Federalist 26: The Constitution’s Biennial Review of Standing Armies Is Salutary
The Balance of Power and Privilege
IT WAS HARDLY TO BE EXPECTED that the minds of individuals inspired by our popular revolution would stop at that happy median that combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. There is a salutary yet delicate boundary between power and privilege that can give rise to difficulties. Unless resolved as to standing armies, we will travel from one chimerical project to another, marking change upon change, but without any material change for the better.
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Those who would restrict the Congress will combat the general consensus of America. Instead of learning from experience – which counsels avoidance of extremes – the opponents of congressional authority would conduct us into more dangerous and extravagant extremities.
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The idea of restraining the authority of Congress to provide for the national defense originates in a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. It found support only in Pennsylvania and North Carolina. Every other State refused to give it the least countenance – wisely judging that the very act of delegating power requires we place confidence somewhere – and it is better to hazard an abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic restrictions on the legislative authority.
Those who would restrict the Congress will combat the general consensus of America. Instead of learning from experience – which counsels avoidance of extremes – the opponents of congressional authority would conduct us into more dangerous and extravagant extremities.
The doctrines they propound are calculated to induce us to depress or relax the tone of government by expedients that were condemned or forborne on other occasions. But the citizens of America have too much discernment to be argued into anarchy. Experience has wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind that greater energy of government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the community.
Historical Restrictions on Funding Standing Armies Were Directed Principally at Hereditary Monarchs
The idea that aims to exclude military establishments in times of peace has its origins in the history of England, a land from which many of the inhabitants of our country have sprung. For a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of the monarch was almost unlimited Inroads were gradually made upon the prerogative in favor of liberty – first by the barons and afterwards by the People – until the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became extinct.
English liberty was made complete with the glorious (or bloodless) revolution which elevated the Prince of Orange to the throne in 1688. Prior to that event, Charles II had kept on foot (in time of peace) a body of 5,000 regular troops, based on his own authority and incident to the undefined power of making war, which was an acknowledged prerogative of the British crown. James II increased this number to 30,000, who were paid out of his civil list. In order to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an authority, the Bill of Rights was amended after the revolution to declare “the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless with the consent of parliament, was against law.”
Thus when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch in that kingdom, no security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up based solely on the monarch’s authority alone. The British patriots who effected the memorable revolution were too temperate and well-informed to impose any restraint on legislative discretion. They were aware a certain number of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable, that no precise bounds could be set to national exigencies, and that a power equal to every possible contingency must exist somewhere in the government. By referring the exercise of that power to the judgment of their legislature (the Parliament), they had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution that could be reconciled with the safety of the community.
The Fear of a Standing Army Should Not Exist when Authorized by Congress, which Represents the People
From this history, the People of America have developed a natural disposition to view standing armies in times of peace as a danger to liberty. The circumstances of our revolution have further quickened the public sensibility on every point connected with the security of popular rights. But the warmth of this zeal was raised beyond the degree consistent with the due temperature of the body politic with the attempts of Pennsylvania and North Carolina to restrict the authority of the legislature in the article on military establishments. These States erroneously assumed that the reasons for being vigilant against misuse of this power by monarchs extended to the representatives of the People in their popular assemblies. Even in some States where this error was not expressly adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought not to be kept up, in time of peace, without the consent of the legislature. Such declarations were unnecessary because the reason for introducing a similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is inapplicable to any of the State constitutions. Under all of those State constitutions, the power of raising armies resides in the legislature. It would superfluous – if not absurd – to declare that a matter should not be done without the consent of the body which alone had the power of doing it!
No State Constitution Actually Prohibits a Standing Army
Even in the two states which seem to have meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of peace, the mode of expression is merely cautionary, not prohibitory. The constitutions of Pennsylvania and North Carolina do not say standing armies shall not be kept up, but that they ought not to be kept up, in time of peace. This ambiguity of terms appears to result from a conflict between jealousy and conviction, between the desire of excluding such establishments at all events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be unwise and unsafe.
In other State constitutions – including the celebrated constitution of New York – there is a total silence upon the subject.
Even If Standing Armies Were Disfavored on Paper, a Crisis Would Compel Their Existence
Can anyone doubt that a mere admonition against standing armies would yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of a state or nation when the People, through their representatives, demanded it? What is the use of such a provision if it ceases to operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard it?
There can be no comparison between admonitions of State constitutions and the provision in the federal Constitution restraining the appropriations of money for military purposes to the period of two years.
Article I, section 8, clause 12, of the Constitution expressly grants to Congress this power: “To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; . . . .”
The State constitutional provisions purporting to limit standing armies aim at too much, and effect nothing. The federal provision steers clear of this imprudent extreme and will have a salutary and powerful operation because it is perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the exigencies of the nation.
At least once every two years, the legislature of the United States will be obliged to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot, come to a new resolution on the point, and declare their sense of the matter by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not at liberty to vest permanent funds with the executive for the support of an army, even if they were to act so incautiously.
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As the spirit of party infects all political bodies in different degrees, there will undoubtedly arise persons in the national legislature willing enough to advocate for providing permanent military funds to the executive department, and to label contrary views criminal.
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As the spirit of party infects all political bodies in different degrees, there will undoubtedly arise persons in the national legislature willing enough to advocate for providing permanent military funds to the executive department, and to label contrary views criminal. However, the provision for limiting the support of a military force will always be a topic favored by those inclined to warn of the dangers to liberty. If they be members of the party in opposition, they will arouse and attract public attention whenever the question comes forward. Should the majority actually be disposed to exceed proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it.
State Legislatures Will Be the Voice – and If Necessary – the Arm of the People’s Discontent
And the State legislatures – being independent of parties in the national legislature – will always be vigilant, suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against encroachments from the Federal government. They will constantly be awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and if any thing improper appears, will be ready enough to sound the alarm to the People. The State legislatures will be the voice of the majority, and if necessary, the arm of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community to mature them for execution. An army so large as seriously to menace those liberties could only be formed by progressive augmentations. This would require a continued conspiracy over a period of time, not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive. Is it probable such a combination could exist at all, and then be persevered in and transmitted through all the successive variations of a representative body elected in whole or in part every two years? Can we presume that the instant a representative took a seat in Congress that individual would commence as a traitor to constituents and country? Can it be supposed that not one representative would be discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise constituents of their danger?
If such a presumption can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The People would recall all the powers they have heretofore ceded, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are counties, in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in person.
Would Every Member of Congress Become a Traitor to a Conspiracy?
Even if we assume every representative made a pledge to become a traitor to constituents and country, still the concealment of the design would be impracticable for any duration. The very circumstance of greatly augmenting the army in times of profound peace would itself announce the conspiracy.
What colorable reason could be assigned for such vast augmentations of the military force in a country situated like the United States? It is impossible the People would be long deceived. The destruction of the project – and of its progenitors – would quickly follow the discovery.
Some have suggested the executive branch could circumvent the two-year limit on appropriations because once possessed of a force large enough to awe the People into submission, the President would find resources in that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the Congress. But upon what pretense could the executive be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If the force were created as a result of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then the objection thereto would not apply because if the objection is leveled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons could seriously contend military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion.
If defense of the community should require an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, it is one of those calamities having neither prevention nor cure. No possible form of government can provide against it. It might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive with confederates or allies, should it be necessary to form an army for common defense. But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than a disunited state. And in a state of disunion (as discussed in Federalist 8), the evil of a standing army would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable.
It is not easy to conceive that dangers so formidable will assail the whole union as to demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if we take into our view the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary.
Hamiltonoriginal Federalist 26