Federalist 9: Union Is a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

A FIRM UNION IS THE ULTIMATE BARRIER against the forces that would overwhelm the peace and liberty of the States. Those forces – domestic faction, party rage, sedition and insurrection – led to a rapid succession of revolutions in the small republics of Greece and Italy. Those same forces – aided by the vices of their governments –  continually agitated and perverted the bright talents and exalted endowments for which these republics were otherwise justifiably renowned.  It is impossible to read their histories without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the petty distractions which kept them in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.  

From the disorders of those republics, the advocates of despotism in America argue that all forms republican government – even the very principles of civil liberty – are inconsistent with the order of society. Happily for mankind, the few glorious instances of governments founded on liberty refute their gloomy sophisms.  

Modern Improvements to the Republican Form of Government Make It the Wisest Choice  

If the enlightened friends of liberty who assembled at the Constitutional Convention believed they could not devise a more perfect republican structure, they would have abandoned that species of government as indefensible.  The science of politics, however, has received great improvement in modern times, as have most other sciences.  Principles which were unknown or imperfectly known to the ancients are now well understood. Many new discoveries, or the perfection of old discoveries, include: the regular distribution of power into distinct departments, the introduction of legislative balances and checks, the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior, and the representation of the People in the legislature by deputies of their own election. To this catalogue of improvements a new one may be added: the enlargement of the geographical orbit within which such systems revolve, either in a single states, or a consolidation of several smaller states into one great confederacy.  

The utility of a confederacy is not really a new idea.  It has been practiced in different countries and ages, in order to suppress faction, guard the internal tranquility of states, and increase external forces and security.  The most esteemed writers on the subject of politics have approved its use.   

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Principles which were unknown or imperfectly known to the ancients are now well understood.  Many new discoveries, or the perfection of old discoveries, include: the regular distribution of power into distinct departments, the introduction of legislative balances and checks, the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior, and the representation of the People in the legislature by deputies of their own election.

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Critics of a Large Republic Misread Montesquieu 

The opponents of a united America have circulated the observations of the great Montesquieu to argue a republican government can succeed only in small geographical territories. Their arguments are drawn from a selective reading of the author’s works and disregard the experiences of our own republican States  –  Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, and Georgia – all of which are larger than the republics Montesquieu considered.  If the critics of the United States are correct, we should either take refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or split ourselves into an infinity of tumultuous little commonwealths which would be the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord and the miserable objects of universal pity and contempt.  

Some writers have even boldly suggested a division of even the larger States is desirable. While such a desperate expedient might multiply the petty offices for individuals who possess no qualification to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue, it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the People of America.

Montesquieu does not stand in opposition to a general union of states, as the critics of union would falsely have us believe. He explicitly treats a confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government to gain the internal advantages a republic and the external force of a monarchy.   

A republic of this kind is able to withstand an external force, and support itself without any internal corruptions. “If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority,” the author writes, “he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states.  Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.”

The United States is a confederacy of States, and not a consolidation of States, as its misguided opponents have claimed. The definition of a confederate republic is simply “an assemblage of societies,” or an association of two or more states into one state. The Constitution makes each State government a constituent part of the national sovereignty, with direct representation in the Senate.  Exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power are left in the possession of the States.  This fully corresponds with the idea of a Federal government.  The objects, extent, and modifications of the Federal authority are merely matters of discretion. Under the Constitution, the separate organizations of the member States – though subordinate to the general authority of the union – continue to exist for local purposes.

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If critics of the United States are correct, we should  either take refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or split ourselves into an infinity of tumultuous little commonwealths which would be the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord and the miserable objects of universal pity and contempt.

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In ancient Lycia, twenty-three republican cities joined in a confederacy governed by a common council. The largest cites were entitled to three votes in the council, those of the middle to two, and the smallest to one.  The cities granted to the council the power to appoint all the judges and magistrates of the respective cities, even though the power to appoint its own officers is one which would seem exclusively appropriated to local jurisdictions. Yet Montesquieu cites the Lycian confederacy as the finest republic to date. From this we can see the critics of our union have misused Montesquieu to advance no more than novel refinements of their erroneous theories.

Hamiltonoriginal Federalist 9