FEDERALIST 18-20: Review of Confederacies throughout History
Federalist 18: Two Confederacies from Greece Offer Valuable Lessons to the United States
HERE I DISCUSS HISTORICAL CONFEDERACIES bearing closest resemblance to the former Confederation of the American States. I will discuss the German, Polish and Swiss confederacies in Federalist 19, and the confederacy of the United Netherlands in Federalist 20.
The Amphictyonic Council of Greece
The first instructive analogy is the confederacy of the Grecian republics of antiquity, associated under the Amphictyonic Council of Greece (“Council”). From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated Council, its members retained the character of independent and sovereign states, and had equal votes in the Council. The Council had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the common welfare of the confederacy, to declare and carry on war, to decide all controversies between the members (including imposing fines on the aggressing party and employing the whole force of the confederacy against the disobedient), and to admit new members. The Amphictyons were the guardian of religion and the immense riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, over which they had the right of jurisdiction to decide controversies between the inhabitants and those who came to consult the oracle. To further the efficacy of the federal powers, a mutual oath was sworn to defend and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.
Both in theory and writing, this apparatus of powers seemed amply sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances, though, the Council exceeded the powers enumerated in its articles of confederation. The Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times – which was one of the principal engines by which their government was maintained. The Council also had a declared authority to use coercion against refractory cities, and the members were bound by oath to exert this authority on the necessary occasions.
The experiment proved very different from the theory. The Council’s powers were administered by deputies appointed by the cities wholly in their political capacities, and exercised over them in the same capacities. This error was the same one we experienced under our former Articles of Confederation. From this error, weakness and disorder ensued, finally destroying the confederacy. The more powerful members – instead of being kept in awe of and subordinate to the Council – tyrannized successively over all the other members. Athens was the arbiter of Greece for 73 years, followed by the Lacedaemonians, who governed for 29 years. After the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of domination.
The deputies of the strongest cities awed and frequently corrupted those of the weaker cities. The members never acted in concert, even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and Macedon. Some deputies were eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissitudes, convulsions, and carnage.
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Had the Greeks been as wise as they were courageous, they would have availed themselves of the peace which followed their success against Persian arms to establish a closer union. Instead, Athens and Sparta – inflated with the victories and the glory they had acquired – first became rivals and then enemies, causing each other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes.
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After the war with the Persians (led by Xerxes) concluded, the Lacedaemonians demanded that a number of the cities be turned out of the confederacy, for their wartime unfaithfulness. The Athenians saw that such a measure would lose them more allies than the Lacedaemonians, who would thereby become masters of the Council’s public deliberations. The Athenians thus vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt. This history proves not only the inefficiency of the union, but the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful members, and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest. The smaller members – though entitled by the theory of their system to revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common center – had in fact become mere satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude.
Had the Greeks been as wise as they were courageous, they would have availed themselves of the peace which followed their success against Persian arms to establish a closer union. Instead, Athens and Sparta – inflated with the victories and the glory they had acquired – first became rivals and then enemies, causing each other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes. Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries culminated with the celebrated Peloponnesian war, which itself ended in the ruin and slavery of the Athenians, who had started it.
Philip of Macedon’s Successful Scheme to Control the Amphictyonic Council
When not at war, a weak government is ever agitated by internal dissensions. These in turn never fail to bring on fresh calamities from abroad. For example, when the Phocians ploughed up some consecrated ground belonging to the temple of Apollo, the Amphictyon Council imposed a fine on the sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians – being abetted by Athens and Sparta – refused to submit to the decree. Other cities undertook to maintain the authority of the Council and avenge the violated god. Being weaker, they invited the assistance of Philip of Macedon. Unbeknownst to the Amphictyons, Philip had instigated the controversy. He gladly seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long planned against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won over to his interests the popular leaders of several cities. By their influence and votes, he gained admission into the Council. By his arts and his arms, he made himself master of the Amphictyonic confederacy.
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When not at war, a weak government is ever agitated by internal dissensions. These in turn never fail to bring on fresh calamities from abroad.
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Such were the consequences of the principle on which this league was founded, and which opponents of our Constitution would have us follow, to a similar end. Had Greece been united by a stricter confederation – and persevered in her union – she would never have worn the chains of Macedon, and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.
The Achaean League
Another society of Grecian republics – known as the Achaean league – supplies us with valuable instruction. That union was far more intimate, and its organization much wiser than in the Amphictyonic Council. The cities comprising the league retained their municipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The cities were represented in a senate, which had the sole and exclusive right of declaring peace and war, sending and receiving ambassadors, and entering into treaties and alliances. The senate appointed a chief magistrate – or praetor, as he was called – who commanded their armies. With the advice and consent of 10 senators, the praetor administered the government while the senate was in recess, and when it was assembled, he had a great share in its deliberations. (Their constitution initially designated two praetors would administer the league, but on trial, this was reduced to one.)
The cities of the league apparently shared the same laws, customs, weights, measures, and money. When Lacedaemon was brought into the league by Philopoemen, the institutions and laws of Lycurgus of Sparta were abolished, and replaced with those of the Achaeans. Prior to its entry to the Achaean league, Lacedaemon had been a member of the Amphictyonic confederacy, which had left her in the full exercise of her government and legislation. This circumstance alone proves a very material difference in the genius of the two systems.
It is regrettable that only imperfect monuments remain of this curious political edifice. If one could ascertain its interior structure and regular operation, it would contribute much to the science of operating a federal government.
One important fact is known about the Achaean league: from its inception, through its renovation by Aratus, and prior to its dissolution by the arts of Macedon, there was infinitely more moderation and justice in the administration of its government – and less of violence and sedition in the people – than were to be found in any of the cities exercising singly all the prerogatives of sovereignty. One of our contemporaries, the French philosopher Abbé de Mably, says the popular government caused no disorders within the members of the Achaean league because it was tempered by the general authority and laws of the confederacy.
Nevertheless, faction did agitate the particular cities to a certain degree, and a due subordination and harmony did not reign in the general system, which is sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the republic.
The Achaean league arose while the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, but comprehended the less important cities only, and made little figure on the theater of Greece. After the Amphictyonic confederacy became a victim to Macedon, the policies of Philip and Alexander spared the Achaean republic. The successors to these princes, however, practiced the arts of division among the Achaeans. Each city was seduced into a separate interest, and the union dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian garrisons, while others under the tyranny of usurpers springing out of their own confusions.
Before long, though, shame and oppression awakened the Achaean love of liberty. A few cities reunited, and others followed, as opportunities were found of cutting off their tyrants. The league soon embraced almost the whole of Peloponnesus. Macedon witnessed this progress, but was hindered from stopping it by internal dissensions. All Greece caught the enthusiasm and seemed ready to unite in one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy of Sparta and Athens to the rising glory of the Achaeans threw a fatal damp on the enterprise.
The dread of Macedonian power induced the Achaean league to court the alliance of the kings of Egypt and Syria, who as successors of Alexander were rivals of the king of Macedon. This policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, whose ambition led him to make an unprovoked attack on the neighboring Achaeans. Sparta, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and Syrian princes to effect a breach of Achaean engagements with the league.
The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to Cleomenes of Sparta, or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor to the north. The Achaeans chose the aid of Macedon, which was again pleased to intermeddle in the affairs of its southern neighbors. A Macedonian army quickly appeared, and Cleomenes was vanquished, but as so often happens, the Achaeans soon realized their victorious and powerful ally intended to be their master. Philip – now on the throne of Macedon – no more than tolerated Achaean laws, and the Achaeans were soon provoked by his tyrannies, which led to fresh combinations among the Greeks. Together with Aetolians and Athenians, the Achaeans erected the standard of opposition. Notwithstanding this new support, the Achaeans found themselves unequal to the undertaking. Once more the Achaeans resorted to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was conquered, and Macedon subdued.
A new crisis to the Achaean league ensued when dissensions broke out among it members, which the Romans fostered. Inveigling their countrymen, popular leaders like Callicrates debased themselves to mere mercenary instruments of Rome. To nourish further the discord and disorder, the Romans proclaimed universal liberty throughout Greece. The Romans seduced members from the Achaean league by representing to their pride that league membership violated their sovereignty. By these arts the Achaean union – the last hope of Greece and the last hope of ancient liberty – was torn into pieces. Such imbecility and distraction were introduced that the arms of Rome found little difficulty in completing the ruin their arts had commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces and Achaia was loaded with chains, under which it still groans.
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The Romans seduced members from the Achaean league by representing to their pride that league membership violated their sovereignty. By these arts the Achaean union – the last hope of Greece and the last hope of ancient liberty – was torn into pieces.
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This important portion of history emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies to induce anarchy among its members, than to impose tyranny from the head.
Madison and Hamiltonoriginal Federalist 18