Federalist 31:  A General Federal Power of Taxation Is Required

Certain Primary Truths Are Indisputable

IN DISQUISITIONS OF EVERY KIND, certain primary truths contain internal evidence commanding the assent of the mind antecedent to all reflection. Upon these all subsequent reasonings must depend. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, such as the whole is greater than a part, things equal to the same are equal to each other, two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and all right angles are equal to one another.  

The objects of geometrical inquiry are so far removed from those pursuits which stir and animate the unruly passions of the human heart that mankind has easily adopted even those abstruse paradoxes which seem at variance with the natural conceptions the mind would entertain in the absence of knowledge. For instance, the infinite divisibility of finite matter – extending even to the minutest atom – is a point agreed among scientists though it is no more comprehensible to common sense than any of those mysteries of religion so industriously assaulted by nonbelievers. 

Of the same nature are the accepted maxims of in ethics and politics, including there can be no effect without a cause, the means ought to be proportioned to the end, every power ought to be commensurate with its object, and there should be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation.  

And besides these are other truths in the science of ethics and politics which – though not ranking in the class of axioms – are direct inferences from the first principles.  They are so obvious in themselves – and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of common sense – that they demand the assent of a sound and unbiased mind with a degree of force and conviction almost equally irresistible.

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I do not pretend the principles of moral and political knowledge generally have the same degree of certainty as in mathematics. But when applied to the conduct of individuals in particular situations, these principles have more claim to truth than we are disposed to admit. If these principles seem obscure to an individual, much more often it is the fault of the passions and prejudices of the reasoner than in the subject being studied. 

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Where these truths produce not these effects, the organs of perception must suffer from some defect or disorder, or be subject to the influence of some strong interest, passion, or prejudice. In the sciences of morals and politics, of course, humans are far less governable. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that this should be the case.  Caution and investigation are a necessary armor against error and imposition.  But intractability can be carried too far, and degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness, or disingenuity.  

I do not pretend the principles of moral and political knowledge generally have the same degree of certainty as in mathematics. But when applied to the conduct of individuals in particular situations, these principles have more claim to truth than we are disposed to admit.  If these principles seem obscure to an individual, much more often it is the fault of the passions and prejudices of the reasoner than in the subject being studied.  On too many occasions, individuals decline to give their own thoughts and knowledge fair play.  Instead, they yield these to some untoward bias, and thus entangle themselves in words and subtleties.

The Federal Government Requires a General Power of Taxation 

The natural human tendencies just described most likely explain why some oppose a general power of taxation in the Federal government. I will assume the objections are sincere, and answer first with a brief recapitulation of the need for a general Federal power of taxation. 

A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other control except a due regard to the public good and the sense of the People.

The duties of superintending the national defense and of securing the public peace against foreign or domestic violence require advance provisions for casualties and dangers.  The power of making these provisions can know no bounds other than the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community.

Revenue is the essential engine to secure these provisions.  As there is no limitation on the Federal power to respond to such national exigencies, neither can there be a limitation on the means by which revenue is secured. The power to secure such revenue is necessarily contained within the power to answer such national exigencies.  

Theory and practice conspire to prove a Federal power of procuring revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their capacities as States. Thus the Federal government must of necessity be invested with an unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes.

While I believe the propriety of a general power of taxation in the Federal government can safely rest on the evidence of these propositions alone, the antagonists of that power most zealously oppose the Constitution on this point.  Their arguments are in substance these:  although the exigencies of the United States may prove unlimited, the Federal power of laying taxes ought to be confined because revenue is as critical to State governments as it is to the Federal government, and State governments are of equal or greater importance to the happiness of the People.  State governments therefore ought to command the means of supplying their needs with no less power than the Federal government possesses with respect to the needs of the United States.  An indefinite Federal power of taxation eventually might deprive State governments of the means of providing for their own necessities, and subject them entirely to the mercy of Congress.  Since the laws of the United States are the supreme law of the land – and the Congress has the power to pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying those laws into execution – the Federal government might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects upon the pretense of an interference with its own.  Congress might allege a necessity of doing this in order to give efficacy to the national revenues, and by degrees all the resources of taxation might become the subjects of Federal monopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of State governments.

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All observations founded upon the danger of usurpation ought  to be referred to the composition and structure of the Federal government, and not to the nature or extent of its powers.

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These arguments spring from two sources, only one of which is grounded in the science of politics, to wit, the view that the structure and composition of the Federal government might gradually lead to a Federal monopoly on tax revenues.   The other objection surfaces from the depths of human passion and prejudice, and floods the minds of its adherents with supposed schemes of Federal usurpation. 

Those Who Would Limit the Federal Taxing Power Act Out of Jealousy or Timidity 

The moment we commence conjecturing about Federal usurpations, we descend into an unfathomable abyss and put ourselves out of the reach of all reason. Imagination can thus allow itself to range at will amidst the labyrinths of an enchanted castle – until the rash adventure bewilders the mind with limitless perplexities.  No matter what limits are erected against the powers of the Federal government, it is easy to imagine an endless train of possible dangers. By indulging an excess of jealousy and timidity, we may bring ourselves to a state of absolute skepticism and irresolution.  

All observations founded upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of the Federal government, and not to the nature or extent of its powers.  

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In republics, strength is always on the side of the People.

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Are not State governments invested with complete sovereignty by virtue of their own constitutions? What security counters usurpation from that quarter? Without doubt the answer is found in the manner of their formation and a due reliance upon those who are to administer them upon the People.  If the Federal Constitution affords the same species of security, all apprehensions on the score of usurpation should be discarded.

A disposition in the Federal government to encroach upon the rights of State governments is no more probable than a disposition in State governments to encroach upon the rights of the Federal government. The prevailing party is such a contest would likely have the greater means of ensuring success. In republics strength is always on the side of the People.  As State governments will commonly possess the most influence over the People, the natural outcome of such contests would benefit State governments at the expense of the Federal government.  

But all conjectures of this kind are extremely vague and fallible: the safest course by far is to lay them altogether aside, and confine our attention wholly to the nature and extent of the powers as they are delineated in the Constitution. Every thing beyond this must be left to the prudence and firmness of the People. Since the People hold the scales of justice in their own hands, we must hope they will always take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the Federal and State governments. Upon this truth, the objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the United States must collapse. 

Hamiltonoriginal Federalist 31