Federalist 27:  A Properly Administered Federal Government Will Not Require Force to Execute Its Laws

SOME HAVE ARGUED THE CONSTITUTION CANNOT OPERATE without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. The argument most likely originates in the assumption the People will be disinclined to the exercise of Federal authority on any internal State matter. 

Why should we presuppose the People will be disinclined to the exercise of Federal power on internal State issues? Unless we presume the powers of the Federal government will be worse administered than those of the State governments, we should not presume the People’s ill-will, disaffection, or opposition. As a general rule, the People’s confidence in and obedience to the Federal government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration.  

We should not presuppose the Federal government will be worse administered than State governments.  Consider first the Senate of the United States, which will be comprised of individuals selected by the State legislatures, whose members themselves are composed of individuals selected by the People. The extension of the spheres of election will present a greater latitude of choice to the People.  If we should presuppose anything, it would be the Senate will be composed with peculiar care and judgment, with the promise of greater knowledge and more extensive information in the national councils.  As a result, the Senate would be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction. It would be more out of the reach of those occasional ill-humors or temporary prejudices and propensities which – in smaller societies –  frequently contaminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of the community, and engender schemes which – though they gratify a momentary inclination or desire – terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust.  

Unless someone can advance reasons why the Federal government will be so maladministered as to render it odious or contemptible to the People, the laws of the United States will neither meet with obstruction from the People, nor stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution than the laws of the particular States. 

Extending Federal Law to Individuals Will Strengthen the United States 

The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition, and the dread of punishment is a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the Federal government – possessed of a due degree of power which can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole country – be more likely to repress the hope of impunity and to inspire the dread of punishment – than that of a single State, which can only command the resources within herself?  

A turbulent faction within a State might suppose itself able to contend with the opposition of the friends of the government in that State. Yet such a faction can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the United States. If this be true, it also is true that irregular combinations of individuals opposed to the authority of the United States will pose less resistance to that authority than that of a single State. 

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The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition, and the dread of punishment is a proportionably strong discouragement to it.

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The more that the operations of the Federal government are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of State governments, the more the People will be accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life. The more the Federal Government is familiarized to the sight and feelings of the People – and the more it acts sensibly and puts in motion the most active springs of the human heart – the greater the probability it will earn the respect and attachment of the People.  

Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses will generally little influence his mind. A Federal government continually at a distance and out of sight will little interest the sensations of the People. The authority of the Federal government – and the affections of the People towards it – will be strengthened by its extension to internal State matters. The Federal government will have less occasion to resort to force in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency.  The more the Federal government circulates through those channels and currents in which the passions of the People naturally flow, the less will it require the perilous expedient of violent compulsion.

One thing is certain. The Federal government as set forth in the Constitution will be less likely to need force to enforce the laws of the United States than a Federal authority which only operates on States in their political or collective capacities as States. As I explained in Federalist 15, in that type of league, the only sanction for disobedience of Federal law is force. Frequent delinquencies of the States would be the natural offspring of the very frame of the government.  As often as they happen, the only redress – if any – would be by violence and war. 

Extending the authority of the Federal government to the individual citizens of the several States will enable it to employ the ordinary administration of each State in the execution of its laws. In practice this will destroy all distinctions between the sources of governmental power. It will give the Federal government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority now enjoyed by the government of each State. In addition to this influence on public opinion, the Federal government will benefit from the public knowledge that it has the power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the entire United States.  

The laws of the United States will become the supreme law of the land as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction.  Every State officer – whether legislative, executive, or judicial – will be bound by the sanctity of oath to uphold those laws. All State legislatures, courts, and officers will be incorporated into the operations of the Federal government – as far as its just and constitutional authority extends – and thus be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws. To those who argue this will tend to the destruction of the State governments, Federalist 41 and Federalist 44 give a complete reply.

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Extending the authority of the Federal government to the individual citizens of the several States will enable it to employ the ordinary administration of each State in the execution of its laws.  In practice this will destroy all distinctions between the sources of governmental power.

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Anyone honestly reflecting on these circumstances will perceive the laws of the United States will be peacefully executed if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence.  If those laws be injudiciously administered, the best government that ever was or ever will be would provoke and precipitate the People into the wildest excesses. The adversaries of the Constitution presumed that the Federal rulers would be insensitive to the motives of public good or to the obligations of duty.  To them I would ask:  how can the interests of ambition or the views of encroachment be promoted by such a conduct?

Hamiltonoriginal Federalist 27