Federalist 8: War Between the States Will Lead to Devastation 

A DISUNITED UNITED STATES would be subject to all those vicissitudes of peace and war – and of friendship and enmity with each other – that are the lot of all neighboring nations who are not united under one government.   

War between the States would be more devastating than in those European countries where regular military establishments have long existed. Although malignant to liberty and economy, the disciplined armies kept on foot in continental Europe have rendered sudden conquests impracticable, ending the rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war there.  

The Deterrent Effect of Fortifications and Garrisons 

Extensive fortifications mutually obstruct invasion.  Frontier garrisons and similar impediments exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader.  In former times, an invading army could penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received. Now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops – acting on the defensive and with the aid of posts – is able to impede and frustrate the invasions of much larger forces.  European history is no longer one of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken, of battles that decide nothing, of retreats more beneficial than victories, and of much effort and little acquisition.

In a Disunited America, the People’s Jealousy of Fortifications and Garrisons Would Deter Construction, Leaving Borders Open to Predators 

If the States were disunited, the scene would be altogether reversed.  The jealousy of military establishments would postpone their construction for as long as possible. The lack of fortifications would leave the frontiers of one State open to another. Populous States would overrun their less populous neighbors with little difficulty. War between States or confederacies would be desultory and predatory, since plunder and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. Individual calamities would characterize our military exploits.

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European history is no longer one of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken, of battles that decide nothing, of retreats more beneficial than victories, and of much effort and little acquisition.

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Liberty Eventually Would Succumb to the Desire for Security 

Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct.  Even the ardent love of liberty will gave way to its dictates after a time.  The violent destruction of life and property incident to war – or the alarm attendant to a state of continual danger – compel all nations to resort to standing armies for security, even though they tend to destroy civil and political rights.  To be more safe, citizens will at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.

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War between States or confederacies would be desultory and predatory, since plunder and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. 

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Frequent war and apprehension of war require a state of constant preparation, which infallibly produces standing armies.  Standing armies certainly would exist with a dissolution of the Union.  Weaker states or confederacies would establish a regular and effective system of defense – by disciplined troops and fortifications – in order to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent neighbors. Such actions would necessarily strengthen the executive arm of the government, because war naturally tends to increase the executive power at the expense of the legislative authority.  Over time, their constitutions and governments would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy.   

Smaller states or confederacies using such expedients would soon be superior to their neighbors – even those with greater resources – since vigorous governments with disciplined armies have often triumphed over large states or states of greater natural strength that did not have these advantages.   

In response to such actions by smaller states, the pride and safety of the more important states or confederacies would not long submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. They would quickly resort to similar means to reinstate themselves. Thus in a little time we would see established in every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old World.  

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The violent destruction of life and property incident to war – or the alarm attendant to a state of continual danger – compel all nations to resort to standing armies for security, even though they tend to destroy civil and political rights.  To be more safe, citizens will at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.

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The Absence of Standing Armies in the Greek Republics Was Specific to Their Circumstances  

It may be asked, by way of objection, why did not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often distracted the ancient republics of Greece?  Several equally satisfactory answers may be given to this question.  Those republics were nations of soldiers. In the present day, the industrious habits of the American people – absorbed in the pursuits of gain and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce – are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers. Our means of revenue – so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold, silver, the arts of industry, together with the new science of finance – have produced an entire revolution in the system of war. Disciplined armies distinct from the body of the citizens are required only when hostilities are frequent.  

The Constitution Permits the Federal Government to Create a Federal Standing Army  

Standing armies are not prohibited in the Constitution, from which it may be inferred they may exist under it, although their actual composition remains uncertain.   

A Small Federal Standing Army Is Consistent with Liberty

Military establishments are quite different between a country often exposed to invasions – and therefore more apprehensive of them – and a country that is geographically secure. The rulers of a relatively secure nation have little pretext to require more than a small standing army.  Such an army rarely would be called into activity for defense of the interior, and thus the citizens of that nation would be in no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws in such a country would not be accustomed to relaxation in favor of military exigencies. The civil state would remain in full vigor, neither corrupted nor confounded with the principles or propensities of a true military state.  The natural strength of the People would overmatch the small army. Citizens would neither be habituated to look to the military power for protection, nor to submit to its oppressions.  Such a country would neither love nor fear the soldiery, but instead view them as a necessary evil, standing ready to resist a power which may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights. The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the People.

A Large Federal Standing Army Would Undermine Liberty 

In a country with a large standing army, the contrary of all this happens.  The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense.  The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen.  The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories, often the theater of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights.  By degrees the People would come to consider the soldiery as their superiors as well as their protectors.  This transition of the soldiery from servants to masters in the minds of the citizenry is neither remote nor difficult, for a People subject to a constant threat rarely mount a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military power.

The Benefits of Our Geographic Insularity 

The kingdom of Great Britain has no large standing army.  Its insular situation and a powerful marine guard against the possibility of foreign invasion, thus superseding the necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom.  A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent, until the militia could have time to rally and embody, is all that is required.  Britain’s national policy has not demanded –  nor her public opinion tolerated – a large number of troops upon domestic establishment.  This peculiar felicity of situation has contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption.  If, on the contrary, had Britain been situated on the continent – and been compelled by that situation to make her military establishments at home coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe – she, like them, would in all probability have fallen victim to the absolute power of a single individual.  It is possible the People of that island might be enslaved from other causes, but not by the prowess of a large standing army.  

If we are wise enough to preserve the United States we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation.  Europe is at a great distance from us.  Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security.  But if we should be disunited –  and the integral parts should either remain separated – or should be thrown together into two or three confederacies (which is most probable) – in a short course of time we should be in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe – our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.

Hamiltonoriginal Federalist 8