Federalist 20: The Confederacy of the United Netherlands
Federalist 20: The Confederacy of the United Netherlands
THE FINAL CONFEDERATION resembling the United States is the present-day United Netherlands. Its contemporary lessons confirm those derived from those confederacies we have already reviewed.
United Netherlands
United Netherlands is a confederacy of republics (or more precisely aristocracies) consisting of seven coequal and sovereign states. Each state (or province) is composed of equal and independent cities. The union requires that the states to be unanimous, and in important cases, the cities also must be unanimous. The sovereignty of the union is represented by the States-General, consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces. Some hold their seats for life, others for six, three, or one year terms, and in two provinces their appointment is at will.
The Legislative Authority in the United Netherlands
The States-General has authority to enter into treaties and alliances, make war and peace, raise armies and equip fleets, ascertain quotas, and demand contributions. In all these cases, unanimity and the sanction of their lesser constituents are requisite. The States-General also has authority to appoint and receive ambassadors, execute treaties and alliances already formed, provide for the collection of duties on imports and exports, regulate the mint, and to govern as sovereigns their dependent territories. Unless given general consent, the provinces are restrained from entering into foreign treaties, establishing imposts injurious to others, or charging their neighbors with higher duties than their own subjects. The federal administration is aided and fortified by a council of state and a chamber of accounts, with five colleges of admiralty.
The Executive Authority in the United Netherlands
The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now a hereditary prince. His weight and influence in the republic are derived in part from this independent title, his great patrimonial estates, and his family connections with some of the chief potentates of Europe. Perhaps most important, however, is his status as stadtholder in the several provinces. As provincial stadtholder, he appoints town magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and controls the power of pardon.
His prerogatives as stadtholder of the union are also considerable. In his political capacity, he has authority to settle disputes between the provinces when other methods fail, assist at the deliberations of the States-General and their particular conferences, give audiences to foreign ambassadors, and keep agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts.
In his military capacity, he commands the federal troops, provides for garrisons, disposes of all appointments from colonel to ensign, selects the governments and posts of fortified towns, and generally regulates military affairs.
In his marine capacity (as admiral-general), he superintends and directs everything relative to naval forces and other naval affairs, presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy, appoints lieutenant-admirals and other officers, and establishes councils of war, whose sentences are not executed until he approves them.
His revenue (exclusive of his private income) amounts to 300,000 florins. The standing army which he commands consists of about 40,000 men.
The United Netherlands in Practice
Such is the nature of the celebrated union on parchment. What are the characters which practice has stamped upon it? Imbecility in the government; discord among the provinces, foreign influence and indignities, a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from war.
The esteemed Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius remarked long ago that nothing but the hatred of his countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being ruined by the vices of their constitution. Another respectable writer observed the union reposes in the States-General an authority seemingly sufficient to secure harmony, but that the practice is very different from the theory due to the jealousies in each province. The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy certain contributions, but that this article will probably never be executed because the inland provinces cannot pay an equal quota on account of insufficient commerce.
It is the practice to waive the articles of the constitution in matters of contribution. The danger of delay obliges the consenting provinces to furnish their quotas without waiting for the others, and then to obtain reimbursement from the others by deputations (which are frequent) or otherwise, as they can. The great wealth and influence of the province of Holland has enabled her to do both. More than once were the deficiencies ultimately collected at the point of the bayonet. This is only possible in a confederacy where the force of one of the members exceeds all the rest, and where several of them are too small to meditate resistance. It is utterly impracticable in a confederacy in which several of the members are equal to each other in strength and resources, and equal singly to a vigorous and persevering defense.
Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple (who was himself a foreign minister), elude matters subject to finalization of details, by tampering with the provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these means a whole year. Instances of a like nature are numerous and notorious.
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Tyranny more often grows out of the demand for and assumption of power not authorized by a constitution – usually to respond to a pressing exigency – than from the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.
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In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled to overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a treaty of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia, in 1648 – by which their independence was formerly and finally recognized – was concluded without the consent of Zealand. Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with Great Britain, the States-General departed from the constitutional principle of unanimity.
A weak constitution necessarily terminates in dissolution, either from want of proper powers, or usurpation of the powers requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation of powers – when once begun – will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, depends on the contingencies of the moment. Tyranny more often grows out of the demand for and assumption of power not authorized by a constitution – usually to respond to a pressing exigency – than from the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.
The calamities just discussed have been produced as well as ameliorated by the stadtholdership. Without his influence in the individual provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would long ago have dissolved it. “Under such a government,” says the Abbé de Mably, “the Union could never have subsisted, if the provinces had not a spring within themselves, capable of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them to the same way of thinking. This spring is the stadtholder.” During intermissions of the of the stadtholdership, Sir William Temple reports, Holland assumed the role “by her riches and her authority, which drew the others into a sort of dependence.”
In addition to the stadtholder, the strength of the surrounding powers has lessened the tendency to anarchy and dissolution, and practically imposed an absolute necessity of union. At the same time, by their intrigues these powers nourish the constitutional vices which keep the republic in some degree always at their mercy.
The true patriots of the United Netherlands have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices and sought to remedy them. They conceived a design to establish a general tax to be administered by the federal authority, but its adversaries defeated it. In no less than four instances, these patriots convened extraordinary assemblies for the special purpose of reforming the known, acknowledged, and fatal evils of the existing constitution. In as many instances has their laudable zeal found it impossible to unite the public councils.
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Experience is the oracle of truth. Where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The important truths history unequivocally pronounces in the present case are these:
a sovereignty over sovereigns,
a government over governments,
and a legislation for communities
– as contradistinguished from legislation for individuals –
are subversive of the order and ends of civil polity. Ultimately they substitute violence in place of law.
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These unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions, dissensions among the states, and the actual invasion of foreign arms – which are crises destined by their defective constitution. All nations have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle. The first wish of humanity is this severe trial will cause such a revolution of their government so as to establish a union that will be the parent of tranquility, freedom, and happiness. The next wish is the asylum under which the enjoyment of these blessings will speedily be secured in this country, to receive and console them for the catastrophe of their own. The melancholy lesson of the United Netherlands causes a tear to drop for the calamities brought on mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish passions. In contrast, we are grateful for the propitious concord which distinguished the consultations for political happiness our own representatives recently concluded.
The Laws of a Federal Government Must Be Directed Towards Its Citizens as Individuals
I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth. Where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The important truths history unequivocally pronounces in the present case are these: a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, and legislation for communities – as contradistinguished from legislation for individuals – are subversive of the order and ends of civil polity. Ultimately they substitute violence in place of law. To replace the destructive coercion of the sword with the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy, the objects of the powers of the sovereign government must be individuals, not fellow sovereigns, governments, or communities.
Madison with the assistance of Hamilton original Federalist 20