FEDERALIST 24-29: Federal Power to Create and Maintain Military Forces 

Federalist 24:  The Objections to a Standing Army Are Illusory

THE ONLY SPECIFIC OBJECTION raised with respect to the powers to be conferred upon the Federal government concerning the creation and direction of the national forces is that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace.  

The Objections to Standing Armies Are So Weak as to Betray Duplicity

The objection is brought forward in the most vague and general form, supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument, and without even the sanction of theoretical opinion.  It contradicts the practice of other free nations as well as the general sense of the American People, as they expressed in most State constitutions. The objection is premised upon a supposed necessity of restraining the legislative authority (Congress) in the article of military establishments. But the objection is rejected in all State constitutions except two, which do not even prohibit them.

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The American People – so jealous of their liberties – have declined to insert into their State constitutions the most precise and rigid precautions against standing armies.  Nonetheless, the same omission in the Federal Constitution gave birth to a torrent of apprehension and clamor.

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A stranger to our politics might reasonably assume the argument against standing armies must have a foundation based on a positive constitutional injunction against maintaining standing armies in times of peace, or that the whole power of levying troops is vested in the executive without any legislative control.  Yet the Constitution contains neither.  First, it contains no provision in favor of standing armies.  Second, the whole power of raising armies is not lodged in the executive, but instead in the Congress, a popular legislative body consisting of the representatives of the People who are elected every two years.  Further, the proposed Constitution includes an important qualification on the legislative discretion. Section 8 of Article I provides: “The Congress shall have Power . . .  [¶]  To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years . . . .”  By forbidding the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any period longer than two years, the drafters have included a precaution that will be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without evident necessity.

The vehement objections and pathetic declamation concerning standing armies are unsupported by a colorable pretext.  The American People – so jealous of their liberties – have declined to insert into their State constitutions the most precise and rigid precautions against standing armies. Nonetheless, the same omission in the Federal Constitution gave birth to a torrent of apprehension and clamor.

Only two of the several State constitutions contain an interdiction of standing armies in time of peace.  The other eleven State constitutions are silent on the subject, or have express terms admitting the right of the State legislature to authorize their existence.  

The two States purporting to interdict standing armies are Pennsylvania and North Carolina, whose constitutions provide:  “As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up.”  Upon inspection, the italicized words are more a caution than a prohibition. The constitutions of four other States – New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland – formally admit the authority of their legislatures to maintain standing armies, using this language: “Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up without the consent of the legislature.”  The italicized language is a formal admission of the authority of the legislature. New York has no bill of rights, and her constitution says not a word about the matter.  No bill of rights appear annexed to the constitutions of any other State, and their constitutions are equally silent. Further, the Articles of Confederation imposed not a single restraint on a standing army in the United States.  

In the absence of a plausible foundation for the cry raised against standing armies, the objection is simply a dubious experiment on the public credulity, dictated by a deliberate deception or an excessive zeal too intemperate to be deceptive, effected by the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to the Constitution.  The allowance of standing armies conforms to the general sense of Americans as declared in their various constitutions, and adds a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them, namely, the requirement of review every two years.

A calm and dispassionate observer might indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and lament that a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions – the adoption of the Constitution – should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination.  The conduct of its opponents has too much appears intended to mislead the People by alarming their passions, and to avoid convincing them with arguments addressed to their intellect. 

It is Foreseeable that a Military Force May Soon Be Required

Having set forth the artifice of the objections, I now review the facts concerning standing armies.  Restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in time of peace are improper. Even if restraints were imposed, they would not be observed due to the necessities of society.

Although a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, various considerations warn us against an excess of confidence or security. The improvements in the art of navigation have rendered distant nations neighbors, at least as to facility of communication.  Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe.  A future concert of views between these nations is not improbable. In France and Spain, the increasing remoteness of consanguinity of their monarchs is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between these two kingdoms.  Further, politicians have with great reason always considered ties of blood as precarious links of political connection.  These combined circumstances admonish us not to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger.

Regular Federal Troops on the Western Frontier Are Preferable to State Militias

To our north – and stretching far into our interior – are growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain.  To our south – and extending to meet the British settlements – are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. For now, it is wise to regard the native tribes on our western frontier as natural enemies – for they have the most to fear from us – and the most to hope from our enemies.  

Prior to the Revolution – and ever since the peace – there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our western frontier. These will remain indispensable, if only to guard against the ravages and depredations of the native tribes.  Our garrisons must be furnished by occasional detachments from the militia or by permanent corps in the pay of the government.  If the garrisons are furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, it would prove impracticable.  Even if it were practicable, it would prove pernicious. Members of a militia would not long submit – if at all – to being dragged from their occupations and families to perform the disagreeable duty of attending forts, especially in times of profound peace. And even if they could be prevailed upon (or compelled) to do it, would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private citizens. The increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, the loss of labor, and the disruption of the industrious pursuits of individuals would conclusively doom the scheme.  The better resource is a permanent corps in the pay of the Federal government. It will be a standing army in time of peace:  a small one, indeed, but real nonetheless.  This view of the subject shows at once the impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and prudence of the Congress. 

As the United States increases in strength, it is certain Britain and Spain would augment their military establishments in our neighborhood. Unless we are willing to be exposed – in a naked and defenseless condition – to their insults and encroachments, it will be expedient to increase our frontier garrisons in a ratio to the force by which our western settlements might be annoyed. Some of the particular posts will include the command of large districts of territory, and facilitate future expansion into the remainder. These posts also will be keys to trade with the native American nations. No one can think it wise to leave such posts in a situation at any instant to be seized by one or two formidable neighboring powers. The usual maxims of prudence and policy dictate otherwise. 

A Federal Navy Also is Required

If we are to be a commercial people – or only to secure our Atlantic side – we must have a navy as soon as possible. There must be dockyards and arsenals, with fortifications and garrisons to protect them. When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its dockyards by its fleets, the necessity of protective garrisons will be superseded. But where naval establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons will be an indispensable security against naval attacks on our arsenals and dockyards, and sometimes on the fleet itself.

Hamiltonoriginal Federalist 24