first to providing for their own safety.
The safety of the People encompasses a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and naturally affords great latitude to those who wish to define it.
For the moment, I will limit myself to those aspects of safety bearing on the preservation of peace and tranquility against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as well as from dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes.
As the dangers of foreign arms and influence come first in order, it should be examined first, to ascertain whether the People are not right in their opinion that a cordial union – under an efficient national government – affords them the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad.
The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes – whether real or pretended – which provoke or invite them.
If it should turn out that the United States will give fewer just causes of war than a disunited America, the United States will tend most to preserve the People in a State of peace with other nations.
The People of America – intelligent and well-informed – have for a long period uniformly entertained the importance of their continuing firmly united under one Federal government vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes. Their opinion merits great respect.
The just causes of war mostly arise from either a violation of treaties or direct violence.
We have already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations. Except for the one with Prussia, all the treaties are maritime, and thereby able to annoy and injure us. Our country also has extensive commerce with the countries of Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and we share borders with the territories of Spain and Britain.
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.
A Federal Government Will Have Wiser Counsel than States or Confederacies
With the establishment of an efficient Federal government, the best individuals in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it.
Unlike assemblies, senates, courts of justice, and executive departments in the States – which can be filled with individuals of town, country, or other limited influence – more general and extensive reputation for talent and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend individuals to offices under the Federal government.
A national government will have the widest field for choice, and never experience a want of proper persons.
The administration, political counsels, and judicial decisions of one Federal government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more safe with respect to us.
A Federal Government Will Speak with One Voice
Under a Federal government for the United States, treaties, articles of treaties, and the laws of nations always will be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner.
Adjudications on the same points and questions by a number of different States or confederacies are less likely to be consistent or in accord, due to the variety of courts and judges that different and independent governments will appoint, and the influence local laws and interests will have on them.
A Federal Government Will Be Less Affected by Local Circumstances
The prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice.
Unless those temptations reach other States, they will have little or no influence on the Federal government. These temptations would prove fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved, as shown by the treaty of peace with Britain.
But even where the governing party in a State should be disposed to resist the temptation to swerve from good faith and justice, upon an actual or perceived loss or advantage affecting a great number of a State’s inhabitants, the governing party may find itself unable to prevent any injustice meditated, or to punish the aggressors.
The Federal government – not being affected by those local circumstances – will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.
A Federal Government Will Provide Fewer Just Causes of War
Either designed or accidental violations of treaties or the laws of nations can afford just causes of war.
Such just causes are less to be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the safety of the People.
As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.
Direct and unlawful violence is more frequently caused by the passions and interests of a part of a community rather than the whole; and by one or two States rather than an entire nation.
None of the wars with the preexisting tribes and nations of America has been occasioned by aggressions of the Federal government, feeble as it is.
But there are several instances where hostilities with these groups were provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, which were either unwilling or unable or to restrain or punish offenses, thereby occasioning the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.
The States bordering on foreign nations – acting under the impulse of sudden irritation and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury – will be most likely to excite war with these tribes and nations by direct violence.
Nothing can obviate that danger so effectively as a Federal government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested.
A Federal Government Will Settle Wars More Easily
Not only will fewer just causes of war be given by a Federal government, it will also be more in its power to accommodate and settle them amicably.
A national government will be more temperate and cool, and thus have more in capacity to act advisedly than an offending State.
The pride of States as well as of individuals naturally disposes them to justify all of their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses.
A Federal government will not be affected by this pride, but instead will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.
Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations from a strong, united nation are often accepted as satisfactory, while such offers would be rejected as unsatisfactory if given by a state or confederacy of little consideration or power.
The Example of Genoa
In 1685, the state of Genoa offended Louis XIV and endeavored to appease him. Louis demanded they should send their chief magistrate and four senators to France to ask his pardon and receive his terms. Genoa was obliged to submit for the sake of peace.
Would Louis either have demanded or received a like humiliation from Spain, Britain, or any other powerful nation?
In Federalist 4, I explain why a disunited America will be subject to undue foreign influence.
Federalist 4: A Unified Federal Government Will Give Fewer Causes for War
In Federalist 3, I explained why a Federal government would best secure the safety of the People against the dangers to which they would be exposed in the event a just cause for war was given to other nations.
With a Federal government, not only would just cause be more rarely given, but if given, more easily accommodated than by individual State governments or confederacies of States.
The safety of the People of America against dangers from foreign force depends not only on their forbearing to give just causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to invite hostility or insult, since it is obvious there are pretended causes of war as well.
It is too true – however disgraceful it may be to human nature – that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it.
And absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, other than for purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.
These and a variety of other motives affecting only the mind of the sovereign – especially an absolute sovereign – often lead such persons to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of the People.
Independently of these inducements to war, there are others which affect nations as often as monarchies, and which can grow out of relative situation and circumstances.
Commercial Rivalries Are Inducements to War
We are rivals with Britain, France and other European nations in navigation and the carrying trade. For instance, we can supply the markets of France and Britain with fish more cheaply than they can themselves, even with their duties on foreign fish.
We shall deceive ourselves if we suppose any of them will rejoice to see our trade flourish, since our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing theirs.
Thus it will be in their interest to adopt policies to restrain our trade rather than promote it.
It is too true – however disgraceful it may be to human nature – that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it
In the trade to China and India, we now have advantages which they had monopolized, by supplying ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase from them.
And the extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any nation which possesses territory on or near this continent.
Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other. Both nations also restrict use of the ocean between them and us in order to control mutual intercourse and traffic.
It is easy to see how jealousy and uneasiness may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations.
We should not expect they will regard with indifference and composure the advancement of our union in power and consequence by use of land and sea.
The value and excellence of our productions, the enterprise of our merchants and navigators, and the circumstance of vicinity give us a greater share in the advantages afforded by those territories, thereby interfering with the wishes or policy of these other sovereigns.
A Single Federal Government Provides Greater Strength, Safety, and Uniformity of Policy and Action with Respect to Other Nations
The People of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of the circumstances described above, as well as from others not so obvious at present.
Whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting.
A Federal government will tend to repress and discourage these pretenses for war rather than inviting them.
This is the best possible state of defense, and it necessarily depends on the unity of the government, arms, and resources of the entire country.
One Federal government is better than one composed of any number of States or confederacies.
One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest individuals, in whatever part of the United States they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy.
It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and also extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each.
In the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with the whole.
State Militias Under Presidential Control Will Be More Uniform
A Federal government can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies could possibly do, due to their want of unity and concert of system.
It also will place the State militias under one plan of discipline and – by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the President – consolidate them into one corps, thereby rendering them more efficient than if divided into thirteen State militias or three or four militias of separate confederacies.
The British Example of Unified Militias
The case of Great Britain proves the point.
What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales? In the event of invasion, would those three governments be able – if they agreed at all – to operate with all their respective forces against the enemy so effectually as the single government of Britain?
The same is true of the British fleet. We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come when the fleets of America engage their attention. If the national government had not so regulated the navigation of the constituent parts of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen – nor called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets – their prowess and thunder would never have been celebrated. If England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland had their own fleets under four independent governments, it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.
Dividing the United States Will Result in Weakness and Uncertainty
If America is divided into any number of States or confederacies, what armies could they raise and pay, and what fleets could they ever hope to have?
If one was attacked, would another spend its blood and money for the defense of another?
It is far more likely these other States or confederacies would remain neutral, whether through the flattery of specious promises offered by the aggressor, the seduction of an untoward fondness for peace, or the jealousy to see their neighbor diminished.
Such conduct, though unwise, would nevertheless be natural. The history of the states of Greece and other countries abounds with such events.
What has so often happened before would – under similar circumstances here – happen again.
Even if we assume a neighbor might be willing to help the invaded State or confederacy, how, when, and in what proportion would the aids of money and men be afforded?
Who would command the allied armies, and from which States shall he receive his orders?
Who would settle the terms of peace, and what umpire shall decide disputes between them and compel acquiescence?
Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation.
One national government, by contrast, would be free from all these embarrassments, and be far more conducive to the safety of the People by watching over the general and common interests and combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole.
Other Nations Will See Our Situation for What It Is
One thing is certain: whatever our situation – whether firmly united under one national government or split into a number of confederacies – foreign nations will see it exactly as it is, and they will act toward us accordingly.
If they see that our Federal government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militias properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, and our People free, united and contented, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment.
On the other hand, what a poor and pitiful figure would America be in their eyes if they should find us either destitute of an effectual government – with each State doing right or wrong as its rulers may deem convenient – or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies – with one inclining to Britain, another to France, a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three.
These confederacies would become liable to their contempt, and then their outrage. The costly experience would prove again that when a People or family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.
In Federalist 5, I explain why a divided America would be more prone to foreign influence and strife.
Jay
Federalist 5: A Divided America Would Be Prone to Foreign Influence and Strife
WEAKNESS AND DIVISIONS AT HOME WOULD INVITE DANGERS from abroad, and nothing would tend more to secure us from these dangers than union, strength, and good government within ourselves, as I noted in Federalist 4.
This copious subject is not easily exhausted.
Queen Anne, in her letter to the Scottish Parliament on the 1st of July 1706, observed the importance of the union then forming between England and Scotland, and it merits repeating:
“An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be enabled to resist all its enemies.” Emphasis added.
She added: “We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only effectual way to secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will undoubtedly, on this occasion, use their utmost endeavors to prevent or delay this union.” Emphasis added.
The Lessons from Great Britain
The history of Great Britain provides many profitable lessons for our use without payment of the price their experiences cost them.
While it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be one nation, for ages they were divided into three, and almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another.
Even though their true interests with respect to the European mainland were really the same, the arts, policies, and practices of those continental nations kept the mutual jealousies of the three governments of the island perpetually inflamed.
For a long series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome to each other than they were useful and assisting.
The British Example Applied to a Divided America
If the People of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen?
Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished?
Instead of their being “joined in affection” and free from all apprehension of different “interests,” envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection.
Instead of pursuing the general interests of all of America, the partial interest of each confederacy would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits.
Hence, like most other bordering nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or living in the constant apprehension of them.
Superior policy and good management would probably distinguish the government of one above the rest.
Their relative equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed.
One cannot presume the same degree of prudence, foresight and sound policy would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years.
However it might happen – and happen it would – if any one of these nations or confederacies were to rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, those neighbors would behold her with envy and fear.
Those passions would lead the neighbors to countenance and promote whatever might promise to diminish the importance of the prospering confederacy, and to restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity.
The prospering confederacy would soon discern these unfriendly dispositions, and begin to lose confidence in her neighbors and to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them.
Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is goodwill and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The Likely Conflict Between North and South
The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances render it probable that in the near future the proposed northern confederacies unquestionably would be more formidable than any of the others.
As soon as this became evident the young swarms of this northern hive might be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.
The same ideas and sensations the northern islands formerly excited in the more southern parts of Europe would be aroused in the southern parts of America.
The history of similar divisions and confederacies shows that northern and southern confederacies of States would be borderers rather than neighbors, who would neither love nor trust one another.
We would be prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries. We then would be formidable only to each other, a situation some other nations doubtless wish to see.
Greatly mistaken are those who suppose alliances offensive and defensive might be formed between these confederacies, producing a union of wills, arms, and resources necessary to put them and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign enemies.
Did the independent states into which Britain and Spain were formerly divided ever combine in such alliance, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy?
The proposed confederacies would be distinct nations, each regulating its commerce with foreigners by distinct treaties.
Since the productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different.
Different commercial concerns necessarily create different interests, with different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign nations.
A foreign nation with whom a southern confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom a northern confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship.
An alliance so contrary to the northern confederacy’s immediate interests would not be easily formed, and if formed, would not be observed or fulfilled with perfect good faith.
The history of similar divisions and confederacies shows that northern and southern confederacies of States would be borderers rather than neighbors, who would neither love nor trust one another. We would be prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries. We then would be formidable only to each other, a situation some other nations undoubtedly wish to see.
Alliances Between Distinct American Confederacies and Foreign Nations Would Destroy Unity
It is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations – acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions – would frequently be found taking different sides.
It would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations.
Each of them would be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves.
It would be natural to receive foreign fleets into their ports, and foreign armies into their lands.
Lest we forget, it is far easier to receive foreign fleets and armies than to persuade or compel them to depart.
How many conquests did the Romans and others make by appearing as allies to the governments of those whom they pretended to protect?
Let candid persons judge, then, whether the division of America into any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.
In Federalist 6, I explain why republics are as subject as to rivalries, intrigues and wars as monarchies.
Jay
Federalist 6: The Causes of Human Hostility Are Innumerable
ONE MUST BE FAR GONE IN UTOPIAN SPECULATIONS to question whether the States of a disunited America would have frequent and violent contests with each other.
We should not presume a lack of motives for such hostilities. Are not humans ambitious, rapacious, and vindictive?
To anticipate harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of the ages.
In Federalist 3 through Federalist 5, I exposed the dangers a disunited United States would suffer from the arms and arts of foreign nations.
I now delineate dangers of a different and more alarming kind: those which will flow from dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions.
The Love and Jealousy of Power
The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. Some have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective bodies of society.
One is the love of power: the desire for preeminence and dominion. Another is the jealousy of power: the desire for equality and safety.
The Commercial Rivalries of Nations
Other causes of hostility are more circumscribed – such as the rivalries and competitions between commercial nations – but these too maintain an equally operative influence within their spheres.
The Rivalries of Passion
Still other causes of human hostility take their origin entirely in private passions, such as the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes and fears of leading individuals in their communities.
Individuals of this class – whether the favorites a king or a people – have in too many instances abused the confidence they possessed.
They have assumed the pretext of some public motive, and sacrificed the national tranquility to personal advantage or personal gratification.
More grounds of human hostility are discussed in Federalist 7.
The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. Some have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective bodies of society. One is the love of power: the desire for preeminence and dominion. Another is the jealousy of power: the desire for equality and safety.
The Case of Pericles and Athens
The celebrated Pericles of Athens attacked, vanquished, and destroyed another Greek city-state – at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his countrymen – to satisfy the resentment of a woman.
The same man was the primitive author of the famous and fatal Peloponnesian War which, after various vicissitudes, intermissions and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth. The stimulus for his actions was either a private pique against another city-state, or to avoid his own prosecution for theft of public funds, or to eliminate accusations that he had dissipated the funds of the state to purchase popularity, or from a combination of all these causes.
Cardinal Wolsey and Charles V of Spain
The ambitious Cardinal Wolsey, the prime minister to Henry VIII, permitted his vanity to aspire to the papacy – with the aid of Emperor Charles V of Spain. To this end, Wolsey precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of policy, thereby hazarding the safety and independence of England and Europe.
If ever there was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal monarchy, it was Charles V, of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once both instrument and dupe.
If ever there was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal monarchy, it was Charles V of Spain, of whose intrigues Cardinal Wolsey was at once both instrument and dupe.
Recent Examples, Including Shays of Massachusetts
More recently, the bigotry of Madame de Maintenon, the petulance of the Duchess of Marlborough, and the cabals of Madame de Pompadour have led to ferments and pacifications of a considerable part of Europe.
It is unnecessary to multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the production of great national events. Even those only superficially acquainted with the sources from which they are drawn will themselves recollect a variety of similar instances.
One has lately happened among ourselves. If the leader of Shays’ Rebellion had not been a desperate debtor, it is doubtful Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war.
Visionaries and Schemers Alike Will Advocate Dismemberment of the United States
Notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, there are still to be found visionary or designing individuals who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace among the States even though they be dismembered and alienated from each other.
The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics like ours, the argument proceeds, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.
But we may ask, is it not the true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit?
And if this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it?
Or has it not invariably been found that momentary passions and immediate interests have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than those general or remote considerations of policy, utility and justice?
In practice, have republics been less addicted to war than monarchies? Both are administered by individuals.
The aversions, predilections, rivalries and desires of unjust acquisitions affect nations as well as kings.
Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice and other irregular and violent propensities?
The decisions of popular assemblies are often governed by a few individual leaders whose passions and views have infected those of the body or assembly.
One must be far gone in utopian speculations to question whether the States of a disunited America would have frequent and violent contests with each other.
Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war?
Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory?
Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion?
Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other?
Let experience – the least fallible guide of human opinions – be consulted for an answer to these inquiries.
Experience Proves Even Commercial Republics Are Fallible
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics.
Sparta was little better than a well regulated camp, and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.
Athens and Carthage were commercial republics, yet were they as often engaged in wars – offensive and defensive – as the neighboring monarchies of the same times. Although it was a commercial republic, Carthage was the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal carried her arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of that commonwealth.
Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition, until it became an object to the other Italian states and the pope, who formed a league with the kingdoms of France and Aragon, which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of the haughty Venetian republic.
The provinces of Holland took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe, until they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes.
Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of Britain, but few nations have been more frequently engaged in war. Although the representatives of its People compose one branch of the national legislature, they have championed aggression in numerous instances.
There have been almost as many popular wars as royal wars.
The cries of a nation and the importunities of its representatives have dragged its monarchs into war upon various occasions, or continued them in it, contrary to the monarch’s inclinations – and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the state.
In that memorable struggle for superiority between the rival houses of Austria and Bourbon, Europe was long kept in a flame by the antipathies of the English – stirred by the avarice of their favored leader, the Duke of Marlborough – who protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the court.
The wars of England and France have in a great measure grown out of commercial considerations – the desire of supplanting and the fear of being supplanted – either in particular branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and navigation.
From this summary of situations nearest our own, what reason can seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of a confederacy in a state of separation?
Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in every shape?
We must awaken from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we – as well as the other inhabitants of the globe – are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue.
We need look no further than the extreme depression to which our national dignity and credit have sunk, the lax and ill administration of government, the revolt in a part of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts.
We must awaken from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we – as well as the other inhabitants of the globe – are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue.
The Enmity which Naturally Arises from Close Physical Proximity Can Be Alleviated by a League of Confederate Republics
From long observation of the progress of human society, it is an axiom in politics that vicinity or nearness of situation can render nations natural enemies.
L’Abbé de Mably, an intelligent writer on this subject, explained how a joinder of neighboring weak confederacies can overcome this natural tendency to animosity: “Neighboring nations are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a confederate republic, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors.”
This passage at once points out the evil and suggests the remedy.
Hamilton
Federalist 7: The Causes of War
WHAT INDUCEMENTS WOULD THE STATES of a disunited America have to make war upon each other?
Precisely the same inducements which have deluged in blood all the nations of the world at various times.
Disputes Over Territory Can Cause War
Territorial disputes have at all times been one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations.
The greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin.
This cause would exist among us in full force.
Disputes have already arisen concerning the rights to the “crown lands,” which had not been granted at the time of the Revolution. Congress appeased this controversy by prevailing upon the States to cede territories to the United States for the benefit of the whole. Dismemberment of the United States would revive these disputes.
The wide field of western territory provides ample theater for hostile pretensions, absent any umpire or common judge to interpose between the contending parties. If the past guides the future, the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of these differences
What inducements would the States of a disunited America have to make war upon each other? Precisely the same inducements which have deluged in blood all the nations of the world at various times
Commercial Competition Can Cause War
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention.
The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors.
Each State or separate confederacy would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself.
This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent.
The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent of this circumstance.
We should be ready to denominate injuries those things which were in reality the justifiable acts of independent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest.
Each State or separate confederacy would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself.
The unbridled spirit of American enterprise would pay little respect to a State trade regulation intended to secure exclusive benefits to its own citizens.
Infractions of such regulations by one side – and the efforts to prevent and repel them on the other – would naturally lead to outrages, reprisals and wars.
There is nothing humans differ so readily about as the payment of money. There is nothing more likely to disturb the tranquility of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident benefit.
Nonpayment of Debts Can Cause War
A further cause of collision between separate States or confederacies of States would arise from the retirement of the public debt of the expired Union under the Articles of Confederation.
The apportionment of those debts in the first instance, and their progressive extinguishment afterward, would be productive alike of ill-humor and animosity.
Settling on a rule would be postponed by real differences of opinion.
The citizens of the States would clamor; foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and internal contention.
There is nothing more likely to disturb the tranquility of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident benefit.
There is nothing humans differ so readily about as the payment of money.
Contract Violations Can Cause War
Laws in violation of private contracts are aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them.
Such laws are another probable source of hostility.
In some circumstances, a war of parchment would give rise to one of the sword, in order to chastise such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social justice.
Divide and command must be the motto of every nation that either hates us or fears us.
Political Machinations Can Cause War
A disunited America gradually would become entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided.
Divided states or confederacies would likely become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers which are equally the enemies of them all.
Divide and command must be the motto of every nation that either hates us or fears us.
Hamilton
Federalist 8: War Between the States Will Lead to Devastation
A DISUNITED UNITED STATES would be subject to all those vicissitudes of peace and war – and of friendship and enmity with each other – that are the lot of all neighboring nations who are not united under one government.
War between the States would be more devastating than in those European countries where regular military establishments have long existed.
Although malignant to liberty and economy, the disciplined armies kept on foot in continental Europe have rendered sudden conquests impracticable, ending the rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war there.
The Deterrent Effect of Fortifications and Garrisons
Extensive fortifications mutually obstruct invasion.
Frontier garrisons and similar impediments exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader. In former times, an invading army could penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received.
Now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops – acting on the defensive and with the aid of posts – is able to impede and frustrate the invasions of much larger forces.
European history is no longer one of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken, of battles that decide nothing, of retreats more beneficial than victories, and of much effort and little acquisition.
In a Disunited America, the People’s Jealousy of Fortifications and Garrisons Would Deter Construction, Leaving Borders Open to Predators
If the States were disunited, the scene would be altogether reversed.
The jealousy of military establishments would postpone their construction for as long as possible.
The lack of fortifications would leave the frontiers of one State open to another.
Populous States would overrun their less populous neighbors with little difficulty.
War between States or confederacies would be desultory and predatory, since plunder and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars.
Individual calamities would characterize our military exploits.
European history is no longer one of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken, of battles that decide nothing, of retreats more beneficial than victories, and of much effort and little acquisition.
Liberty Eventually Would Succumb to the Desire for Security
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct.
Even the ardent love of liberty will gave way to its dictates after a time.
The violent destruction of life and property incident to war – or the alarm attendant to a state of continual danger – compel all nations to resort to standing armies for security, even though they tend to destroy civil and political rights.
To be more safe, citizens will at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.
War between States or confederacies would be desultory and predatory, since plunder and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars.
Frequent war and apprehension of war require a state of constant preparation, which infallibly produces standing armies.
Standing armies certainly would exist with a dissolution of the Union.
Weaker states or confederacies would establish a regular and effective system of defense – by disciplined troops and fortifications – in order to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent neighbors.
Such actions would necessarily strengthen the executive arm of the government, because war naturally tends to increase the executive power at the expense of the legislative authority.
Over time, their constitutions and governments would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy.
Smaller states or confederacies using such expedients would soon be superior to their neighbors – even those with greater resources – since vigorous governments with disciplined armies have often triumphed over large states or states of greater natural strength that did not have these advantages.
In response to such actions by smaller states, the pride and safety of the more important states or confederacies would not long submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority.
They would quickly resort to similar means to reinstate themselves.
Thus in a little time we would see established in every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old World.
The violent destruction of life and property incident to war – or the alarm attendant to a state of continual danger – compel all nations to resort to standing armies for security, even though they tend to destroy civil and political rights. To be more safe, citizens will at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.
The Absence of Standing Armies in the Greek Republics Was Specific to Their Circumstances
It may be asked, by way of objection, why did not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often distracted the ancient republics of Greece?
Several equally satisfactory answers may be given to this question.
Those republics were nations of soldiers.
In the present day, the industrious habits of the American people – absorbed in the pursuits of gain and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce – are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers.
Our means of revenue – so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold, silver, the arts of industry, together with the new science of finance – have produced an entire revolution in the system of war.
Disciplined armies distinct from the body of the citizens are required only when hostilities are frequent.
The Constitution Permits the Federal Government to Create a Federal Standing Army
Standing armies are not prohibited in the Constitution, from which it may be inferred they may exist under it, although their actual composition remains uncertain.
A Small Federal Standing Army Is Consistent with Liberty
Military establishments are quite different between a country often exposed to invasions – and therefore more apprehensive of them – and a country that is geographically secure.
The rulers of a relatively secure nation have little pretext to require more than a small standing army. Such an army rarely would be called into activity for defense of the interior, and thus the citizens of that nation would be in no danger of being broken to military subordination.
The laws in such a country would not be accustomed to relaxation in favor of military exigencies.
The civil state would remain in full vigor, neither corrupted nor confounded with the principles or propensities of a true military state.
The natural strength of the People would overmatch the small army.
Citizens would neither be habituated to look to the military power for protection, nor to submit to its oppressions.
Such a country would neither love nor fear the soldiery, but instead view them as a necessary evil, standing ready to resist a power which may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.
The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the People.
A Large Federal Standing Army Would Undermine Liberty
In a country with a large standing army, the contrary of all this happens.
The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense.
The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen.
The military state becomes elevated above the civil.
The inhabitants of territories, often the theater of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights.
By degrees the People would come to consider the soldiery as their superiors as well as their protectors.
This transition of the soldiery from servants to masters in the minds of the citizenry is neither remote nor difficult, for a People subject to a constant threat rarely mount a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military power.
The Benefits of Our Geographic Insularity
The kingdom of Great Britain has no large standing army.
Its insular situation and a powerful marine guard against the possibility of foreign invasion, thus superseding the necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom.
A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent, until the militia could have time to rally and embody, is all that is required.
Britain’s national policy has not demanded – nor her public opinion tolerated – a large number of troops upon domestic establishment.
This peculiar felicity of situation has contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption.
If, on the contrary, had Britain been situated on the continent – and been compelled by that situation to make her military establishments at home coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe – she, like them, would in all probability have fallen victim to the absolute power of a single individual.
It is possible the People of that island might be enslaved from other causes, but not by the prowess of a large standing army.
If we are wise enough to preserve the United States we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us.
Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance.
Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security.
But if we should be disunited – and the integral parts should either remain separated – or should be thrown together into two or three confederacies (which is most probable) – in a short course of time we should be in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe – our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.
Hamilton
Federalist 9: Union Is a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
A FIRM UNION IS THE ULTIMATE BARRIER against the forces that would overwhelm the peace and liberty of the States.
Those forces – domestic faction, party rage, sedition and insurrection – led to a rapid succession of revolutions in the small republics of Greece and Italy.
Those same forces – aided by the vices of their governments – continually agitated and perverted the bright talents and exalted endowments for which these republics were otherwise justifiably renowned.
It is impossible to read their histories without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the petty distractions which kept them in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.
From the disorders of those republics, the advocates of despotism in America argue that all forms republican government – even the very principles of civil liberty – are inconsistent with the order of society.
Happily for mankind, the few glorious instances of governments founded on liberty refute their gloomy sophisms.
Modern Improvements to the Republican Form of Government Make It the Wisest Choice
If the enlightened friends of liberty who assembled at the Constitutional Convention believed they could not devise a more perfect republican structure, they would have abandoned that species of government as indefensible.
The science of politics, however, has received great improvement in modern times, as have most other sciences.
Principles which were unknown or imperfectly known to the ancients are now well understood.
Many new discoveries, or the perfection of old discoveries, include: the regular distribution of power into distinct departments, the introduction of legislative balances and checks, the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior, and the representation of the People in the legislature by deputies of their own election.
To this catalogue of improvements a new one may be added: the enlargement of the geographical orbit within which such systems revolve, either in a single states, or a consolidation of several smaller states into one great confederacy.
The utility of a confederacy is not really a new idea. It has been practiced in different countries and ages, in order to suppress faction, guard the internal tranquility of states, and increase external forces and security.
The most esteemed writers on the subject of politics have approved its use.
Principles which were unknown or imperfectly known to the ancients are now well understood. Many new discoveries, or the perfection of old discoveries, include: the regular distribution of power into distinct departments, the introduction of legislative balances and checks, the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior, and the representation of the People in the legislature by deputies of their own election.
Critics of a Large Republic Misread Montesquieu
The opponents of a united America have circulated the observations of the great Montesquieu to argue a republican government can succeed only in small geographical territories.
Their arguments are drawn from a selective reading of the author’s works and disregard the experiences of our own republican States – Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, and Georgia – all of which are larger than the republics Montesquieu considered.
If the critics of the United States are correct, we should either take refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or split ourselves into an infinity of tumultuous little commonwealths which would be the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord and the miserable objects of universal pity and contempt.
Some writers have even boldly suggested a division of even the larger States is desirable.
While such a desperate expedient might multiply the petty offices for individuals who possess no qualification to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue, it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the People of America.
Montesquieu does not stand in opposition to a general union of states, as the critics of union would falsely have us believe.
He explicitly treats a confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government to gain the internal advantages a republic and the external force of a monarchy.
A republic of this kind is able to withstand an external force, and support itself without any internal corruptions.
“If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority,” the author writes, “he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.”
The United States is a confederacy of States, and not a consolidation of States, as its misguided opponents have claimed.
The definition of a confederate republic is simply “an assemblage of societies,” or an association of two or more states into one state.
The Constitution makes each State government a constituent part of the national sovereignty, with direct representation in the Senate.
Exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power are left in the possession of the States.
This fully corresponds with the idea of a Federal government.
The objects, extent, and modifications of the Federal authority are merely matters of discretion. Under the Constitution, the separate organizations of the member States – though subordinate to the general authority of the union – continue to exist for local purposes.
If critics of the United States are correct, we should either take refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or split ourselves into an infinity of tumultuous little commonwealths which would be the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord and the miserable objects of universal pity and contempt.
In ancient Lycia, twenty-three republican cities joined in a confederacy governed by a common council.
The largest cites were entitled to three votes in the council, those of the middle to two, and the smallest to one.
The cities granted to the council the power to appoint all the judges and magistrates of the respective cities, even though the power to appoint its own officers is one which would seem exclusively appropriated to local jurisdictions.
Yet Montesquieu cites the Lycian confederacy as the finest republic to date.
From this we can see the critics of our union have misused Montesquieu to advance no more than novel refinements of their erroneous theories.
Hamilton
Federalist 10: Governments Are Formed to Protect Property Rights; a Republic Is Far Superior to a Democracy
ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES promised by a well-constructed Constitution is its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.
By “faction,” I mean a minority or majority of citizens who are united and motivated by some common impulse of passion or interest adverse either to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
Lessening the Instability, Injustice and Confusion Caused by Factions
Popular governments have perished everywhere from the mortal diseases of instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into their public councils by factions.
Even with the valuable improvements made by State constitutions on ancient and modern models, we still hear complaints that issues related to the public good are decided by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority rather than the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party.
These complaints – in some degree true – are chiefly the effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
Popular governments have perished everywhere from the mortal diseases of instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into their public councils by factions.
Different Human Aptitudes and Abilities Result in the Unequal Ownership of Property, which Leads to Factions
The creation or acquisition of property results from the diversity of human abilities and aptitudes sown into the nature of mankind.
The first object of government is to protect those differing faculties and skills.
Once a sovereign power extends physical protection to the different and unequal faculties of creating and acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results.
History has shown the most common and durable source of faction is the various and unequal distribution of property.
Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society.
Those who are creditors and those who are debtors fall under a like discrimination.
A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest – with many lesser interests – necessarily arise in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, motivated by different sentiments and views.
The influence of property ownership on the sentiments and views of their proprietors ensure a division of society into different interests and parties, which can become factions.
The regulation of these various and interfering interests is the principal task of modern legislation, and necessarily involves the spirit of party and faction in the ordinary operations of the government.
The Diversity of Human Interests Is Visible Everywhere
We see the expression of these differing interests everywhere, from the variety of opinions concerning government, religion and the like, to attachments to different leaders who ambitiously contend for preeminence and power, and to persons whose fortunes have interested human passions.
Mankind’s propensity to fall into mutual animosities is so strong that the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have sufficed to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts.
These interests have divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for the common good.
Mankind’s propensity to fall into mutual animosities is so strong that the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have sufficed to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts.
Factions Test Republics, and Can Control Governments
It is an ancient rule that no man shall be judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and probably corrupt his integrity.
Neither should a body of individuals be both judges and interested parties at the same time.
Yet what are legislative acts but so many judicial determinations concerning the rights of persons and large bodies of citizens?
Are not the different classes of legislators simply advocates and parties to the causes they determine?
If a law is proposed concerning private debts, the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them, yet the parties are – and must be – themselves the judges. The most numerous party – the most powerful faction – must be expected to prevail.
Even legislative acts which seem to require the most exact impartiality – such as the apportionment of taxes on property – can tempt the predominant party to trample the rules of justice.
Every penny by which they overburden the inferior number is a penny saved to their own pockets.
In cases where a faction consists of less than a majority, the republican principle of majority vote will defeat its sinister views by regular vote.
On the other hand, when the faction is in the majority, both the public good and the rights of other citizens will be sacrificed to the majority passion or interest.
The ultimate question is how to secure the public good and private rights against such a faction, while at the same time preserving the spirit and form of popular government.
Do Not Expect the Enlightened to Save the Day
It is vain to hope enlightened statesmen will adjust these clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good.
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.
Moreover, their equitable arguments rarely will prevail over the immediate interest one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
Democracies Have Never Possessed the Cure for Faction
A pure democracy – a society consisting of a small number of citizens who assemble and administer the government in person – can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.
In almost every case, a common passion or interest will be felt by a majority of the whole.
The form of government itself leads to a communication of the passion and the resulting concert of action.
There is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.
Democracies can devolve into rule by mob.
Democracies are incompatible with personal security or the rights of property.
They have forever been spectacles of turbulence and contention – usually as short in their lives as violent in their deaths.
Their histories prove wrong those theorists who suppose that reducing mankind to a perfect equality in political rights would perfectly equalize them in possessions, opinions, and passions.
The Only Cures for Factions Are Worse than the Disease
To remedy the mischiefs of faction, we must either remove its causes or control its effects.
As I will show, the causes cannot be removed, only the effects lessened.
It is impossible to eradicate factions without also destroying the liberty that allows them to exist, or requiring every citizen to share the same passions and interests.
Destroying liberty is as unwise as forcing everyone to think alike is impractical.
In scientific terms, the idea that liberty should be extinguished in order to prevent the creation of factions is as foolish as annihilating the air we breathe because it imparts to fire a destructive agency.
As for uniformity of opinion, so long as the reason of man continues to prove fallible – and he is at liberty to exercise it – different opinions will be formed.
As for uniformity of interests, the natural and acquired abilities of humans – from which property rights originate – erect an impenetrable barrier to its attainment.
Human interests will never be uniform, nor will ownership of property.
It is impossible to eradicate factions without also destroying the liberty that allows them to exist, or requiring every citizen to share the same passions and interests. Destroying liberty is as unwise as forcing everyone to think alike is impractical.
The Only Relief from Faction Is to Limit its Effects Through Representative Government
There are two ways to manage factions, but only one will succeed.
The first is to prevent the same passion or interest from ever forming a majority.
The second is to prevent the majority from executing its schemes of oppression.
To those who think the second option might suffice – blocking the execution of an oppressive scheme – it is well known that neither morals nor religion can reliably control the injustice and violence of individuals – let alone groups – should the impulse to passion and the opportunity to execute it be suffered to coincide.
That leaves the first option – preventing the same passion or interest from forming a majority – which is best accomplished through a republic in which the scheme of representation occurs.
Compared to the passion of a democracy, the first great difference is that the citizens of a republic delegate control of the government to a small number of citizens elected by the rest.
The second is that a republic may be extended over a far greater sphere of country and citizens than a democracy.
Representation Positively Refines and Enlarges the Viewpoints of the Representative and Represented Alike
The election of representatives refine and enlarges the People’s views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens.
The collective wisdom of the representatives is best able discern the true interests of the country.
Their patriotism and love of justice should render them the least likely to sacrifice those ideals based on temporary conditions or a predisposition to favor one interest over another.
So regulated, the public voice will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the People themselves, should they be convened to decide a particular question.
The Proper Size of a Representative Body Lies Between Extremes
Representative government creates the risk that individuals of factious tempers, local prejudices, or sinister designs might first obtain the votes of the citizens through intrigue, corruption or other means, and then betray those electors.
Consequently, no matter how small a republic may be, its representatives must be raised to a certain number in order to guard against the cabals of a few.
Conversely, no matter how large its size, the representatives must be limited to a certain number in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude.
Deciding on the correct number of representatives does present obstacles.
If the number of electors for an office is too large, the representatives will be too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests.
If the number of electors is too small, representatives will be unduly attached to local circumstances and interests.
The Constitution is a happy compromise of these extremes: the great and aggregate interests are referred to the Federal legislature, and the local and particular interests to the State legislatures.
The Larger the Republic, the Larger the Number of Suitable Candidates Available to the Electors
The number of potential suitable representatives should be greater in a large republic, thereby increasing the probability of a fit choice for office.
This circumstance will make it more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice successfully the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried.
The votes of the People – being less influenced by such arts – will more likely center on the individuals who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
A large republic with more citizens and territory renders factious combinations less likely than in a democracy.
A Large Republic Provides a Better Guard Against Factions than a Small Republic, or a Democracy of Any Size
A large republic with more citizens and territory renders factious combinations less likely than in a democracy.
A small society is more likely composed of fewer distinct parties and interests.
The fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently the majority will be of the same party. The representatives – being fewer in number – can more easily work in concert to execute their plans of oppression.
By contrast, a large republic – having a greater geographical sphere and larger number of citizens – will likely include a greater variety of parties and interests.
This will reduce the probability that a majority of the electors will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.
And if such a common motive did exist, those who felt its strength would have difficulty communicating it to and acting in unison with others, since the communication of a consciously unjust or dishonorable purpose is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
The advantage a republic has over a democracy in controlling the effects of faction is the same as one enjoyed by a large over a small republic.
Another advantage of a republic consists in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments should render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice.
Yet another advantage will be the increased number of parties, which afford security against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest.
Finally, a republic will erect greater obstacles to the execution of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority.
Democracies are incompatible with personal security or the rights of property. They have forever been spectacles of turbulence and contention – usually as short in their lives as violent in their deaths. Their histories prove wrong those theorists who suppose that reducing mankind to a perfect equality in political rights would perfectly equalize them in possessions, opinions, and passions.
Factions Originate Locally, and Republican Government Is Best-Suited to Prevent their Spread Nationally
While factious leaders may from time to time kindle a flame within their particular States, they will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States.
A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in one part of the United States, but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it will secure the Federal government against any danger from that source.
A rage for paper money, an abolition of debts, an unequal division of property – or any other improper or wicked project – will be less apt to pervade the whole body of States than a particular member of it, in the same way such maladies are more likely to infect a particular county or district than an entire State.
Thus in size and proper structure of the United States do we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.
Madison
Federalist 11: A Unified Country Is the Wisest Choice for Protecting Our Trade from Foreign Interference
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES to foster and improve commerce among the several States is indisputable.
The same is true for our commercial intercourse with foreign countries.
The commercial character of the United States has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe.
They are apprehensive that our union will interfere with their carry of trade, which supports their navigation and naval strength.
Those countries with colonies in America foresee the dangers to their American dominions from United States, which would have the disposition and means to create a powerful marine.
The cabinet ministers of Europe already have in place policies designed to foster divisions among us, and to deprive us of an active commerce with our own ships.
By dividing us, they seek to prevent our interference in their navigation, monopolize the profits of our trade, and clip the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness.
Methods to Counter Foreign Interference
If we continue united, we may counteract these unfriendly policies in a variety of ways.
By prohibitory regulations, we would oblige foreign countries to bid against each other for the privileges of our growing markets.
Any manufacturing nation would discern the immense difference between using its own ships to trade directly with our union and the indirect conveyance of its products and returns to and from the United States in the ships of another country.
If we excluded Great Britain from our ports, would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom?
Some have responded that such a prohibition on our part would produce no change in the system of Britain, because she could prosecute her trade with us through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immediate customers and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for the supply of our markets.
But would not her navigation be materially injured by the loss of the important advantage of being her own carrier in that trade?
Would not the principal part of its profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and risk?
Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable deduction?
The price of British commodities in our markets would increase, and facilitate competition from other nations by transferring to other hands the management of British commerce.
The cabinet ministers of Europe already have in place policies designed to foster divisions among us, and to deprive us of an active commerce with our own ships. By dividing us, they seek to prevent our interference in their navigation, monopolize the profits of our trade, and clip the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness.
The real disadvantages to Britain from such a state of things – together with the predispositions of its inhabitants in favor of trade with the United States, as well as the needs of its colonies in the West India islands – would relax her present system let us enjoy privileges in the markets of those islands and elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the most substantial benefits.
To gain such a point from the British government, of course, could not be expected without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our markets.
It would, however, improve the conduct of other nations, who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.
Monroe Doctrine Suggested
The establishment of a Federal navy would further improve the conduct of European nations toward our trade.
The continuance of the Union under an efficient Federal government would soon put in our power the ability to create a navy which – if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers – would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties.
This would be particularly true in the West Indies, where a few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign.
Our position in this respect is a most commanding one.
If we add the usefulness of supplies from this country to the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies, we could bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges.
A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality.
By a steady adherence to the Union we may hope soon to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate.
Should we fail to remain united, our commerce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each other, who, having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple or remorse, supply their wants by depredations on our property as often as it fell in their way.
The rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power.
A nation that is despicable by its weakness forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.
Under a vigorous Federal government, the natural strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth.
An active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the offspring of moral and physical necessity.
We might defy the little arts of little politicians to control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature.
Without a union, powerful maritime nations would avail themselves of our universal impotence to prescribe the conditions of our political existence, since they have a common interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing our becoming theirs.
We would be confined to a passive commerce, compelled to content ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich our enemies and persecutors.
That unequaled and inexhaustible American spirit of enterprise, exemplified by the genius of our merchants and navigators, would be stifled and lost, and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with wisdom, might make herself the admiration and envy of the world.
Due to the length of her superiority, Europe has plumed herself the Mistress of the World. She considers the rest of mankind as created for her benefit.
Our nation holds rights to coastal fisheries and navigation of the Great Lakes and Mississippi.
If the Union is dissolved, these rights would be open to question, and the European powers would hardly fail to solve those questions to our disadvantage.
The rights of fishing and navigation are important to all navigating States, and would be more so with a greater extension of mercantile capital.
The navigating States are a nursery of seamen, who in turn are indispensable to the establishment of a navy.
Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the quantity and extent of the means concerted towards the formation and support of a navy.
A navy of the United States – established from the resources of all – is far less remote than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy.
Each region of America will contribute its own part. The more southern States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval stores – tar, pitch, and turpentine – as well as wood of a more solid and durable texture. Iron from the southern and middle States is plentiful and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn from the northern hive.
The necessity of naval protection to external or maritime commerce requires no elucidation.
Similarly, the success of maritime commerce is conducive to the prosperity of a navy.
An unrestrained intercourse of trade between the States will advance the trade of each; first, by an interchange of their respective productions for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, and second, for export to foreign markets.
The diversity in the production of different States will give commercial enterprise a much greater scope, from the diversity in the productions of different States.
When the staple of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of another.
The variety of products for export contributes as much as does their value to the activity of foreign commerce.
Much better terms can be had with a large number of materials of a given value than with a small number of materials of the same value.
Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods and unsalable at others.
The greater the variety of articles available for export, the lesser the chance the operations of merchants would stagnate.
The speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these observations.
A union is far more likely to command a fair price for its goods than single State or partial confederacy.
Some might argue that an intimate intercourse between the States would exist with or without a union, thus achieving the same ends.
To this we believe these papers show that such intercourse would be fettered, interrupted and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes.
A unity of commercial and political interests can result only from a unity of government.
The Hubris of Europe
Our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs.
At present, the world is divided politically and geographically into four parts – Europe, Africa, Asia, and America – each having a distinct set of interests.
Unhappily for the other three, Europe – by her arms and negotiations, by force and fraud – has by degrees extended her dominion over them all.
Africa, Asia, and America have successively felt her domination.
Due to the length of her superiority, Europe has plumed herself the Mistress of the World.
She considers the rest of mankind as created for her benefit.
Some philosophers actually have attributed to Europe’s inhabitants a physical superiority, and seriously asserted that all animals – and with them the human species – degenerate in America – so that even dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.
Unfortunately, the facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions.
Therefore it falls to America to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach moderation to our pretentious European brethren.
A Federal union will enable us to do it.
Disunion will add another victim to Europe’s triumphs.
Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness!
Let the thirteen States – bound together in a strict and indissoluble union – concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old world the new one!
Hamilton
Federalist 12: The Union Will Increase Commerce and Therefore Taxes
THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED STATES will increase the commercial prosperity of the States and revenues to their governments.
The prosperity of commerce is the most useful and productive source of national wealth.
The introduction and circulation of precious metals – those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise – invigorate the channels of industry.
The assiduous merchant, the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious manufacturer – all orders of individuals – look forward with eager expectation to this pleasing reward of their toils.
Experience demonstrates the interest of agriculture and commerce are intimately blended and interwoven.
Where commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And how could it have happened otherwise?
Commerce procures a freer vent for the products of the earth, and incites the cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument in increasing the quantity of money in a state.
The value of land, in turn, is augmented by labor and industry. It is astonishing that so simple a truth should ever have had an adversary.
It is but one example of how a spirit of ill-informed jealousy – or one of too great abstraction and refinement – can lead humans astray from the plainest truths of reason and conviction.
The ability of a country to pay taxes must in great degree be proportioned to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the celerity with which it circulates.
Since commerce contributes to both these objects, it necessarily renders the payment of taxes easier, to the benefit of the public treasury.
Wealth without Commerce Reduces Tax Revenue
The hereditary dominions of the emperor of Germany consist of a fertile, cultivated, and populous territory, largely situated in mild climates, and with some of best gold and silver mines in Europe. And yet revenues are slender due to a lack of commerce, resulting in borrowing from foreigners to preserve his essential interests, and an inability to sustain a long or continued war upon the strength of his own resources.
Experience demonstrates the interest of agriculture and commerce are intimately blended and interwoven. Where commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And how could it have happened otherwise? Commerce procures a freer vent for the products of the earth, and incites the cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument in increasing the quantity of money in a state.
From experience we have discovered it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation.
Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uniformly disappointed; and the treasuries of the States have remained empty.
Even in Britain, direct taxation is far exceeded by revenue of the indirect kind, such as imposts and excises, particularly duties on imported articles.
In America, revenue must depend chiefly on import duties.
Other excise taxes – which are imposed on a step in the production, manufacture, sale or distribution of goods – must be confined within a narrow compass in most parts of the country, since the genius of the People will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws.
Impositions on houses and lands will yield but scanty supplies from the reluctant pockets of farmers. Personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any other way than by the imperceptible agency of taxes on consumption.
A general union, being conducive to the interests of commerce, would tend to the extension of revenue drawn from that source, and contribute to rendering regulations for the collection of the duties more simple and efficacious.
In making the same rate of duties more productive, governments would have the power to increase the rate without prejudice to trade.
To mitigate such trade, separate States or confederacies would forced to lower their duties.
The temper of our governments would not likely countenance the rigorous precautions by which European nations guard the avenues of land and water into their respective countries, and which, even there, are found insufficient obstacles to the adventurous stratagems of avarice.
In the absence of a union of States, a conspiracy of circumstances – the number of our rivers and bays, the facility of communication in every direction, the affinity of language and manners, and the familiar habits of intercourse – would render an illicit trade between the States a matter of little difficulty, and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations of each other.
Wisely Guarding Our Coastlines Is Our Best Defense against Smugglers
In France, there is an army of patrols constantly employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the dealers in contraband trade. Without a union, the States would be placed in a situation resembling that of France with respect to her neighbors, and armed patrols would necessarily arise. The arbitrary and vexatious powers of such patrols would be intolerable in a free country.
With a union, we would have but to guard our coastlines, principally the Atlantic coast, which touches only one side of the union.
Foreign vessels would rarely choose to hazard transferring valuable cargoes prior to entering port. hey would dread the dangers of the coast and of detection upon entry.
A few armed vessels – judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports – might at a small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws.
Since a Federal government would have the same interest to prevent violations everywhere, uniform application of its measures in each State would render them effectual.
By preserving the United States, we also preserve the advantage of geographical separation natural has accorded us.
The United States lies at a great distance from Europe, and a considerable distance from all other areas with which we might have extensive foreign trade. It would be impractical to smuggle goods from these areas in a few hours or a single night, as happens between the coasts of France and Britain. This is a prodigious security against a direct contraband with foreign countries.
Without a union, a circuitous contraband to one State through the medium of another would be both easy and safe.
The difference between a direct importation from abroad, and an indirect importation in small parcels through the channel of a neighboring State – according to time and opportunity, with the additional facilities of inland communication – must be palpable to everyone of discernment.
Duties on Imports Are a Sound Basis for Federal Revenue and Ought Not Be Neglected
A single Federal government would be able to extend the duties on imports, at much less expense, than would be practicable by separate States or partial confederacies.
Hitherto these State duties have not exceeded three percent on average. In France they average fifteen per cent, and in Britain twenty percent.
Thus, the United States reasonably could triple existing import duties of the several States.
The Federal regulation of a single article – ardent spirits – would furnish a considerable revenue. Four million gallons are imported annually. A duty of a shilling per gallon would produce revenue of two hundred thousand pounds. Liquor would well bear this duty, and if the duty diminishes consumption, the effect would be equally favorable to the agriculture, economy, morals, and health of society. There is nothing so much a subject of national extravagance as these spirits.
What will be the consequences of not availing ourselves of these sources of revenue?
A nation cannot long exist without revenue.
Destitute of this essential support, it must resign its independence and sink into the degraded condition of a province.
This is an extremity to which no government will of choice accede. Revenue, therefore, must be had at all events.
Taxes on Commerce Must Be the Principal Source of Federal Revenue
In the United States, if the principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon land.
Excise taxes are too little in unison with the feelings of the People to admit of great use. Indeed, in the States where almost the sole employment is agriculture, the objects proper for excise are insufficiently numerous to permit very ample collections in that way.
Personal property, due to the difficulty in tracing it, cannot be subjected to large contributions, except by indirect taxes on consumption.
In populous cities, perhaps, personal property taxes may more easily be collected – to the oppression of individuals – but beyond these circles, it will largely escape the eye and hand of the tax gatherer.
This leaves the possessors of land as the principal source of revenue for the public treasury.
Without having other sources of revenue available to maintain the government, we shall not even have the consolation of a full treasury to atone for the oppression of that valuable class of the citizens employed in cultivation of the soil.
Public and private distress will keep pace with each other in gloomy concert; and unite in deploring the infatuation of those counsels which led to disunion.
Taxation is discussed in greater detail in Federalist 30 through Federalist 36.
Hamilton
Federalist 13: Our National Economy Will Prosper with Union
HE SEPARATION OF THE STATES into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates.
Having just discussed the revenue of the Federal government, we now turn to economy.
The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, with so much the less drawn from the pockets of the People.
The States united under one government would have but one national civil list to support.
If they are divided in each to several confederacies, there would be as many different national civil lists to be provided for, and each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive with that which would be necessary for a government of the whole.
Those who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire generally envisage three confederacies – one consisting of the four northern States, another of the four middle States, and a third of the five southern States.
According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than the kingdom of Great Britain.
Proper regulation of each confederacy would require a government as comprehensive in its organs and institutions as that of the Federal government, for when the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the same forms of administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent.
By comparison, the measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the government of the United States – properly organized and exerted – would be capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent, and reproducing itself in every part of a great empire by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.
Each imagined confederacy would require a government not less comprehensive than the government of the United States, particularly if we consider that in case of disunion they will most naturally league themselves under two governments.
New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, having active foreign commerce, would ally with the northern confederacy.
The more southern States, from various circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in the encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system which would give unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well as the purchasers of their commodities.
Each imagined confederacy would require a government not less comprehensive than the government of the United States, particularly if we consider that in case of disunion they will most naturally league themselves under two governments.
The thirteen States if united will be able to support a national government better than one half, or one third, or any number less than the whole.
Aside from requiring multiple civil lists, separate confederacies will require additional personnel, both to guard the inland communication between the different confederacies against illicit trade, and to collect taxes.
If we also take into view the military establishments which would unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts of the several confederacies, we discover that separation would be more injurious to the economy, tranquility, commerce, revenue, and liberty of every part.
Hamilton
Federalist 14: The Geographical Size of the United States Is No Detriment to Union
THE UNION OF THE UNITED STATES will be our bulwark against foreign danger, conservator of peace among ourselves, guardian of our commerce and other common interests, and as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World.
Union is the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming symptoms are present in our own.
All that remains within this branch of our inquiries is to take notice of an objection that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the union embraces.
A few observations on this subject are proper to refute this objection, which is based on prejudice rather than fact.
The error of the objection results from confusing a republic with a democracy.
In a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents.
A democracy must be confined to a small spot, while a republic may be extended over a large region.
Union is the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming symptoms are present in our own.
To this confusion may be added the error of some celebrated authors whose writings informed the modern standard of political opinions.
Since the subjects these authors studied were either absolute or limited monarchies, they endeavored to heighten the advantages – or palliate the evils of monarchical forms – by identifying the vices and defects of republican government, but citing as specimens the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy.
Their conclusions – republics can only be established among a small number of people living within a small compass of territory – are applicable to democracies only.
The natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand, and will include no greater number than can join in those functions.
So too the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the center which will barely allow the representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of public affairs.
Can it be said that the limits of the United States exceed this distance?
The size of the United States is commensurate with several European countries.
At present it is not a great deal larger than Germany, where a diet representing the whole empire is continually assembled; or than Poland before the late dismemberment, where another national diet was the depositary of the supreme power.
In Great Britain, the representatives of the northern extremity of the island have as far to travel to the national council as will be required of those of the most remote parts of the present United States.
Additional observations further ameliorate the objection based on the physical size of the union.
In the first place, the Federal government is not charged with the whole power of making and administering laws.
Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any.
The subordinate State governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity.
A second observation, concerning expansion, is that the immediate object of the Federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen original States, which we know to be practicable.
Further discoveries and experience will render the addition of new States equally practicable.
In the first place, the Federal government is not charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any.
In the third place, intercourse throughout the union will be facilitated by new improvements.
Roads will everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for travelers multiplied and ameliorated; and interior navigation on our eastern side opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the thirteen States, as demonstrated by those numerous canals which nature’s beneficence has intersected our country, and which are not difficult to connect and complete.
A fourth and still more important consideration is that those distant States bordering foreign nations should be willing to exchange the burden of traveling to the capital for the general protection of the union, of which they will have the greatest need.
Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you the People of America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family, nor continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness, nor be fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire.
Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you the form of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish.
No, my countrymen, shut your ears against this unhallowed language, and shut your hearts against the poison it conveys.
Madison
Federalist 15-22: Insufficiency of the Articles of Confederation