Federalist 25: The Utility of a Federal Standing Army
A Federal Standing Army Must Be Controlled by the Federal Government, not State Governments
THE ARGUMENT THAT STANDING ARMIES ought to be provided for by State governments under Federal direction is an inversion of the primary principle of our political association. The project would be oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful to the United States.
Although the territories of Britain, Spain, and the native tribes do not border on particular States, they encircle the United States from Maine to Georgia. The danger is a common one, although in different degrees. The means of guarding against it ought to be the objects of common councils and a common treasury. Due to local situation, some States are more directly exposed, such as New York. But if New York had to provide for its own defense, it would have to sustain not only the whole weight of establishments requisite to her own immediate safety, but also the protection of her neighbors. This would be both inequitable as to New York and unsafe as to her neighbors. Various inconveniences would attend such a system. To those States required to support the necessary establishments, they would be unwilling and unable to bear the burden for a considerable in the future. Further, the security of all would be subject to the parsimony, improvidence or inability of a part. Should the resources of one State become more abundant and extensive – and its provisions proportionally enlarged – the other States quickly would take alarm at seeing the whole military force of the United States in the hands of two or three States, which likely would be among the most powerful in the country. Every lesser State would choose some counterpoise. Pretenses easily could be contrived. The growth of competing military establishments – nourished by mutual jealousy – would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper size. Being at the separate disposal of the State, they would be engines for the abridgment or demolition of the national authority.
The People Will Keep a Warier Eye on the Representatives of the Federal Government
I have already given reasons why State governments will be naturally prone to a rivalry with the United States. The foundation of the rivalry is the love of power. In any contest between the Federal government and one of the States, the citizens of that State would be most apt to unite with their local government. The ambition of a State – stimulated by its separate and independent possession of military forces – would afford too strong a temptation (and too great a facility) to make enterprises upon and ultimately subvert the constitutional authority of the United States. In those circumstances, the liberty of the People would be less safe than if the national forces were left in the hands of the Federal government. Because an army may be considered a dangerous weapon of power, it ought to be in the hands of individuals of whom the People are most jealous (distant Federal representatives), rather than in the hands of those of whom the People are least jealous (State representatives). The People are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.
The framers of our former Confederation were fully aware of the danger to the United States from the separate possession of military forces by the States. They expressly prohibited the States from having either ships or troops without the consent of Congress. A Federal government supported only by State military establishments will result in conflict between the States and the United States.
Other reasons demonstrate the impropriety of restraining the discretion of Congress with respect to standing armies, as revealed by a cross-examination of potential objections. Those opposed to standing army in times of peace never inform us how far the prohibition should extend. Does the prohibition extend to raising armies as well as keeping them up, whether the season be tranquil or not? If it be confined to keeping them up, it will be imprecise, and thus ineffectual. What shall be denominated “keeping them up,” once armies are raised? What date shall be designated to ascertain a violation? Shall it be a week, a month, a year?
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The People are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.
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Or shall we say they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned their raising continues? To admit this is to admit they might be kept up in time of peace, against threatening or impending danger. This would at once deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and introduce an extensive latitude of construction. Who shall be the judge of the continuance of the danger? That question undoubtedly must be submitted to the Federal government, where the matter would eventually be brought to the issue whether the Federal government, in order to provide against an apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise troops, and afterwards keep them on foot as long as the peace or safety of the community was in any degree of jeopardy. A discretion of such wide latitude would afford ample room for eluding the force of any paper prohibition of a standing army.
The Only Reason to Limit a Standing Army Is the Possibility Congress and President Might Combine to Usurp Power
The utility of a provision against standing armies in times of peace can be founded only on the possibility of a combination between the executive and the legislative in some scheme of usurpation. If this should happen, they easily could fabricate pretenses of approaching danger. Indian hostilities – instigated by Spain or Britain – would always be at hand. Foreign powers could themselves stage provocations to produce the desired appearances, in exchange for Federal concessions. If an army were raised in response, it easily could be applied to execute the project of usurpation.
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Some might respond the militia of the country is a natural bulwark against a standing army, and would be at all times equal to the national defense. This belief would have lost the Revolution.
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Even in Circumstances of Attempted Usurpation, a Standing Army Will Still Prove Essential
To obviate this possibility, one might argue the prohibition against a standing army ought be limited to the raising of armies in time of peace. But if this prohibition were added, the Constitution would incapacitate the nation from preparing a defense before it was actually invaded. This would be an extraordinary spectacle for the world to see. The Federal government would have to await the presence of an enemy within our territory to warrant the commencement of levies of men for the protection of the country. We would have to await receipt of an actual blow before even preparing to return it, contrary to the policies by which nations anticipate distant danger to meet gathering storm. We would thereby expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness to seize us as naked and defenseless prey, based on the fear that our leaders – created by our choice and dependent on our will – might endanger our liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation.
State Militias Are an Inadequate Substitute for a Standing Army
Some might respond the militia of the country is a natural bulwark against a standing army, and would be at all times equal to the national defense. This belief would have lost the Revolution. The facts from our own experience are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy confirm this position. During the Revolution, the valor of the American militia erected eternal monuments to their fame, but the bravest of them know the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. Like most other things, war is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, perseverance, time, and practice.
The Recent Rebellions in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts Prove the Utility of a Standing Army
All policies based on violence defeat themselves, as they are contrary to the natural course of human affairs and experience. Recent events in Pennsylvania affords an example of the truth of this remark. The bill of rights of that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Nevertheless, in a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of her counties, Pennsylvania resolved to raise a body of troops; and in all probability will keep them up as long as there is any appearance of danger to the public peace.
The conduct of Massachusetts also affords a lesson on the same subject, although on different ground. That State (without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the Articles of the Confederation required) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the spirit of revolt. The constitution of Massachusetts contained no obstacle to the measure; but the instance of its still instructs us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as well as under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in time of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is therefore improper in this respect to control the legislative discretion. It also teaches us – in its application to the United States – how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be respected, even by its own constituents. And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public necessity.
The Example of Lysander
In the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, tradition held the post of admiral could not be conferred twice on the same person. But when their Peloponnesian confederates suffered a severe defeat at sea from the Athenians, the confederates demanded that Lysander (who had before served with success in the post of admiral) command the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians agreed (not only to gratify their allies – but also to preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient institutions), yet they resorted to the flimsy subterfuge of naming Lysander vice-admiral, although he was actually vested with the real power of an admiral. This example is selected from among a multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced and illustrated by domestic examples, which is: nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated to run counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians are cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know that every breach of fundamental law – though dictated by necessity – impairs that sacred reverence rulers ought to maintain towards the constitution of their country, and sets a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
Hamiltonoriginal Federalist 25