In Federalist 3, I explained why a Federal government would best secure the safety of the People against the dangers to which they would be exposed in the event a just cause for war was given to other nations.
With a Federal government, not only would just cause be more rarely given, but if given, more easily accommodated than by individual State governments or confederacies of States.
The safety of the People of America against dangers from foreign force depends not only on their forbearing to give just causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to invite hostility or insult, since it is obvious there are pretended causes of war as well.
It is too true – however disgraceful it may be to human nature – that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it.
And absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, other than for purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.
These and a variety of other motives affecting only the mind of the sovereign – especially an absolute sovereign – often lead such persons to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of the People.
Independently of these inducements to war, there are others which affect nations as often as monarchies, and which can grow out of relative situation and circumstances.
Commercial Rivalries Are Inducements to War
We are rivals with Britain, France and other European nations in navigation and the carrying trade. For instance, we can supply the markets of France and Britain with fish more cheaply than they can themselves, even with their duties on foreign fish. We shall deceive ourselves if we suppose any of them will rejoice to see our trade flourish, since our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing theirs. Thus it will be in their interest to adopt policies to restrain our trade rather than promote it.
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It is too true – however disgraceful it may be to human nature – that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it.
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In the trade to China and India, we now have advantages which they had monopolized, by supplying ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase from them. And the extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any nation which possesses territory on or near this continent. Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other. Both nations also restrict use of the ocean between them and us in order to control mutual intercourse and traffic. It is easy to see how jealousy and uneasiness may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations. We should not expect they will regard with indifference and composure the advancement of our union in power and consequence by use of land and sea.
The value and excellence of our productions, the enterprise of our merchants and navigators, and the circumstance of vicinity give us a greater share in the advantages afforded by those territories, thereby interfering with the wishes or policy of these other sovereigns.
A Single Federal Government Provides Greater Strength, Safety, and Uniformity of Policy and Action with Respect to Other Nations
The People of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of the circumstances described above, as well as from others not so obvious at present. Whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting. A Federal government will tend to repress and discourage these pretenses for war rather than inviting them. This is the best possible state of defense, and it necessarily depends on the unity of the government, arms, and resources of the entire country.
One Federal government is better than one composed of any number of States or confederacies. One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest individuals, in whatever part of the United States they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and also extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with the whole.
State Militias Under Presidential Control Will Be More Uniform
A Federal government can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies could possibly do, due to their want of unity and concert of system. It also will place the State militias under one plan of discipline and – by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the President – consolidate them into one corps, thereby rendering them more efficient than if divided into thirteen State militias or three or four militias of separate confederacies.
The British Example of Unified Militias
The case of Great Britain proves the point. What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales? In the event of invasion, would those three governments be able – if they agreed at all – to operate with all their respective forces against the enemy so effectually as the single government of Britain?
The same is true of the British fleet. We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come when the fleets of America engage their attention. If the national government had not so regulated the navigation of the constituent parts of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen – nor called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets – their prowess and thunder would never have been celebrated. If England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland had their own fleets under four independent governments, it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.
Dividing the United States Will Result in Weakness and Uncertainty
If America is divided into any number of States or confederacies, what armies could they raise and pay, and what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would another spend its blood and money for the defense of another?
It is far more likely these other States or confederacies would remain neutral, whether through the flattery of specious promises offered by the aggressor, the seduction of an untoward fondness for peace, or the jealousy to see their neighbor diminished. Such conduct, though unwise, would nevertheless be natural. The history of the states of Greece and other countries abounds with such events. What has so often happened before would – under similar circumstances here – happen again.
Even if we assume a neighbor might be willing to help the invaded State or confederacy, how, when, and in what proportion would the aids of money and men be afforded? Who would command the allied armies, and from which States shall he receive his orders? Who would settle the terms of peace, and what umpire shall decide disputes between them and compel acquiescence?
Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation. One national government, by contrast, would be free from all these embarrassments, and be far more conducive to the safety of the People by watching over the general and common interests and combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole.
Other Nations Will See Our Situation for What It Is
One thing is certain: whatever our situation – whether firmly united under one national government or split into a number of confederacies – foreign nations will see it exactly as it is, and they will act toward us accordingly.
If they see that our Federal government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militias properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, and our People free, united and contented, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment.
On the other hand, what a poor and pitiful figure would America be in their eyes if they should find us either destitute of an effectual government – with each State doing right or wrong as its rulers may deem convenient – or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies – with one inclining to Britain, another to France, a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three.
These confederacies would become liable to their contempt, and then their outrage. The costly experience would prove again that when a People or family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.
In Federalist 5, I explain why a divided America would be more prone to foreign influence and strife.